Mark Elliott

In this interview with the SCOTUS Blog, which launches its series on global apex courts, I reflect on the role of the UK Supreme Court & consider whether adjudication at this level in the UK is really as apolitical as we often assume it to be. scotusblog.com/2026/03/the-uk….

The Divisional Court has now issued but immediately suspended a quashing order in relation to the proscription of Palestine Action. This results in the situation addressed in my post below: a proscription order that is unlawful according to the High Court but unquashed for now.

A powerful critique of the High Court's reasoning in the policy-related limb of its judgment in the Palestine Action case.

@MWHoyle19 @philipmurraylaw If you haven't read it, you may enjoy the book chapter by Christopher Forsyth referred to in my most recent post; his approach is, in my view, persuasive, and (I think) addresses a number of the points you have raised. Thanks again for engaging and for this interesting exchange!

@MWHoyle19 @philipmurraylaw I don't dispute the possibility of remedial discretion (eg leveraging Wade's principle of relativity) or suspended quashing orders under the SCA (which we address in the article). But they need to be understood in ways that also account for the underlying conceptual position.

In a new post on the Palestine Action case, I ask whether, given the High Court's conclusion that proscription was unlawful, the Metropolitan Police is right to say that the organisation remains a proscribed one. publiclawforeveryone.com/2026/02/17/if-…

@MWHoyle19 @philipmurraylaw A fair question. Ahmed No 2 suggests (rightly in my view) that declarations are the functional equivalent of quashing orders if (as the court did) we proceed on the basis that unlawful administrative acts are void.

@ProfMarkElliott @philipmurraylaw But if this is true (and I agree that this is an explanation of post-Anisminic thinking), why do we have quashing orders at all? Why do the courts not simply make declarations of nullity?

@MWHoyle19 @philipmurraylaw I think our posts crossed. I deal with how a modern verison of the ultra vires theory can account for the dynamic nature of the grounds of judicial review in my book on the subject (link in previous response).

@ProfMarkElliott @philipmurraylaw Indeed, that is also odd in a situation where ex p Coughlan was only decided the year before the TA 2000 - did Parliament really implicitly constrain the scope of the power by reference to the HS's policy when that ground of review didn't really exist independently of legit exp.?

@MWHoyle19 @philipmurraylaw An application of the version of the UV theory I defend in my book: discretionary power is granted subject to proviso that it is exercised in accordance with the principles of administrative law. *Requirement to adhere to policy* thus constrains the power. bloomsbury.com/uk/constitutio…

@ProfMarkElliott @philipmurraylaw To me, that is a particularly odd one (in comparison to purpose) - a policy as to how you will exercise a power constrains the scope of that power?

@MWHoyle19 @philipmurraylaw Another way of putting this is to say that I don't share your premise that, here, the HS merely made a procedural error in exercising a power she had: the requirement to adhere to her own policy is one of the factors that determines the scope of the power.

@MWHoyle19 @philipmurraylaw Thank you for engaging. As you say, this relates back to your reaction to the article on validity, and to the connections we draw in it between the foundations of judicial review, the conceptual limits of administrative statutory power and implications for validity.

Is it possible to withdraw a peerage nomination? There is a precedent. nortonview.wordpress.com/2026/02/15/wit…

@jleytong Thank you

Professor Elliot’s take on the High Court decision in R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. As usual, clear and precise analysis.

@AdamWagner1 I was wondering exactly the same thing as I was writing my blogpost! Perhaps we will find out in due course...

@ProfMarkElliott I have had some similar thoughts. I kept wondering what Lord Sales would/will make of the (strict) policy/(lack of) deference points

Useful analysis and worth reading as Mark always is

The High Court has held that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action under the Terrorism Act 2000 was unlawful. This post explains the court's reasoning and discusses some potential weaknesses in it; the government has said it will appeal. publiclawforeveryone.com/2026/02/13/the…

"In Defence of Classical Administrative Law", by @philipmurraylaw and me, has now been published in the Cambridge Law Journal on FirstView. It is available via the following link (open access): doi.org/10.1017/S00081…

A reminder, following the conviction of Jimmy Lai, that two senior British lawyers—a former Law Lord and a former Supreme Court President—continue to lend respectability to the Hong Kong legal system by sitting as non-permanent judges on its highest court. theguardian.com/world/2025/dec…

New post: Correcting the record on the ‘primacy’ of the House of Commons publiclawforeveryone.com/2025/12/15/cor…

I'm grateful to the Sunday Times for publishing my letter on the constitutional role of the House of Lords, correcting the misleading impression created by an open letter signed by several former Cabinet Secretaries. thetimes.com/comment/letter…