Habataki 🇵🇸

Eid Mubarak to our Muslim friends. We wish you and your families a blessed holiday.

Hegseth: Iran is an energy rich country. instead, like so many other places, driven by a radical ideology, instead of investing in their people… they invested in missiles, and they invested in launchers and UAVS.

الكويت تعلن إغلاق وحدات في مصفاة ميناء الأحمدي عقب نشوب حريق بضربات مسيرات.

For the first time since 1967. No Eid prayer at Al-Aqsa mosque.

If Melania Trump was on social media dropping the N-word, it would be front page news for weeks and people would be calling for her execution. But since it’s Zohran Mamdani’s wife, I guess it’s different, right?

"I don't think anyone in Israel should feel sorry for those Gazans. Not for adults, not for the elderly, not for the young and not for children... As far as I'm concerned, let them starve to death" From the backlog, CH14, Feb 10, 2024: Haredi media figure Yaki Adamker with the usual genocide incitement on HaPatriotim, the government propaganda outlet's flagship talk show.

The Iranian regime executed a 19 year old for demanding democracy. I stand with his memory and the thousands of other young Iranians. Those who grieve the elimination of Iranian leaders over murdered protesters is telling.

For the first time: Mossad Chief David Barnea’s pre-war assessment reveals a joint US-Israel regime change strategy in Iran, despite internal hesitation A major revelation from Israeli investigative programme Uvda (Channel 12), reported by Sefi Ovadia on 19 March 2026, shows that before the war began, Mossad Chief David Barnea assessed in closed discussions that the fall of the Iranian regime was possible, while also warning that the timeline and outcome remained uncertain. This hesitation is critical. It shows that even at the highest level, there was no guarantee that military pressure would translate into internal collapse. At the same time, the report makes clear that this was not an Israeli-only vision. The strategy was discussed in coordination with the United States, with a defined role for both Mossad and the CIA. This confirms that the war was launched with a shared political objective, not just military goals. According to the report, if operational objectives are achieved, meaning severe damage to leadership figures, governing institutions, and the regime’s enforcement apparatus, then Mossad and the CIA would move to the next phase: pushing Iranians into the streets and facilitating an alternative leadership. This reveals a structured two-phase strategy. First, military shaping through targeted strikes to weaken the regime’s control. Second, political engineering aimed at internal collapse and regime replacement. However, the second phase is the most uncertain and potentially the longest, and early indicators suggest it is already failing to unfold as planned. Nearly twenty days into the war, there are no signs of large-scale internal uprising in Iran, which was a central assumption behind this strategy. This phase depends not on external force, but on internal reaction, and historical precedent shows that such expectations rarely materialise quickly under external attack. In cases such as Iraq War and Arab Spring, internal mobilisation either required prolonged pressure or emerged from internal dynamics rather than direct external military campaigns. If large-scale unrest does not develop, this phase is likely to shift into a prolonged effort involving sustained pressure, covert operations, and gradual attempts to destabilise the system from within. Netanyahu publicly states that it is too early to know whether Iranians will rise. Yet internally, this outcome appears to have been part of the strategic objective from the beginning. What this reveals is not just a gap between expectation and reality, but a structural flaw in the strategy itself. The entire second phase relies on a variable that external actors cannot control. Nearly twenty days in, that variable is not responding. What follows from that failure is already visible. The pattern of targeted assassinations and strikes suggests a shift from regime change through internal collapse to escalation through pressure. The reported targeting of senior political and intelligence figures, individuals who could manage escalation or open political exit channels, alongside strikes on energy infrastructure such as the South Pars gas field, points to a different logic. Remove the leadership layer capable of restraint. Hit the systems that force a response. This does not create conditions for collapse. It removes the conditions for de-escalation. Iran has already signalled that it may expand strikes to energy infrastructure across the region, and further escalation becomes more likely in the absence of actors able to contain it. When regime change fails to materialise quickly, the strategy does not end. It hardens. The war moves from a controlled plan with a political endgame into an open-ended escalation dynamic, where pressure replaces outcome and where each step makes the next one harder to reverse. It is the early architecture of a regional war, driven by escalation and a logic that risks dividing and breaking the region to impose a new order.

People of Paradise ❤️

Up to the South, Jayce Salloum and Walid Raad, 1993 (Credit: IG @/lolamaupas)