
Moritz Müller-Wirth
4.6K posts

Moritz Müller-Wirth
@muellerwirth
@DIEZEIT. @zeitonline Hier, auch, privat



Markus W. heißt der Mann, der von Gil Ofarim falsch beschuldigt wurde. Bislang hat er nie ein Interview gegeben. Gestern nun war er zu einem Treffen in Leipzig bereit. Hier spricht er über seine Vereinbarung mit Ofarim und seine Enttäuschung: zeit.de/gesellschaft/2…

Eichner im Interview: "Der ein oder andere traut mir immer noch nicht zu, dass ich auch hart sein kann" - Anfang Februar seit sechs Jahren im Amt (k+) #KSC #KarlsruherSC #twfeed" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">kicker.de/eichner-im-int…




welt.de/debatte/kommen… "Die Meinungen sind frei. Doch die Fakten sind es nicht: Russland hat die Ukraine überfallen. Putin will keinen Frieden. Es gibt kein Recht darauf, gefährlichen Unsinn zu verbreiten." Das, was @cturzer schreibt, sollte man hingegen verbreiten. Ganz weit.




My very first reaction to the published plan: while it reflects most of Putin’s demands (that until recently seemed unrealistic), it contains — from a Russian perspective — two major problems. First, the wording reveals a dismissive and inaccurate understanding of how Moscow formulates its positions. The plan takes Russian demands into account, but Russia would not articulate them in this manner, which makes it difficult to imagine, as @vfroloff noted, real involvement of Russian diplomats in drafting it. Second, although the concessions to Russia appear substantial, the plan would also require Moscow to abandon some of its earlier conditions — for example, the more radical reduction of Ukraine’s armed forces or parts of the political reform package. The wording itself may represent a problem for Moscow, as it reflects what Russia would see as unbacked promises — requiring extensive Western (NATO) commitments — and may therefore be interpreted as a “bird in the sky.” I am not suggesting that Putin would reject the plan outright, but he would almost certainly insist on scrupulous work on the formulations and on putting every commitment down on paper in detailed form. This creates a paradox: having received, in outline, much of what it wanted, Moscow now has to treat seriously something it is likely to view as fundamentally unsubstantiated and unreliable.










