Essential

853 posts

Essential

Essential

@only01Essential

Bug huntoor Rust | Move | C | Solidity

-analyzer เข้าร่วม Aralık 2022
156 กำลังติดตาม864 ผู้ติดตาม
Essential รีทวีตแล้ว
LonelySloth
LonelySloth@lonelysloth_sec·
@injective is a sad joke. How long can it survive without the **extremely underpaid** help of top white hats? **You should not submit bugs to them** unless you want to be equally mistreated. That sort of behaviour is damaging to all SRs and the entire industry, including all legitimate BBPs run by serious people who actually care about security. Let’s see: Ignored critical LOSS OF FUNDS for 3 months. Attempt to classify COSMOS bug as WEB. 😂 Claims impact is misleading but cant provide specifics of how much money could be stolen. Try to say bug not being exploited is a problem for the report 😂 The “head of engineering” @bangjelkoski is just throwing technical nonsense at the issue and pretending it sticks. Is he even technical at all? Does he know what a bug bounty is? Doesn’t sound like it. Sounds like Chat-GPT from ‘23 making excuses. How likely is it that this was the first critical Loss of Funds bug to go unnoticed? Id say 0% likelihood. **I’d say extremely likely it wasn’t the last one either.** Again 0% likelihood its the last protocol-ending level bug. But it will probably be the **last time they are helped by white hats.**
f4lc0n@al_f4lc0n

the figures referenced in the post are entirely misleading. There was no impact realized from this issue. Zero user funds were affected and zero addresses were compromised. My response: Are you suggesting I should have actually exploited the bug and caused real damage before coming to talk to you? For the stated vulnerability to work in practice, it would require execution of several suspicious transactions that would have an extraordinarily limited impact. My response: You should know better than anyone that on a Cosmos-based chain, a single transaction can pack multiple messages. Just one transaction is more than enough to completely drain multiple whale accounts. Injective has dynamic rate limiting functionalities which are applied automatically based on our live monitoring systems. This functionality has been live on mainnet since last year and is publicly available in our code base. My response: First, this has nothing to do with the vulnerability itself. Rate limiting doesn't stop attackers from stealing funds. It only slows them down when they try to bridge those funds over to Ethereum. Second, when I submitted my report, the mainnet configuration for this feature was not set. In other words, this feature wasn't even turned on! In addition to all of the above, this report was reviewed against the clearly defined terms of our Immunefi program. Based on those terms, issues such as those raised in this report that DO NOT impact block production or consensus are categorized outside of the Blockchain/DLT tier and carry a maximum payout of $50,000. My response: First, Immunefi has always put the impact of direct fund theft at the very top of its priority list. This is a fact that everyone knows. Second, you changed your bug bounty page after I submitted my report. Here’s the snapshot from November 8, 2025: web.archive.org/web/2025110816… . And now, there’s an extra line added to your bug bounty page: “IMPORTANT: Within the Assets in Scope table, the injective-core folder is listed for both Blockchain/DLT and Web/App due to overlap between the two within the same folder. However, for a report to be categorized as Blockchain/DLT, the resulting impact has to be directly involved with the block production process or with consensus failures. All reports not dealing directly with either of these are to be categorized as Web/App.” I’d really like to know when this line was added. and do you really value chain consensus more than users' funds? We remain committed to fair, transparent, and consistent handling of all reports, and to maintaining the highest standards of security for the ecosystem. Injective has done so since its mainnet inception in 2021 and will continue to do so in perpetuity, always putting builders and security first. My response: You never even replied to my messages, and now you’re blaming me for not requesting mediation? I can post the original report if you agree. I left many messages, but you haven't replied to a single one. ---------- Finally: Stop making excuses from every angle and trying to use technical jargon to confuse people who aren't developers. That doesn’t work anymore these days. Anyone can just ask an AI to fact-check what both of us are saying. I have no ill intentions toward your project. All I'm asking is for you to be honest and handle this transparently.

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Essential@only01Essential·
@sin99xx Especially if you are experienced. Spending your time wrongly could cause burn out. Imagine submitting two criticals and they are both duplicates. Avoiding what's trending helps you avoid duplicates
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Essential@only01Essential·
Bug Bounty 101: Don't hunt on what everyone else is currently looking at.
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Essential@only01Essential·
@0xKaden @bangjelkoski @injective It's in dlt scope but should be treated as a smart contract bug. Clowns 🤡 x.com/i/status/20341…
f4lc0n@al_f4lc0n

the figures referenced in the post are entirely misleading. There was no impact realized from this issue. Zero user funds were affected and zero addresses were compromised. My response: Are you suggesting I should have actually exploited the bug and caused real damage before coming to talk to you? For the stated vulnerability to work in practice, it would require execution of several suspicious transactions that would have an extraordinarily limited impact. My response: You should know better than anyone that on a Cosmos-based chain, a single transaction can pack multiple messages. Just one transaction is more than enough to completely drain multiple whale accounts. Injective has dynamic rate limiting functionalities which are applied automatically based on our live monitoring systems. This functionality has been live on mainnet since last year and is publicly available in our code base. My response: First, this has nothing to do with the vulnerability itself. Rate limiting doesn't stop attackers from stealing funds. It only slows them down when they try to bridge those funds over to Ethereum. Second, when I submitted my report, the mainnet configuration for this feature was not set. In other words, this feature wasn't even turned on! In addition to all of the above, this report was reviewed against the clearly defined terms of our Immunefi program. Based on those terms, issues such as those raised in this report that DO NOT impact block production or consensus are categorized outside of the Blockchain/DLT tier and carry a maximum payout of $50,000. My response: First, Immunefi has always put the impact of direct fund theft at the very top of its priority list. This is a fact that everyone knows. Second, you changed your bug bounty page after I submitted my report. Here’s the snapshot from November 8, 2025: web.archive.org/web/2025110816… . And now, there’s an extra line added to your bug bounty page: “IMPORTANT: Within the Assets in Scope table, the injective-core folder is listed for both Blockchain/DLT and Web/App due to overlap between the two within the same folder. However, for a report to be categorized as Blockchain/DLT, the resulting impact has to be directly involved with the block production process or with consensus failures. All reports not dealing directly with either of these are to be categorized as Web/App.” I’d really like to know when this line was added. and do you really value chain consensus more than users' funds? We remain committed to fair, transparent, and consistent handling of all reports, and to maintaining the highest standards of security for the ecosystem. Injective has done so since its mainnet inception in 2021 and will continue to do so in perpetuity, always putting builders and security first. My response: You never even replied to my messages, and now you’re blaming me for not requesting mediation? I can post the original report if you agree. I left many messages, but you haven't replied to a single one. ---------- Finally: Stop making excuses from every angle and trying to use technical jargon to confuse people who aren't developers. That doesn’t work anymore these days. Anyone can just ask an AI to fact-check what both of us are saying. I have no ill intentions toward your project. All I'm asking is for you to be honest and handle this transparently.

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kaden.eth
kaden.eth@0xKaden·
>In addition to all of the above, this report was reviewed against the clearly defined terms of our Immunefi program. Based on those terms, issues such as those raised in this report that DO NOT impact block production or consensus are categorized outside of the Blockchain/DLT tier and carry a maximum payout of $50,000. can you clarify further? is it technically not categorized as a blockchain/dlt exploit due to this one term? or is it unequivocally not a dlt exploit?
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Bojan Angjelkoski
Bojan Angjelkoski@bangjelkoski·
Security is paramount at @injective and we take our bug bounty program very seriously. First and foremost, the figures referenced in the post are entirely misleading. There was no impact realized from this issue. Zero user funds were affected and zero addresses were compromised. For the stated vulnerability to work in practice, it would require execution of several suspicious transactions that would have an extraordinarily limited impact. Injective has dynamic rate limiting functionalities which are applied automatically based on our live monitoring systems. This functionality has been live on mainnet since last year and is publicly available in our code base. In addition to all of the above, this report was reviewed against the clearly defined terms of our Immunefi program. Based on those terms, issues such as those raised in this report that DO NOT impact block production or consensus are categorized outside of the Blockchain/DLT tier and carry a maximum payout of $50,000. If the poster had requested a mediation we would explain to him the dynamic rate limiters and monitoring systems we have in place and why his stated figures are misleading. However, he did not do so. We always follow the procedures set forth by the Immunefi program and expect the submitter to do so as well. We remain committed to fair, transparent, and consistent handling of all reports, and to maintaining the highest standards of security for the ecosystem. Injective has done so since its mainnet inception in 2021 and will continue to do so in perpetuity, always putting builders and security first.
f4lc0n@al_f4lc0n

I Saved Injective's $500M. They Pay Me $50K. I like hunting bugs on @immunefi . I'm decent at it. - #1 — Attackathon | Stacks - #2 — Attackathon | Stacks II - #1 — Attackathon | XRPL Lending Protocol - 1 Critical and 1 High from bug bounties (not counting this one) Life was good. Then I found a Critical vulnerability in @injective . This vulnerability allowed any user to directly drain any account on the chain. No special permissions needed. Over $500M in on-chain assets were at risk. I reported it through Immunefi. The next day, a mainnet upgrade to fix the bug went to governance vote. The Injective team clearly understood the severity. Then — silence. For 3 months. No follow up. No technical discussion. Nothing. A few days ago, they notified me of their decision: $50K. The maximum payout for a Critical vulnerability in their bug bounty program is $500K. I disputed it. Silence again. No explanation for the reduced payout. No explanation for the 3 month ghost. No conversation at all. To be clear: the $50K has not been paid either. I've seen others share bad experiences with bug bounty payouts recently. I never thought it would happen to me. I can't force them to do the right thing. But I won't let this be forgotten. I will dedicate 10% of all my future bug bounty earnings to making sure this story stays visible — until Injective pays what I deserve. Full Technical Report: github.com/injective-wall…

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Essential
Essential@only01Essential·
@al_f4lc0n Damn, quickly changing the program rules so they can make a stupid point. This guys are criminals in suits
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f4lc0n
f4lc0n@al_f4lc0n·
the figures referenced in the post are entirely misleading. There was no impact realized from this issue. Zero user funds were affected and zero addresses were compromised. My response: Are you suggesting I should have actually exploited the bug and caused real damage before coming to talk to you? For the stated vulnerability to work in practice, it would require execution of several suspicious transactions that would have an extraordinarily limited impact. My response: You should know better than anyone that on a Cosmos-based chain, a single transaction can pack multiple messages. Just one transaction is more than enough to completely drain multiple whale accounts. Injective has dynamic rate limiting functionalities which are applied automatically based on our live monitoring systems. This functionality has been live on mainnet since last year and is publicly available in our code base. My response: First, this has nothing to do with the vulnerability itself. Rate limiting doesn't stop attackers from stealing funds. It only slows them down when they try to bridge those funds over to Ethereum. Second, when I submitted my report, the mainnet configuration for this feature was not set. In other words, this feature wasn't even turned on! In addition to all of the above, this report was reviewed against the clearly defined terms of our Immunefi program. Based on those terms, issues such as those raised in this report that DO NOT impact block production or consensus are categorized outside of the Blockchain/DLT tier and carry a maximum payout of $50,000. My response: First, Immunefi has always put the impact of direct fund theft at the very top of its priority list. This is a fact that everyone knows. Second, you changed your bug bounty page after I submitted my report. Here’s the snapshot from November 8, 2025: web.archive.org/web/2025110816… . And now, there’s an extra line added to your bug bounty page: “IMPORTANT: Within the Assets in Scope table, the injective-core folder is listed for both Blockchain/DLT and Web/App due to overlap between the two within the same folder. However, for a report to be categorized as Blockchain/DLT, the resulting impact has to be directly involved with the block production process or with consensus failures. All reports not dealing directly with either of these are to be categorized as Web/App.” I’d really like to know when this line was added. and do you really value chain consensus more than users' funds? We remain committed to fair, transparent, and consistent handling of all reports, and to maintaining the highest standards of security for the ecosystem. Injective has done so since its mainnet inception in 2021 and will continue to do so in perpetuity, always putting builders and security first. My response: You never even replied to my messages, and now you’re blaming me for not requesting mediation? I can post the original report if you agree. I left many messages, but you haven't replied to a single one. ---------- Finally: Stop making excuses from every angle and trying to use technical jargon to confuse people who aren't developers. That doesn’t work anymore these days. Anyone can just ask an AI to fact-check what both of us are saying. I have no ill intentions toward your project. All I'm asking is for you to be honest and handle this transparently.
Bojan Angjelkoski@bangjelkoski

Security is paramount at @injective and we take our bug bounty program very seriously. First and foremost, the figures referenced in the post are entirely misleading. There was no impact realized from this issue. Zero user funds were affected and zero addresses were compromised. For the stated vulnerability to work in practice, it would require execution of several suspicious transactions that would have an extraordinarily limited impact. Injective has dynamic rate limiting functionalities which are applied automatically based on our live monitoring systems. This functionality has been live on mainnet since last year and is publicly available in our code base. In addition to all of the above, this report was reviewed against the clearly defined terms of our Immunefi program. Based on those terms, issues such as those raised in this report that DO NOT impact block production or consensus are categorized outside of the Blockchain/DLT tier and carry a maximum payout of $50,000. If the poster had requested a mediation we would explain to him the dynamic rate limiters and monitoring systems we have in place and why his stated figures are misleading. However, he did not do so. We always follow the procedures set forth by the Immunefi program and expect the submitter to do so as well. We remain committed to fair, transparent, and consistent handling of all reports, and to maintaining the highest standards of security for the ecosystem. Injective has done so since its mainnet inception in 2021 and will continue to do so in perpetuity, always putting builders and security first.

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Essential@only01Essential·
And how do you explain the ghosting? So you won't respond to him until he requests mediation that could sometimes take more than five months? Immunefi allows negotiation of bounty amount between whitehat and the project, even outside immunefi program. So, you can't be making this excuses about him following the procedures when you yourself didn't even follow the SLA you agreed to
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Essential@only01Essential·
If the protocol have a bug bounty program, then the bounty amount are clearly stated there. So, how much a researcher will be paid is tied to the severity of the bug and its impact. For a bug like this with such a huge impact, the max bounty should be offered. Even if $50m was at risk, 500k should have been offered as a bounty. For injective they advertise paying upto 500k for critical severity bugs
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Mrjimmy
Mrjimmy@Sabrout0x00·
@only01Essential @injective If i may ask i saw lately someone got ato in facebook and only paid around 250k$ how this ? I mean how they consider the payment for bugs like critical-high even if someone will do illegally will offer at least 10* payment of the bug!
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Essential@only01Essential·
Very sad. @injective do the right thing now. If he had drained, you would have offered him more than 5m, 500k max critical is nothing compared to that, so please pay fairly
f4lc0n@al_f4lc0n

I Saved Injective's $500M. They Pay Me $50K. I like hunting bugs on @immunefi . I'm decent at it. - #1 — Attackathon | Stacks - #2 — Attackathon | Stacks II - #1 — Attackathon | XRPL Lending Protocol - 1 Critical and 1 High from bug bounties (not counting this one) Life was good. Then I found a Critical vulnerability in @injective . This vulnerability allowed any user to directly drain any account on the chain. No special permissions needed. Over $500M in on-chain assets were at risk. I reported it through Immunefi. The next day, a mainnet upgrade to fix the bug went to governance vote. The Injective team clearly understood the severity. Then — silence. For 3 months. No follow up. No technical discussion. Nothing. A few days ago, they notified me of their decision: $50K. The maximum payout for a Critical vulnerability in their bug bounty program is $500K. I disputed it. Silence again. No explanation for the reduced payout. No explanation for the 3 month ghost. No conversation at all. To be clear: the $50K has not been paid either. I've seen others share bad experiences with bug bounty payouts recently. I never thought it would happen to me. I can't force them to do the right thing. But I won't let this be forgotten. I will dedicate 10% of all my future bug bounty earnings to making sure this story stays visible — until Injective pays what I deserve. Full Technical Report: github.com/injective-wall…

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Essential@only01Essential·
The next waive of hacks will probably be done by researchers you know
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Essential@only01Essential·
Someday I will also share my experience with @hydration_net Those guys are monsters trust me. They'll receive your reports fix them then tell you it's out of scope or not in scope, if it's valid They'll tell you the pallet is about to be removed from runtime, yet it's in scope in their program. This guys also fish bugs from their sister program basilisk, every bug you submit there will automatically be out of scope for real, yet their program is still live. Found a crit there they told me it's a duplicate yet they never fixed it, even till now, to bait researchers. I don't think i have ever seen a team treat me more badly than them. They were cold and ruthless 💀 You could ask four questions for weeks they will ignore all of them then respond to something else. Their paid Bounties baited me.
Essential@only01Essential

Meanwhile @aelfblockchain have gone on another radio silence 🔕 It's tiring fr, in this space you can't find even a fund loss bug and be confident of being paid. The least you owe a researcher acting in good faith by reporting a security vulnerability is sufficient closure. Imagine reporting bugs since December last year and still begging and tagging the project to respond to you 🙃

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Essential@only01Essential·
@Yaamwastaken @injective Yeah, but based on their bug bounty program, paying the max critical of 500k, should even be considered cheap
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Essential@only01Essential·
@injective Oga, go and pay that whitehat 🚶‍♂️
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Injective 🥷
Injective 🥷@injective·
This past week Injective went all in on AI. A full developer toolkit and a mainnet upgrade to power it. The chain also had its largest Community BuyBack yet. Below are some of the top developments that happened on Injective from the past week 👇️ 🟪 The new Injective Mainnet Upgrade is officially live, delivering speed and performance improvements across the network: x.com/injective/stat… 🟪 Injective's AI toolkit is here. Skills, MCP servers & AI agents that can trade, deploy contracts, and query data through natural language: x.com/injective/stat… 🟪 The March $INJ Community BuyBack is live. Over 61,000 $INJ ready to be removed from circulation forever while rewarding loyal ninjas: x.com/injective/stat… 🟪 Injective Summit attracts only the best, see the past company's that have participated: x.com/injective/stat… 👥 Ecosystem News 🟪 @CointelegraphAc's latest accelerator cohort is building on Injective, with @Kustodia_mx, @SvimFinance, @SuperApp_io, @azmth_ai, and @FalqExchange moving through the program: x.com/CointelegraphA… 🟪 @code4rena's Injective audit competition ends March 17. Still time to submit findings: x.com/code4rena/stat… 🟪 $USOIL is trading 24/7 on @HelixMarkets. Powered by Injective: x.com/injective/stat… The AI stack is live. The tools are open. Now build ninjas.
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Mint
Mint@MintPurpose·
@only01Essential @aelfblockchain Sometimes, some protocols deserves what they get just that at the end of everything, they're not the ones that will be burnt, oftentimes innocent users are the ones that got burnt
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Essential@only01Essential·
Meanwhile @aelfblockchain have gone on another radio silence 🔕 It's tiring fr, in this space you can't find even a fund loss bug and be confident of being paid. The least you owe a researcher acting in good faith by reporting a security vulnerability is sufficient closure. Imagine reporting bugs since December last year and still begging and tagging the project to respond to you 🙃
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Essential@only01Essential·
Saw it. He could have been atleast $50m rich if he was greyhat. Said it before, it seems we need to normalise greyhat, steal then negotiate seems faster, and less stressful lately. Posting and tagging them like this doesn't really hurt them, they could even choose to ignore and nothing will happen. Steal then negotiate a percentage should start being a norm even in programs with a bug bounty program
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