The Bazaar of War

The Indian Ocean has rarely been a major theater of war. Naval power primarily served colonial commercial interests or as a minor auxiliary to land operations—rarely was sea control a strategic end in itself. With one major exception: Anglo-French competition of 1744-83. 🧵

The IDF has now struck seven bridges over the Litani river. Documenting them in this thread. @GeoConfirmed

Lest we forget amidst the torrent of Iran news, 23 years ago US-led forces were beginning their drive on Baghdad. So much has changed since then, it seems like a completely different era of warfare. For precisely that reason, it's worth looking back and considering how it would be fought with today's weapons - counterfactuals help us see how deeply technology alters planning assumptions. Below is my modest attempt to do so in a few thousand words. This is not a complete reimagining of the entire scheme of maneuver, but rather a look at several tactical scenarios: dispatch.bazaarofwar.com/p/oif-redux-im…

@Kevin_Gg94 A declared blockade means no one's buying that oil in the first place.

@bazaarofwar the oil is still completely Iranian owned when it’s on Kharg, not all the tankers carrying it are and their crews certainly aren’t. Don’t think Trump wants to piss of SEA more than he already has

Has anyone spelled out why exactly capturing Kharg Island would even be necessary to cut off Iranian oil? Is the assumption that tankers could remain within range of their AShMs until entering Pakistani and Indian territorial waters?

@dyingempires I just don't see what value it has as a negotiating chip that a blockade doesn't.

@bazaarofwar I'm assuming the only real justification is occupying it to use it as a negotiating chip. Not a good idea, but makes more sense than doing so to cut off oil exports.

@Kevin_Gg94 Not sure it would be easier to take if AShMs are a concern, and I don't see what leverage Kharg gives that a total blockade doesn't.

@bazaarofwar obv traditional interdiction/SBSS would be easier than taking Kharg if stopping oil was the goal. Need IRGCN to stop (threatening) activity in the straight so I see this more as an attempt to gain leverage. Sadly US could take Kharg easier than running sustained MCM in SoH

@Kevin_Gg94 Doesn't answer the question.

@bazaarofwar 90% of their exports move through the terminal there

@postpostpostr Export terminals, not refineries.

@bazaarofwar Doesn't it have a bunch of their refining capacity? That's what I heard

Crossing the civ-mil divide is one of the hardest parts of strategy. But even when dealing the strictly military aspects, it spans a wide gamut. 🧵

@TheIntelFrog @1kenthomas2 @FreeUkraine91 @grok That's 2 bns(+), you're out of your fucking mind.

@1kenthomas2 @FreeUkraine91 @grok There are currently 2 MEUs en route, with 5,000 Marines. That size of a force could easily secure shoreline along the SoH.

The most likely force to conduct an operation to take Kharg Island would be the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). To get to Kharg, the ships carrying the MEU would have to first pass through the Strait of Hormuz. If the plan is to take Kharg, they'll likely have to secure the SoH first, a task that could potentially be accomplished with both MEUs once they arrive.

/AIR ASSAULT/

We define strategy in terms of its objective (to win wars), but unlike tactics and operational art, the nuts and bolts encompass a vast territory - making it much, much harder than other levels of war. Read the full piece here: dispatch.bazaarofwar.com/p/strategic-wi…

And this is not even to mention the non-military aspects that are an integral part of wartime strategy: x.com/bazaarofwar/st…