BJW

Russian propagandist Dugin openly says that Russia needs a mobilization and that Putin must make the decision to go through with it. A new large-scale mobilization campaign in Russia in the fall of 2026 has not yet been announced. However, the likelihood that mobilization will be announced in late September or October is very high. It is clear that the Russian authorities will not announce this in advance so as not to trigger a mass exodus and a decline in loyalty on the eve of the parliamentary elections. If the campaign is being prepared, it will logically be concealed until the administrative system is ready and opportunities to leave the country are as limited as possible. Therefore, it's necessary to see whether Russia's individual actions are coming together into a unified mobilization configuration. ◾️ First, independent Russian media outlets with sources in regional administrations and the military recruitment system report that a new mobilization is being discussed at various levels of government. October (after the State Duma elections) is cited as a possible date. ◾️ Second, Russia is facing an increasingly severe shortage of manpower. Regions are increasing payments to contract soldiers and expanding recruitment among debtors, prisoners, the unemployed, foreigners, and socially vulnerable groups. At the same time, recruitment numbers are declining, while the need for monthly replenishment is estimated at tens of thousands of people. This means that the voluntary-monetary model is approaching its limits. ◾️ Third, military enlistment offices are not just updating their databases. Since the beginning of 2026, reports have been coming in from various regions that mobilization orders are being affixed to military ID cards during summonses, ostensibly for "data update." Such an order predetermines where a person must report on their own once mobilization measures are in effect. ◾️ Fourth, the state has established an e-infrastructure that it did not have in September 2022. A summons is considered served once it is entered into the registry, and a travel ban can take effect as soon as it is uploaded, regardless of whether the citizen has seen it. If a person fails to appear, the system allows for additional restrictions to be imposed. This means that the Kremlin no longer needs to publicly announce a general border closure: it is sufficient to simultaneously enter the required number of people into the registry and forward the data to the border service. ◾️ Fifth, one of the potential ways for circumventing Russian control has already been closed. Belarus has confirmed that Russians prohibited from leaving Russia due to a military summons will not be able to leave Belarusian territory either. Thus, the restriction effectively applies to both countries. ◾️ Sixth, the tightening of border control, consultations with neighboring countries on closing borders to Russians, changes to transport links, and growing interest among Russians in leaving Russia coincide with the worsening of military conscription. ◾️ Seventh, the calendar follows a political logic. Before the election, it is not in the government's interest to stir up widespread anxiety. After the vote, the political cost drops sharply. That is why September may be the final month of administrative preparations, and October - a convenient time for mobilization. The available indicators are sufficient to assess that the risk of a new mobilization this fall is high. It may not be called a mobilization. It could take the form of mass "data update," reservist assemblies, mobilization orders, forced enlistment, regional quotas, or phased travel restrictions. For someone who will ultimately be sent to war, the legal name of the mechanism will not matter. What should those who do not want to participate in the war do: 🔹 Don't wait for an official mobilization announcement. Once a draft notice is entered into the electronic registry, the travel ban may take effect automatically. The moment when mobilization is publicly acknowledged may come only after opportunities to leave the country have effectively been closed off. 🔹 Leave in advance and only via legal routes. Belarus should not be viewed as a way to circumvent Russian restrictions, as the Belarusian border system may enforce Russia's travel bans. 🔹 Don't consider Europe as the primary relocation destination. Russian citizens will face visa restrictions there, stricter checks on the source of funds, banks' refusal to open or maintain accounts, difficulties with money transfers from Russia, and restrictions on transactions with Russian banks, payment and cryptocurrency services. 🔹 Use Central Asia primarily as a quick transit zone. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, or Uzbekistan may be options for an initial departure, temporary stay, and planning the next route. At the same time, these countries should not be considered guaranteed safe havens for deserters, anti-war activists, or people wanted by Russia, due to the cooperation between local law enforcement agencies and Moscow. After the initial departure, potential relocation destinations may include: ▪️ countries in Latin America, specifically Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Mexico, or countries in Central America; ▪️ countries in South and Southeast Asia; ▪️ Türkiye as a temporary transport and relocation hub; ▪️ certain countries in the Middle East, Africa, or the Caribbean; ▪️ other countries where legal entry, long-term stay, study, work, or a residence permit are available. A practical strategy should consist of two stages: first, a quick, legal departure through an accessible country in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Türkiye, or another open route; then, travel to a country in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, or another region where long-term legalization is possible. Waiting for full documentary confirmation of mobilization in this situation means risking that the decision will be confirmed only after it will no longer be possible to cross the border.