@oderKinvest @StockMKTNewz will 1970s be back again? that was long 🐻 …
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Harry
166 posts
@StockMKTNewz Same energy as every other “this time it’s different” moment that ended up being a buying opportunity
The market always recovers and better be invested
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我一个挺好的朋友，几乎和我同时来日本，他在国内生意做得挺成功，来日本投资了不少房产，还开了家餐厅，生意也非常好。他一直很喜欢日本，也计划入籍。从去年开始，就开始风传归化标准要改成十年，他于是在去年十月提交了入籍申请。他的履历很漂亮，从没有拖欠过税款，没有违章记录，日语过了N2，在日本很早就买了房子居住，还有多套房子投资。
就在上个月，他和法务省第一次面谈，对方收下了他全部的资料。
就在昨天，3月27日，日本归化新政策正式出台，并从4月一号开始实施。中间只隔了两个工作日，归化年限从五年改为十年。最可怕的还不是这条，而是它规定，截止到4月1号没有被批准的归化申请，将一律按照新规重新审核。即便你的申请已经递交，审核已经在继续。
日本的归化申请审核时间很长，一般要一年半以上，也就是说，在2024年底申请的归化群体，都将成为新政策的执行对象。
法律不溯及既往？好像在日本没这个规定。也没见到那些被选上去的国会议员有人提出异议。在我看来，这是足以动摇国本的规定。
我不知道我的这位朋友心情如何，我还没有给他打电话。
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@TrumpDailyPosts Easy: ignore Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and ships can pass through the strait as usual. If the Iranian IRGC attacks any ship and causes damage, Iran will seize twice the amount of its assets as compensation. In other words, Iran will provide insurance compensation.
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ZXX
伊朗国家电视台，今天采访了伊朗总统。伊朗总统坐在被抽干的泳池里，在包括小哈梅内伊等三位伊朗最高领袖遗像的鼓励下，发表了对伊朗人民的讲话。
他激励伊朗人人民要勇敢的抵抗美帝国主义，相信伊朗一定会打败美国。
KUNLUN昆侖@Kunluntalk
日本首相高市早苗，对美国是有真感情的，今天，她在阿灵顿国家公墓无名烈士墓敬献花圈。 高市早苗是一位真正的在促进美日关系的卓越领导人。
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@dayangelcp 在民选国家，主权确实是主权是有合法性的。而在专制国家很多所谓政府就是黑帮没有合法性，所以说人权在很多地方是大于所谓主权的。
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很多朋友在用盈透投资美股的时候，经常遇到一个问题，买卖美股时，自动换汇 vs手动换汇，哪个更划算？
之前我没有过多关注过这个问题，只听很多人说自动换汇更划算。
今天问了 Claude，算是把这个问题彻底搞懂了。
盈透手动换汇每笔最低收费 2 美元，而自动换汇没有最低收费，但有 0.03% 的汇率差损失。
所以这就是一个算术问题，临界点是 6667 美元。
换汇金额低于这个值时，自动换汇更划算，反之则是手动换汇。
我又让 ChatGPT 核查了一遍，确实是正确的。
以后这种查文档找答案的问题，你直接交给 Claude 就行，绝对比你在推特/抖音/小红书上道听途说强得多。
这也是为什么我建议，每个人每个月都应该拿出 20 美元，去订阅目前最先进的 AI 大模型，解放生产力不是一丁半点儿。
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We've uploaded a fruit fly. We took the @FlyWireNews connectome of the fruit fly brain, applied a simple neuron model (@Philip_Shiu Nature 2024) and used it to control a MuJoCo physics-simulated body, closing the loop from neural activation to action.
A few things I want to say about what this means and where we're going at @eonsys. 🧵
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今年买美股，100%会挣钱！
最近，不少读者私信我，表达了对市场波动的焦虑。
确实，每逢中期选举年，美股似乎总会经历一场“中年危机”，上蹿下跳的行情让很多投资者乱了阵脚。而在2026年，同时进行的多场战争，也让市场的波动雪上加霜。
然而，如果你能跳出短期的杂音，去审视过去 70 多年的历史长周期，你会发现：这种波动不仅是有规律可循的，甚至可能是市场送给理性投资者的“大礼包”。
一、中期选举年的惊人规律
在投资界，我们常说“风险是未知的确定性”。对于华尔街和投资者而言，最讨厌的不是坏消息，而是“不确定性”。
在中期选举日之前，市场往往处于一种迷茫状态：税收政策会变吗？监管环境会收紧吗？国会到底谁说了算？这种情绪反映在盘面上，就是剧烈的震荡。
事实上， 自 1950 年以来，中期选举年的平均盘中最大回撤高达 16% 到 18%。
其背后的逻辑非常简单。这种波动本质上是市场在为“不确定性”支付代价。资金在看不清方向时，往往会选择观望甚至撤离。
但是，一旦我们把目光移向选举日之后，数据呈现出的规律简直可以用“惊人”来形容。
根据 Capital Group 等多家投行的复盘，从 1950 年到 2022 年的 19 次中期选举中，标普 500 指数在选举日后的一年内，胜率是不可思议的 100%！而在非中期选举年，指数获得增收益的几率为70%。
另外，中期选举后一年里，标普500指数的平均涨幅高达约18%，也远超非中期选举年的约8%！
这意味着，在过去 70 多年里，无论你是选了共和党还是民主党，只要你在选举日当天买入标普 500 并持有，一年后稳赚不赔，且平均收益是普通年份的两倍多。
二、为什么这个规律如此稳健？
你也许会好奇，为什么会有这样的如此可靠的规律？
作为投资者，我们不能只看数据，更要理解数据背后的驱动力。我认为主要有几点。
-- 政治僵局是市场的利好： 当白宫和国会分属不同政党（形成僵局）时，政府很难出台可能剧烈改变商业环境的激进法案。对于企业来说，这种“稳定”就是最好的营商环境。
-- 总统周期的“第三年效应”： 中期选举后的第一年，通常是总统任期的第三年。为了后续的大选，现任政府往往会在这段时间释放政策红利或经济刺激方案，美股也因此受益。
-- 不确定性的消除： 尘埃落定后，无论结果如何，市场不再需要“猜谜”。资金重新入场布局，这种确定性本身就是上涨的动力。
三、我的理财建议
面对这样的历史规律，我们该如何操作？
首先，不要试图精准抄底。 所谓的“选举日买入”，并不意味着你要盯着某一个交易日的收盘价。通常整个第四季度都是较好的布局点。
其次，尊重历史，但不迷信历史。 2026 年我们可能面临不同的宏观环境，比如持续的通胀压力或地缘政治风险。历史不会简单重复，但往往会押韵。
最后，保持长期主义的耐心。 很多时候，投资的收益并不是靠频繁交易得来的，而是靠在市场恐慌时，基于常识和数据，安稳地坐在牌桌上，坚持我们的投资纪律，继续定投指数基金。
我相信，只要你继续坚持定投并长期持有指数基金，你最终必然会取得优异的投资回报。
我本人还是坚持每个月定投的习惯，不会刻意等到第四季度才加仓。
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@mehdiy_fa @catlady_wocat He probably means USA bombing is for USA interest only.
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The quoted account is run by an adviser to Qalibaf who is in charge of the war in Iran. It appears the Iranian government is threatening to escalate the conflict by attacking oil facilities in the region.
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@MarioNawfal It's useless. After Israel (and the USA) invented the "decapitation strike" model, where leaders are sent first, dictators in authoritarian countries will have to think twice before starting a war. From now on, wars will be battles between leaders, not sacrifices of people.
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🇰🇵 With the world glued to the Middle East, Kim Jong Un apparently got FOMO, so he fired cruise missiles off his new 5,000-ton destroyer just to remind everyone he still exists.
Because nothing says “don’t forget about me” like a strategic weapons demo.
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🔥🎇Next Tuesday night is Chaharshanbe Suri, Iran's annual fire festival. Large crowds come out and the fire crackers are intense. This could be a major test of whether people would reclaim the streets again and potentially an opportunity.
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@michaelxpettis So the current government of the PRC is a barrier to healthy growth and must at some point be replaced with the triple and indivisible liberties of free markets, freedom of expression, and free elections.
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The Economist argues here that China should set a higher GDP growth target because the current target (4.5-5.0%) is too low and will make the economy’s current problems, including surging debt, worse. “The proof,” it says, “lies in China’s prices. They have been falling, by some measures, for three years. This persistent deflation is a worry in itself—it increases the burden of debt, limits the room for monetary easing and mutes price signals, given the reluctance even in China to cut wages in money terms. It is also a sign of a deeper problem. It suggests that output is falling short of what the country could produce if its capital and labour were more fully employed.”
But this is the wrong way to look at the Chinese economy. Chinese deflationary pressures are not an unexpected aberration but rather a consequence of its current growth model.
Falling prices suggest not that there is a shortfall in output but rather that output is growing faster than what domestic – and, increasingly, foreign – demand can absorb. In a system in which excessively high GDP growth targets are met mainly by increasing investment in infrastructure and manufacturing (and, not too long ago, in the property sector), it seems a little perverse to argue that boosting output in a system already suffering from excess capacity in property, infrastructure and manufacturing will cause prices to rise.
If anything, increasing investment in an already investment-heavy economy will tend to worsen the very imbalances that have produced falling prices in the first place. When production capacity expands more rapidly than the purchasing power of households and businesses, prices must adjust downward to clear inventory that banks are increasingly reluctant to finance. In China’s case, the imbalance is reinforced by the structure of the economy, which systematically channels resources toward investment and production rather than toward household income and consumption.
The article also argues that a higher GDP growth target will make it easier to manage the country’s debt burden. But this assumes that there is no connection between GDP growth and the debt burden.
In fact, the opposite is true. The overwhelming majority of lending in the Chinese financial system is used to fund investment, with a very small share going to fund consumption. If investment were healthy, it should be impossible in such a financial system for the debt-to-GDP ratio to rise – except occasionally in the very short term – because the investment itself would generate faster increases in economic value than in debt-servicing costs.
But over the past fifteen years China has suffered from among the fastest increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio in history. This is strong evidence that a rising share of debt is funding non-productive manufacturing capacity, infrastructure and property. More generally, there is a pretty strong correlation between the investment contribution to Chinese growth and the rise in the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio.
To put it another way, China can only set GDP growth targets much above a sustainable GDP growth level – perhaps around 2–3 percent – by accelerating credit creation. In that case, a higher GDP growth target would require even faster growth in debt, and would raise the debt burden further rather than reduce it.
The article does hedge against the likelihood of increasing non-productive investment by arguing that a higher GDP growth target could be achieved by directing resources to households to boost consumption. While this sounds attractive on paper, and while China has spoken for nearly a decade about the need to rebalance with an acceleration in consumption growth, there is a reason why this has proved so difficult. There is also a reason why no country in China’s position has ever managed to rebalance without a slowdown – or even a contraction – in growth.
In rapidly growing economies where high investment is powered by even higher savings, low consumption is not an accident or an oversight. It is fundamental to the way the economy is structured. Businesses and governments receive a disproportionately large share of GDP, while households receive a disproportionately small share. These imbalances are embedded in the mechanisms that drive growth.
If China is to boost the consumption share of GDP, it would require reversing the transfers implicit in the national distribution of income. This could be done by raising wages, raising interest rates, increasing the value of the currency, raising current social-safety-net payments (future promises will not affect current consumption except after many years of credibility building), and/or increasing other forms of household income. In each case, however, the policies that increase household income simultaneously reduce the resources available to subsidize investment and manufacturing.
What many analysts fail to grasp about Chinese manufacturing – just as they failed to understand Japanese manufacturing in the 1980s, is that while China’s very large manufacturing sector is globally competitive, it is also far less efficient than most analysts assumed. If it were genuinely efficient, it would be profitable without subsidies. Yet in many cases it is only marginally profitable despite large transfers that directly and indirectly subsidize its costs.
Among these transfers are an undervalued currency, abundant and cheap credit, artificially low interest rates on household savings, and government overspending on logistics, infrastructure and transportation networks that reduce costs for manufacturers. These policies boost manufacturing competitiveness, but they do so by transferring income from households to producers.
If the global competitiveness of China’s manufacturing sector depends on these direct and indirect transfers, reversing those transfers in order to raise household income would necessarily undermine that competitiveness. The process of rebalancing therefore requires a structural shift away from investment and manufacturing toward consumption and services.
Japan provides a useful example. Between 1991 – when Japan’s consumption share of GDP bottomed out – and 2008, Japan succeeded in increasing its consumption share by roughly 10 percentage points of GDP. But during that same period Japan not only lost roughly half its share of global GDP, it also experienced a decline of roughly one-third in the manufacturing share of its economy. This implies a drop in its share of global manufacturing of roughly two-thirds.
These were not coincidental; they were the nearly-inevitable consequences of rebalancing income toward households.
For China, the implication is straightforward. Increasing the consumption share of GDP necessarily implies slower overall growth and a smaller manufacturing share of the economy. The idea that China can simultaneously dedicate resources to increasing output while dedicating even more resources to increasing demand is hard to reconcile with either logic or historical experience.
My conclusion, therefore, is the opposite of the Economist’s. Chinese deflationary pressures, its huge trade surpluses, its surging debt burden, and its increasingly unviable investment in property, infrastructure and manufacturing are all direct consequences of a political obsession with too-high GDP growth targets. Maintaining these targets requires ever-increasing credit expansion and ever-greater investment in sectors that are already suffering from excess capacity.
It is not an accident that no country with Chinese-style imbalances has ever adjusted without a slowdown – or even a contraction – in GDP growth. Rebalancing toward consumption requires shifting income from producers to households, and this necessarily reduces the pace of investment-driven growth.
For this reason, raising China’s GDP growth target would almost certainly make the underlying problems worse rather than better. The real challenge for Chinese policymakers is not how to increase growth targets, but how to accept lower growth – and a smaller share of global manufacturing – while restructuring the economy and rebalancing the domestic drivers of growth.
economist.com/leaders/2026/0…
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@zerohedge The decline did not meet expectations, and I was unable to successfully buy in.
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Hedge Fund Bloodbath: Biggest Crash Since Liberation Day... Here Are The 3 Biggest Risks zerohedge.com/markets/hedge-…
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Will the war between the US/Israel, and Iran pose a spillover risk? That depends on how long it takes to end. If, as Trump has stated, it ends in four weeks and middle east regions return to pre-war conditions, then it's fine; otherwise, the spillover risk exceeds 50%. No WW3!
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