Lux
2.3K posts
Lux
@CriptoMis1C
In search of my 100x if many have succeeded one day I will have the happiness of being able to tell them that I have also achieved it 💪🏼😎 👾👨💻 🚀🍀💹🟢
Katılım Ağustos 2025
376 Takip Edilen248 Takipçiler
Lux retweetledi
Lux retweetledi
Lux retweetledi
Lux retweetledi
Percolator Trade is now a Delaware C Corp.
Don't trust it, verify it.
Search "Percolator Trade Corp" on the Delaware registry, file #10631711.
Incorporating is the easy part.
The goal is the program that outlives the company.
English
have no comms and they delete in a few hours so made it on my friends platform, also pump comms is fucking dogshit
coms.club/c/genny-runner
English
Lux retweetledi
Lux retweetledi
@joshyote We’re building cool shit on Solana and experimenting with different things to make it even more unique; permisionless perps on Solana, permisionless prediction markets? Positional NFT’s ? Pretty cool stuff. Wdyt
English
Who’s building cool shit on Solana and wants to tell people about it?
josh@joshyote
The plan is simple: 1. Build cool shit on Solana 2. Tell people about it Repeat forever
English
Lux retweetledi
Lux retweetledi
Lux retweetledi
Wait, so both our founders are @superteam members now?
This is too bullish, join the waitlist:
percolator.trade/r/12ZWF3H6
Squid@0xSquid_Sol
Happy to announce that I’ve officially been invited to join and am now a member of @SuperteamCAN! It’s an honour to be part of an amazing group of builders from across the country who are helping drive the growth and development of the Solana ecosystem. If you’re building on Solana, I highly recommend getting involved with your local @Superteam. They’re there to help you succeed! 🇨🇦🇨🇦🇨🇦☕️☕️☕️
English
Lux retweetledi
Hint hint. Instead of all building your own thing, get a bunch of startups together that are all building perps, prediction markets, new oracles, prop amms, etc… bootstrap a Futarchy together that run common protocols.
Percolator (baring any bugs) has formally verified isolation between markets. Anyone can create additional markets under one roof with guarantees that they can’t wreck anyone else.
Reduce the rents in it to be marginal and return all the rents to users. Then the actual value creation can capture real roi.
English
Lux retweetledi
Love that the bootstrap runs on Percolator itself!
The Sybil bond is real backing in a live book, earning voting power and no yield, so there’s nothing for a fund to farm.
One note for liquidity networks: the cheap thing to exit is your principal, the expensive thing is the book, so “let them take the cookie” works best if the liquidity stays forkable too.
It’s also why futarchy feels permanent here.
Net-new vs cannibalized liquidity is a counterfactual no oracle settles.
You don’t measure it -> you price it.
toly 🇺🇸@toly
Do you want a whole single grape or a slice of the watermelon? The perfect way to bootstrap a network should offer every participant a slice of the watermelon, so they chose to participate in network as apposed to trying to build their own thing. You must have minimal rent seekers, fair rewards for contributions. Using @MetaDAOProject just to fundraise is basic. The best crypto networks and protocols all solved for bootstrapping network effects, and this is the best version of HARD crypto (thank you @TrustlessState for the term). It’s not a company with a token, it’s a network with a ton of contributors. What would that look like for perps or any kind of hard defi? IMHO, the most valuable contributors are the ones that create new high value markets, that bring the best net additional shared liquidity. There is just no magical succinct proof of work equivalent to verify net new liquidity, and all incentives create embedded rent seekers. So it’s always going to end up to governance to make this work, and governance generally sucks. My hope is that futarchy fixes this. So how to bootstrap governance? 1) you need some Sybil check 2) minimize any clear financial gain from participation. All the Merkle mine and pow schemes only worked once because as soon as the roi was clear it ended up gamed. You don’t want funds to participate in this phase. They want an roi of the network effects without contributing anything but capital. They need to do this after the network does real work, not before. 3) it shouldn’t matter who starts it, or who wins the bootstraping process. If a cabal games the bootstrap process, the Sybil check still works, and the “good” portion of the network can just leave and fork into their own. Basically, let the cabal take the whole cookie, because if they do you can exit at no cost and no loss and create your own. Some form of this is inevitable because AI is dropping the cost of creating software and therefore protocols, and doing analysis for market decisions, aka futarchy style governance. This was my shot at this, give me some feedback or find bugs or fork it and run with it. There is a cost to get a vote, the vote doesn’t guarantee anything, all the good participants can gtfo and leave at any time and do their own thing. github.com/aeyakovenko/pe…
English
Lux retweetledi
Lux retweetledi
Do you want a whole single grape or a slice of the watermelon? The perfect way to bootstrap a network should offer every participant a slice of the watermelon, so they chose to participate in network as apposed to trying to build their own thing. You must have minimal rent seekers, fair rewards for contributions.
Using @MetaDAOProject just to fundraise is basic. The best crypto networks and protocols all solved for bootstrapping network effects, and this is the best version of HARD crypto (thank you @TrustlessState for the term). It’s not a company with a token, it’s a network with a ton of contributors.
What would that look like for perps or any kind of hard defi? IMHO, the most valuable contributors are the ones that create new high value markets, that bring the best net additional shared liquidity.
There is just no magical succinct proof of work equivalent to verify net new liquidity, and all incentives create embedded rent seekers.
So it’s always going to end up to governance to make this work, and governance generally sucks. My hope is that futarchy fixes this.
So how to bootstrap governance?
1) you need some Sybil check
2) minimize any clear financial gain from participation. All the Merkle mine and pow schemes only worked once because as soon as the roi was clear it ended up gamed. You don’t want funds to participate in this phase. They want an roi of the network effects without contributing anything but capital. They need to do this after the network does real work, not before.
3) it shouldn’t matter who starts it, or who wins the bootstraping process. If a cabal games the bootstrap process, the Sybil check still works, and the “good” portion of the network can just leave and fork into their own. Basically, let the cabal take the whole cookie, because if they do you can exit at no cost and no loss and create your own.
Some form of this is inevitable because AI is dropping the cost of creating software and therefore protocols, and doing analysis for market decisions, aka futarchy style governance.
This was my shot at this, give me some feedback or find bugs or fork it and run with it. There is a cost to get a vote, the vote doesn’t guarantee anything, all the good participants can gtfo and leave at any time and do their own thing.
github.com/aeyakovenko/pe…
English
Lux retweetledi
Lux retweetledi
Lux retweetledi
Set a reminder for our space today at 1:30pm EST
twitter.com/i/spaces/1AxRn…
English