Daniel Silverberg

Policymakers and investors are focused on the above-ground infrastructure for AI (data centers, grid access, etc)). A massive vulnerability for AI and offshore wind power lies beneath the sea. My colleague and I wrote an oped in the Washington Post on danger to undersea cables

Good read from @warontherocks. “Iran’s ability to threaten maritime traffic depends less on conventional naval forces than on asymmetric capabilities: mines, missiles, drones, and small attack craft.” #iran #hormuz warontherocks.com/outgunned-but-…

Well said - there was never really an agreement on Strait.

The hawkish GOP faction lost a warrior in Sen. Graham. Condolences to family and friends. His approach at times could be maddening for those seeking consistency, but today we should focus on positive aspects of his legacy, of which there were many. Let’s hope others step up.

Statement from the Office of U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina).

It’s striking that six months ago it seemed likely the Iranian regime was entirely delegitimized and possibly done for after murdering thousan of its own civilians, then facing Epic Fury. They are now conducting regional diplomacy as though nothing happened at all.

“Israel does not have a problem with the Democratic Party, israel has a problem in America” @RahmEmanuel speaking directly to Israelis, on @N12News tonight:

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Please read beautiful, personal story from @AnneNeuberger in @TheAtlantic on her parents’ experience in July 4 raid on Entebbe and significance for US intelligence work. Useful reminder on this holiday weekend of what happens behind scenes to keep Americans safe.

Well said @yairlapid

See smart analysis here from INSS on Israeli dynamics around AI export controls. inss.org.il/publication/ai…

Reminder: These are ballistic missile strikes against a civilian population.

#predictable. Trump legacy on the line, he does not want to be embarrassed by Iran but also does not want to reenter full scale hostilities. Expect more of these discrete (critics would say ‘performative’) strikes to show US resolve while pushing negotiations. New normal.

My full interview with @CNN @amanpour . Key points: 1. The Strait was never “open” under this MOU. 2. Gulf states remain apoplectic about this negotiation. 3. Congress has tools at its disposal to slow down negotiations, hard to do. edition.cnn.com/2026/06/26/tv/…

Pleased to join Channel 18 to discuss latest in Strait.

Brief taste of capturing World Cup magic by staying at Courtyard Marriott by Newark airport last night with fans from Ecuador post Germany victory. Ok, back to Iran and Middle East chaos…..

Motherfucker was 9 and had already lost an eye.

Rubio’s GCC Tour, the New Hormuz Route, and #Iran’s Defiant Response 🔹Marco Rubio’s GCC tour struck a harder tone toward Iran than recent comments by Vance or even Trump. He pushed back on Iran deriving any revenue from the Strait of Hormuz, whether through tolls or under any other designation, stated that the Gulf states have zero support for such fees, and warned that if Iran threatens or blocks ships in the strait, “then we’re going to have a problem.” 🔹The trip appears to have had two objectives. The first was to reassure Gulf states, many of which have grown disillusioned by the war and have begun questioning the U.S. commitment to their security. The second was to bring them, especially Oman, on board in preventing Iran from establishing control over the strait. 🔹It is therefore unlikely to be a coincidence that, during the visit, Oman and the IMO announced a new southern route through the Strait of Hormuz, running close to the Omani coast. Washington has probably been encouraging Muscat for some time not to align with Tehran on transit fees or other forms of exclusive regulation in the strait. 🔹The significant point is that Oman coordinated with the IMO but not with Iran. The IRGC Navy reacted sharply, declaring that safe passage is only possible via Iran-designated routes, that coordination is mandatory, and that the Omani-IMO corridor is dangerous and prohibited. 🔹Hours later, a Singapore-flagged container ship was struck by a projectile near the Omani coast, on the new southern route. U.S. officials attributed the strike to the IRGC. The IMO responded by pausing its evacuation of stranded ships. 🔹This was effectively a response to the dilemma Iran faced. Tehran could either accept the Omani route and watch its leverage erode, or contest it and risk breaching the MOU’s safe-passage provisions. The strike on the Singapore-flagged ship indicates Iran chose to contest it. The strike was designed as a limited, deniable hit that damages a vessel without sinking it or killing its crew, intended to make the Omani route unusable in practice rather than to trigger a wider confrontation. 🔹The logic behind the choice is that allowing traffic to flow freely on a route Iran neither designated nor controls would erode Iran’s main leverage. It would establish, in operational terms, that the strait can be transited without Tehran’s permission. 🔹Muscat is adhering to the 1982 Convention, running the IMO route, and publicly ruling out transit fees, while at the same time keeping a bilateral channel open with Tehran. Amid the recent incidents, Iranian and Omani FMs spoke by phone and reportedly reached an understanding on a mechanism for joint cooperation. Oman is having a difficult task preserving its international obligations and its good relationship with Iran at once. 🔹This Omani hedging is a challenge for Iran. Tehran invested its most intensive postwar diplomacy in Muscat, yet Oman still proceeded with the IMO route without Iranian consent. Iran retains a bilateral track with Oman, but apparently it no longer has the ability to determine, on its own, the terms under which the strait operates. The recent strike was partly a response to that challenge. 🔹The same logic runs through the GCC joint statement issued with Rubio. The ministers identified Iran’s ballistic missile program, drones, and support for proxies as threats, called for unconditional reopening of the strait, and tied any trade or investment in Iran to full MOU compliance and an end to what they described as destabilizing behavior. None of these conditions appear in the MOU itself. The same applies to the proposed $300 billion investment, which Washington appears to be making contingent – albeit indirectly – on a broader range of Iranian behavior. In effect, the United States is using the 60-day period to shape, through Iran’s relations with the GCC, the issues it could not settle in the memorandum. It is outsourcing pressure to the Gulf states. 🔹This feeds a growing skepticism in Iran, among hardliners and more cautiously among pragmatists, that the negotiation period is being used to weaken Iranian leverage across several arenas: the strait, the nuclear issue, and the economic track. The dilemma over the strait is becoming a test of whether the MOU’s logic of deferred gains can survive while the space for those gains narrows, and the recent strike suggests Iran has decided it will not let that space close without imposing a cost.

@mdubowitz thx for flagging below tweet. Best summary of what the general license issued Monday will actually do.

Interesting find: a 2023 Senate GOP press release attempting to assert congressional review over any “enormous cash windfall to the Iranian regime in exchange for dubious non-proliferation promises.” hagerty.senate.gov/press-releases…