Hamidreza Azizi

#Iran War Update No. 20 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative): 🔹The Strait of Hormuz is being increasingly framed in Tehran as a tool of Iranian leverage rather than a temporary wartime tactic. Iranian officials are openly discussing a post-war regulatory regime, including transit fees and IRGC-controlled routing. At the same time, there are reports that a “safe corridor” system is already being implemented for selected countries through Iran’s territorial waters. 🔹Meanwhile, international efforts to counter this are taking shape. Six U.S. allies U.S. allies – the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands – have signaled readiness to support maritime security operations in the strait, pointing toward a gradual internationalization of the waterway’s security. However, the exact form of their involvement remains unclear. 🔹Iran’s approach to escalation remains centered on vertical escalation rather than horizontal (expanding target types/categories). When Israel struck South Pars, Iran responded by targeting major energy infrastructure across the Persian Gulf. Continued strikes on U.S. bases follow the same pattern, i.e., response to attacks on Iranian military infrastructure. The focus so far has been on escalating within existing categories of targets, increasing scale and impact, rather than opening entirely new domains. 🔹This logic was reinforced by Iran’s strike on the Haifa refinery despite U.S. messaging against further energy targeting, underlining Tehran’s emphasis on enforcing its own red lines rather than accepting those imposed by the adversaries. 🔹According to Iranian expert commentaries, Iran’s current approach rests on three key elements: unpredictability, a “madman strategy,” and making threats to the enemy more credible; the latter reflected in shortened gap between warning and action, aimed at “correcting past misperceptions” caused by restraint. 🔹Energy infrastructure remains at the center of the conflict. Damage to Qatar’s Ras Laffan LNG facility has caused significant disruptions to global gas markets, with parts of the complex potentially requiring years to fully recover. 🔹At the same time, Iran continues to sustain its own exports. Oil shipments from Kharg Island remain ongoing at roughly 1.1 to 1.5 million barrels per day, while increased storage at Jask suggests preparation for prolonged disruption scenarios. 🔹The war is also driving new economic dynamics. Discussions in Washington about waivers for up to 140 million barrels of Iranian oil indicate mounting pressure to stabilize global energy markets, but Tehran signals it will continue prioritizing China as its main costumer. 🔹Militarily, the United States maintains that operations are progressing, with over 7,000 targets reportedly struck. However, Iranian assessments suggest U.S. operations are adapting under pressure, including greater reliance on stand-off strikes, regional bases, and long-range bomber missions from Europe. 🔹Israeli strikes continue to target Iran’s military-industrial base, including electronic industries in Shiraz, reflecting an ongoing effort to degrade Iran’s industrial ecosystem. 🔹At the same time, there are indications of Iranian tactical adaptation. Reports of an F-35 being hit, possibly through Surface-to-Air Missile ambush (SAMbush), have fueled discussion about improved survivability and evolving Iranian air defense tactics. 🔹Regionally, attacks on U.S. positions persist. Bases in Erbil and Bahrain have reportedly been targeted again by Iran and its Iraqi allies. 🔹Unconfirmed reports of rocket fire from Syrian territory toward the Golan Heights raise the possibility of another active front, although the scale and intent remain unclear. 🔹Tensions between Iran and the UAE have escalated sharply. Diplomatic relations are deteriorating, with visa suspensions, closures of Iranian institutions, and reports of embassy shutdowns signaling a significant breakdown in ties. 🔹Internal security pressures inside Iran remain high. Authorities continue arrests linked to “espionage” and insurgent activity, particularly in southeastern regions, reflecting ongoing concerns about internal destabilization alongside the ongoing war. 🔹Diplomatically, divisions within GCC persist. Oman continues to push for de-escalation, Qatar maintains a more balanced stance, while Saudi Arabia and especially the UAE are adopting increasingly confrontational positions toward Iran. 🔹China has maintained a cautious posture, emphasizing stability and energy security while avoiding alignment with either side. Beijing has so far refrained from calling directly on Iran to halt its attacks and instead, continues calling on all parties to end hostilities. 🔹Inside Iran, discussions about nuclear doctrine are re-emerging, including limited calls for weaponization or withdrawal from the NPT, although these remain on the margins for now. 🔹Overall, the war is increasingly being shaped by competing efforts to define the rules of escalation, with Iran attempting to formalize new realities on the ground – especially at the strait – while external responses remain fragmented and uncertain despite growing concern over maritime security.

There are people in #Iran’s strategic community already warning about this, but the existential mindset of the current military leadership of the Islamic Republic is laser-focused on ending this war without "defeat" and thinking about the longer term afterwards.

#Iran War Update No. 19 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative): 🔹The war has entered a clear energy infrastructure phase following the strike on Iran’s South Pars gas field. The attack has caused disruption in Iran’s gas production and marked a shift toward targeting the country’s economic backbone rather than purely military assets. 🔹Iran responded by expanding retaliation across the Persian Gulf. Strikes on energy and industrial infrastructure, including major facilities such as Ras Laffan in Qatar, indicate a deliberate strategy to regionalize the energy confrontation and globalize its impacts by imposing extra pressure on the energy market. 🔹This shift is also reflected in Iranian strategic thinking. Rather than “proportional” responses, Tehran increasingly appears to be operating under a new strategy of escalation above the threshold set by its adversaries, aiming to correct what it sees as past miscalculations caused by restraint. 🔹At the same time, the risk of a more direct U.S. intervention is rising. Recent discussions in Washington reportedly include scenarios involving special operations forces targeting Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles or seizing strategic locations such as Kharg Island, although large-scale ground operations remain uncertain. 🔹Iran has responded by signaling preparedness for such scenarios. IRGC’s special/commando force deployments in Iran’s southern regions and its public messaging emphasize readiness for ground confrontation, while some Iranian analysts even argue that a limited U.S. ground presence could be turned into a strategic advantage by exposing American forces to direct attack. 🔹Israeli operations continue to focus on decapitation strikes. The latest case was intelligence minister Esmail Khatib whose death in Israeli strikes was confirmed by the Iranian government. 🔹At the same time, Israeli strikes are expanding geographically. Attacks on northern provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran suggest a widening target set. 🔹Iran’s missile campaign against Israel continues in a sustained attritional pattern. Smaller but frequent salvos, including the use of cluster munitions, appear aimed at maintaining psychological pressure and gradually degrading Israeli air defenses. 🔹Hezbollah’s involvement also persists at a steady pace, with continued rocket and missile fire into northern Israel. Some reports indicate that longer-range missiles have now been used to strike areas near Gaza, potentially aimed at enabling a reactivation of armed activity there and suggesting a higher degree of coordination with Iranian operations. 🔹In Iraq, the conflict is deepening further. U.S. strikes on PMF units and retaliatory militia attacks are continuing, while disruptions to Iranian gas exports following the South Pars strike are directly affecting Iraq’s electricity supply. 🔹Regional reactions are becoming more pronounced but remain divided. Gulf states have condemned Iranian strikes on energy infrastructure, with Saudi Arabia warning of stronger responses, while Oman continues to emphasize de-escalation. 🔹At the same time, Qatar’s decision to expel Iranian military attachés highlights growing concern even among states that have maintained relatively stable ties with Tehran. 🔹Global economic effects are intensifying. Oil prices surged above $110 per barrel following the South Pars attack and subsequent Iranian strikes, reflecting a growing geopolitical risk premium tied to energy infrastructure. 🔹Iran continues to sustain oil exports despite the conflict. High prices and continued sales, primarily to China, are generating significant revenue, reinforcing Tehran’s ability to maintain its war effort. 🔹Inside Iran, the internal security dimension remains a central concern. Authorities have intensified crackdowns, including arrests and even executions for alleged espionage, while maintaining strong public mobilization of their supporters to deter unrest. 🔹At the same time, Iranian officials are increasingly framing the war as part of a broader transformation of the regional order. Statements from both the IRGC and the army (Artesh) suggest a shared view that U.S. influence in the region is declining. 🔹Another emerging issue is Iran’s nuclear program. While there is no confirmed policy shift, recent remarks by Iranian officials highlight uncertainty around the future of the longstanding prohibition on nuclear weapons by Ali Khamenei. Iranian foreign minister says that the new Supreme Leader has not yet clarified its position on this issue. 🔹Overall, the conflict is entering a phase where infrastructure warfare, leadership targeting, and potential ground operation scenarios are beginning to intersect, making escalation less predictable and harder to contain.