Hamidreza Azizi

Today, Chatham House hosted Qatar’s Minister of State at Ministry of Foreign Affairs @Dr_Al_Khulaifi At a session entitled “Diplomacy and Mediation: Opportunities and Challenges”, Minister Al Al Khulaifi spoke about changing landscape of mediation, Qatar’s role as a key mediator, and the need for more middle powers’ collaboration in mediation and diplomacy. The event was chaired by @GalipDalay (@CH_MENAP).

Another indication that #Iran still does not want to escalate to the point of no return - unless it is pushed to that point. Yet whenever I argue that Tehran is operating under strategic constraints that make it unwilling to go all in -unlike during the 40-day war - some self-proclaimed "experts" on this platform immediately push back and offer all sorts of alternative explanations, while largely ignoring the broader logic behind Iran's behavior.

Another indication that #Iran still does not want to escalate to the point of no return - unless it is pushed to that point. Yet whenever I argue that Tehran is operating under strategic constraints that make it unwilling to go all in -unlike during the 40-day war - some self-proclaimed "experts" on this platform immediately push back and offer all sorts of alternative explanations, while largely ignoring the broader logic behind Iran's behavior.

Another indication that #Iran still does not want to escalate to the point of no return - unless it is pushed to that point. Yet whenever I argue that Tehran is operating under strategic constraints that make it unwilling to go all in -unlike during the 40-day war - some self-proclaimed "experts" on this platform immediately push back and offer all sorts of alternative explanations, while largely ignoring the broader logic behind Iran's behavior.

IRGC-linked platforms insist that Tehran is “responding in kind.” However, if the United States expands its attacks, they argue, Iran will impose comparable costs across the regional military architecture supporting those operations. - The repeated use of expressions such as “for now” suggests that the current level of response is a political choice, not the limit of Iran’s capabilities. In other words, restraint is being presented as conditional and reversible. - The main message appears to be: Iran still claims to be responding proportionally, but it is warning that proportionality may not last. The real threat lies in the suggestion that the next phase could be broader and qualitatively different. #Iran

A few thoughts on the latest escalation: During the 40-day war, #Iran had a clear targeting strategy, and each set of targets served a specific purpose. In the first stage, Iran targeted U.S. radar and early-warning systems at bases across the region. The aim was to enable longer-range strikes against Israel later. At the same time, Iran targeted those U.S. bases that could be used for a potential ground operation against Iran, including bases in Kuwait, Al-Harir in Iraq, as well as some bases in the UAE that could be used for operations against Iranian islands. At the same time, attacks on energy infrastructure in the region were intended to maximize economic pain. This time, however, despite the effective resumption of war, Iran continues to target U.S. bases (in Kuwait and Bahrain) that have already been attacked several times. This may partly reflect efforts to strike new installations deployed by the United States at those bases. But when judged against current U.S. objectives, these attacks do not appear particularly helpful to Iran. During the previous round of war, the U.S. had a broader set of objectives, including regime change, a potential ground operation to sieze HEU stockpile, and the targeting of Iran’s missile capabilities. In this round, however, the U.S. is focused on weakening Iran’s ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, and it is carrying out strikes toward that objective every night. These operations rely primarily on capabilities that the United States already has in the region, as well as on the reimposition of the naval blockade, which depends on U.S. warships and naval forces. Iranian attacks therefore do not appear to be deterring the United States from continuing its strikes. Therefore, it appears that Iran’s only strategy at this moment is to keep the Strait closed for as long as possible while the United States continues drawing down its strategic oil reserves, until the impact on the global oil market and the U.S. economy becomes irreversible. Iran hopes that this would push Trump to reconsider his position. Of course, this is a risky bet at a time when Iran remains under constant and heavy attack.

Some of the reactions to this analysis have been truly amazing. People want to hear what they like, not what they need to hear. I was the one who wrote more than 2,500 words in March on how #Iran had rewritten its war strategy (irananalytica.org/p/how-iran-rew…), and I now clearly see that it does not have an effective strategy for the current phase of the conflict. What worked during the 40-day war is not supposed to work today because the nature of the conflict has changed. Two more points: 1. Iran not having a coherent strategy does not automatically mean that Trump has one. Both sides are essentially resorting to the same tactics, hoping they will produce a different outcome. The U.S.'s main advantage remains its air superiority, given Iran's almost complete lack of effective air defense. 2. If you think I am being biased, you would be surprised to hear and read what military analysts in Iran – including, and especially, pro-government experts – are saying about the shortcomings of their own strategy. In any case, my job is not to please anyone. It is to point out unpleasant facts to those who are willing to hear them.

The #Iran-U.S. conflict enters a new phase of escalation 🔹Developments on July 17 suggest that both Iran and the United States are broadening the scope of the conflict. While it remains too early to draw firm conclusions, the pattern of reported military activity points toward preparations for a potentially more dangerous phase. 🔹On the U.S. side, reports indicate that several aerial refueling aircraft have been redeployed from Europe to the CENTCOM area of operations. Many of these assets had left the region following the ceasefire, making their return noteworthy amid renewed tensions. 🔹At the same time, the geographical scope of U.S. strikes appears to be further expanding. In addition to previous areas in the south, reported attacks have reached Lar in Fars Province and Yazd in central Iran – areas hosting some of Iran’s missile bases. 🔹Iran, meanwhile, appears to be widening its own target set. The IRGC claimed to have struck American UAV facilities and an AI center in Bahrain allegedly used to support U.S. targeting operations, while warning that it would increasingly target economic, technological, and industrial assets linked to American interests across the region. 🔹This marks a potentially important shift. Rather than focusing primarily on military targets, Tehran is signaling that infrastructure associated with U.S. economic and technological interests may now be considered legitimate targets if attacks on Iran continue. 🔹Maritime developments are also becoming more concerning. Iranian sources reported that a Thailand-flagged vessel was targeted after attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz without coordinating with Iran, while later claiming that two oil tankers struck mines in the Strait and caught fire. 🔹Whether or not all of these claims can be independently verified, they underscore the growing risks to commercial shipping. Even previously deployed mines could have a significant impact on maritime traffic. 🔹Perhaps the most significant reported development is the Iranian strike on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia after U.S. refueling aircraft allegedly operated from the base. It represents the first reported Iranian attack on a U.S. facility in Saudi Arabia since the April ceasefire. 🔹It is also noteworthy that, the previous day, Iran announced an attack on the al-Tanf base in Syria. Some Iranian analysts interpreted the strike as a warning to the Syrian government not to intervene in Lebanon against Hezbollah. 🔹This suggests that Tehran may be setting aside some of the restraint that shaped its earlier responses. Over the past several weeks, Iran’s attacks have focused primarily on Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, with far more limited strikes against the UAE, Qatar, and Oman. That calculation may now be changing, as Tehran appears to believe that these attacks have neither altered U.S. calculations nor changed the military balance on the ground. 🔹Reports that further bridges and transportation infrastructure in southern Iran continue to be targeted have also attracted attention. As mentioned yesterday, many Iranian analysts interpret these strikes as part of a gradual effort to degrade mobility and logistics in southern Iran, potentially laying the groundwork for future military options involving ground troops. 🔹From the Iranian perspective, this does not necessarily mean that a U.S. ground operation is imminent. However, repeated attacks on transportation infrastructure fit a broader pattern of battlefield preparation that cannot be ignored. As such, the question may increasingly be one of "when" rather than "if." 🔹Meanwhile, Iran continues operations on other fronts. The Iranian Army announced additional operations against Kurdish insurgent groups in Iraqi Kurdistan, claiming multiple commanders were killed and several facilities destroyed. 🔹There are also unverified reports that the Houthis are preparing measures that could affect shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. While these claims remain uncertain, they contribute to perceptions inside Iran that the conflict may increasingly extend beyond the immediate Persian Gulf region. 🔹Overall, Tehran appears to be concluding that its previous level of “restrained engagement” has not generated sufficient deterrence. As a result, it is increasingly willing to expand both the geographical scope of its operations and the categories of targets it is prepared to strike. 🔹Whether this reflects the collapse of expectations surrounding a negotiated framework or simply an effort to restore deterrence remains unclear. What is becoming increasingly evident, however, is that both sides are incrementally raising the stakes, increasing the risk that the conflict could enter a broader and significantly more dangerous phase. P.S.: I cannot believe I’m doing this again…

A few thoughts on the latest escalation: During the 40-day war, #Iran had a clear targeting strategy, and each set of targets served a specific purpose. In the first stage, Iran targeted U.S. radar and early-warning systems at bases across the region. The aim was to enable longer-range strikes against Israel later. At the same time, Iran targeted those U.S. bases that could be used for a potential ground operation against Iran, including bases in Kuwait, Al-Harir in Iraq, as well as some bases in the UAE that could be used for operations against Iranian islands. At the same time, attacks on energy infrastructure in the region were intended to maximize economic pain. This time, however, despite the effective resumption of war, Iran continues to target U.S. bases (in Kuwait and Bahrain) that have already been attacked several times. This may partly reflect efforts to strike new installations deployed by the United States at those bases. But when judged against current U.S. objectives, these attacks do not appear particularly helpful to Iran. During the previous round of war, the U.S. had a broader set of objectives, including regime change, a potential ground operation to sieze HEU stockpile, and the targeting of Iran’s missile capabilities. In this round, however, the U.S. is focused on weakening Iran’s ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, and it is carrying out strikes toward that objective every night. These operations rely primarily on capabilities that the United States already has in the region, as well as on the reimposition of the naval blockade, which depends on U.S. warships and naval forces. Iranian attacks therefore do not appear to be deterring the United States from continuing its strikes. Therefore, it appears that Iran’s only strategy at this moment is to keep the Strait closed for as long as possible while the United States continues drawing down its strategic oil reserves, until the impact on the global oil market and the U.S. economy becomes irreversible. Iran hopes that this would push Trump to reconsider his position. Of course, this is a risky bet at a time when Iran remains under constant and heavy attack.

از شروع جنگ ۴۰ روزه @HamidRezaAz از بی برنامگی جنگی آمریکا و استراتژی مشخص دفاعی ایران می گفت و گزارش های روزانه او برای تحلیلگران بین المللی مرجع بودند. نتایج اون جنگ درستی تحلیلهاش رو نشون داد. ولی حالا معتقده ایران استراتژی روشنی در مورد حملات اخیر آمریکا نداره. آمریکا داره با هدف مشخص تحلیل بردن توانایی ایران برای زدن کشتی ها در تنگه هرمز عمل میکنه، که لزوما جواب نداده، ولی پاسخ های ایران هم کاری از پیش نبرده. زدن پایگاه های آمریکایی که چندین بار در طول جنگ هدف قرار گرفتند، نه بازدارندگی ایجاد کرده نه چندان ضرر مضاعفی به آمریکا زده. حمیدرضا عزیزی میگه الان ایران نمیخواد وارد جنگ زیرساختی بشه و اون ریسک پذیری جنگ ۴۰ روزه، جای خودش رو به خویشتن داری و انتظار برای تاثیرگزاری بسته موندن تنگه هرمز داده. او معتقده شاید اگر آمریکا وارد فاز حمله به زیرساختهای ایران بشه،‌ ایران هم واکنشهای خودش رو به فاز تازه ای ببره. ولی فعلا ایران بی دفاع مونده و واکنش هاش بی اثر هستند.