GeoCrow_

❗️Those threatening to make Kyiv unlivable should understand: Ukraine’s Defense Forces possess extensive intelligence on military sites across Moscow and the Moscow region.

@GrandpaRoy2 Stork movement and aerodynamics shall be studied for drone evasion.

The pestilential Russians tried to kill a stork with an FPV drone, as they have done before. This time, the Ukrainian stork showed them what real flying is about.

@HpwWJVafCv83954 oko gora with some more information about it (Opensource, easy to find): x.com/oko_gora_tg/st…

@GeoCrow_ Thank you.

プリモルスコ・アフタルスク飛行場 火災ですかね🙄 46.06584,38.22026

@GEOIMINT Okay hear me out 🤓

@banthisguy9349 look up DNS server. aquire target coordinates. launch.

I have a scenario for defenders to think about. You are provided a malicious domain. What are you going to do with it? 1. Block just that domain. 2. Block the domain and every subdomain created under it. 3. Block just the domain,block subdomains is difficult with existing tools

🇫🇷 EXCLU | Lors de l’exercice inter-armées #ORION26, une brigade d’infanterie française a reçu des images satellitaires radar en quelques minutes pour coordonner ses feux. Le fournisseur : @iceye_global, une société privée étrangère intégrée directement dans sa chaîne de commandement. C’est une première. Et ça dit beaucoup sur les lacunes capacitaires françaises en imagerie radar. Joost Elstak, VP Missions chez #ICEYE, nous a répondu en exclusivité sur ce qui s’est joué, les délais réels, la confiance politique et la suite possible (il y en aura forcément une). opexnews.fr/iceye-epopee-s…

@Filestine145187 @GEOIMINT Life is not fair

@GEOIMINT Stop fucking geo-locating everything you dumbass.

Geolocation of an Iranian ballistic missile launch failure. C: 34.906643, 48.410153 C [POV]: 34.899231, 48.421203 S: x.com/IranIntl_En

@seblatombe seb un ddos c'est basique, pas de quoi faire un tweet

🚨🇫🇷 Le groupe de hackers pro-russe « NoName », déjà lié aux attaques DDoS contre La Poste fin 2025, revendique une nouvelle vague d’attaques contre plusieurs services français. 👉 Cour des comptes 👉 Registre des agents financiers (REGAFI) 👉 EDF 👉 Renault Trucks 👉 Métropole de Toulouse 👉 Départements du Gers, de l’Aude, de la Haute-Saône, de la Vienne et des Hautes-Pyrénées. ...

@justincbzz @delfoo @clement_molin @AndrewPerpetua On top of that, since when was OSINT proprietary - credit is just good mannerism

@delfoo @clement_molin @AndrewPerpetua He did give credit though

Oh look @clement_molin stealing maps again, on top of the scraping of @AndrewPerpetua 's map. And just 2 days ago he was whining about people stealing maps. When I was his age I'd be kicked out of Uni for such plagiarism...

🚨Beijing spent six months trying to break Japan🇯🇵. It threatened to behead the Japanese prime minister. It locked fire-control radars onto Japan's F-15 fighter jets. It banned the export of rare earths, magnets, and dual-use electronics. It sanctioned 40 named Japanese corporations. It sent Coast Guard vessels — including ships equipped with 76mm naval guns — into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkakus a record 27 times in 2025 alone. It conducted the eighth major military exercise around Taiwan in three years. The campaign was the most sustained, multi-vector coercion any East Asian capital has faced from China in the postwar era. Here is what it produced. On December 26, 2025 — seven weeks after Prime Minister Takaichi's Diet remarks invoking the "survival-threatening situation" clause for Taiwan — Japan passed a record 9.04 trillion yen defense budget. The largest in its history. Two full years ahead of the GDP 2% target. On March 19, 2026, Takaichi arrived at the White House. Japan formally joined the Golden Dome missile defense initiative. The Diet's lower house passed the defense budget the same day. The cabinet approved a National Intelligence Agency the same day. On March 31, 2026 — exactly one month after Operation Epic Fury began — Japan did something it had not done since 1945. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force deployed homegrown long-range strike missiles capable of reaching the Chinese mainland. The upgraded Type 12. The Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile. Operationally fielded. From Camp Kengun in Kumamoto, the range envelope covers North Korea, the eastern Chinese coastline, and Taiwan in their entirety. On the same day, JS Chokai completed Tomahawk integration. 400 Tomahawks acquired from the United States. $2.35 billion. Timeline accelerated by one full year. In April 2026, the Takaichi cabinet removed the "five categories" restriction on lethal weapons exports. In May, Tokyo concluded an agreement with Manila for the transfer of Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to the Philippine Navy — the first export of finished lethal military equipment in Japan's postwar history. And in November 2025, three months before the Iran war began, Japan made its first-ever transfer of domestically-produced PAC-3 interceptor missiles to the United States military, backfilling American stockpiles depleted by Ukraine. Beijing's pressure tools, applied at maximum political volume, accelerated every single development they were intended to deter. Zero retractions. Zero policy reversals. The opposite of the strategic isolation the campaign was designed to achieve. Three months before America discovered, in the harshest possible terms, the structural fragility of its munitions industrial base, Japan had already become a backfill source for U.S. air defense stockpiles. Before USS Tripoli left Sasebo for the Middle East with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard, Japan had already conducted the first lethal weapons transfer in its postwar history. Tokyo did not need Operation Epic Fury to teach it the lesson. Tokyo had adopted the conclusion in December 2022, accelerated it in late 2024, fielded the capability in March 2026, and codified its industrial role in April 2026. The most consequential strategic fact about Japan's response to the Iran war is that the response had begun before the war. This is not luck. This is doctrine. And it is the single most important variable in the Indo-Pacific equation that Beijing now has to solve. My full analysis below. 🔗

Le journal estonien Delphi a obtenu des leaks de plusieurs entreprises sous-traitant la propagande russe. Leak partagé avec Le Monde. On y apprend quelques détails sur les opérations visant la France, notamment l'affaire des têtes de cochon. Et on découvre des opérations auxquelles on a -probablement- échappé. Dommage: 1⃣ Le De Gaulle de Wish : Un texte intitulé "Général - plan d'action" visait à vandaliser une statue du général de Gaulle avec des slogans anti Pierre de Gaulle, en faisant croire que les auteurs étaient ukrainiens. Les slogans prévus: "Pierre de Gaulle, retourne dans ta Russie !" "Pierre de Gaulle, bon sang !" Oui, on sent que les slogans n'ont pas été pondus par un francophone. 2⃣ Les poupées du grand remplacement : Lancé de poupées gonflables sur la Seine, 20 blanches, 10 noires, avec des slogans anti immigrés. 3⃣ Génocide arménien : Projet de collage d'autocollants à proximité des ambassades turque et azerbaidjanaise commémorant le génocide arménien. Source: Le Monde lemonde.fr/pixels/article…

None of this is organic.

Sub en

Newly hacked files offer rare insight into Kremlin propaganda operations. These include planting bloody pig heads in front of mosques in Paris; election interference campaigns and propaganda laundering through Israeli media. Let’s dive into #FactoryofFakes🕵️‍♂️AGAIN! 1/10

@MalcolmNance @skykiss22 why would you share iranian propaganda

EXPLAIN TO ME HOW I LEARNED ABOUT THIS THROUGH AN IRGC LEGO VIDEO?

@ZeroStateReflex and "speculation" is a way for AI to cheapen the cost of your session, force it to assess against the actual base everytime it asserts something to prevent this

I'm paying for this.

Russia appears to have maneuvered at least five Cosmos satellites into nearly co-planar orbits with ICEYE-X36, a commercial SAR imaging satellite supporting Ukrainian military operations. integrityisr.com/is-russia-mane…

A key factor compounding the urgency to build resilience in critical underwater infrastructure (CUI) is the cable-repair time, which has varied over the last decade and is understood to be influenced by issues such as repair-ship capacity and permitting requirements. The Submarine Telecoms Forum’s 2025–26 report states that, from 2015 to 2020, cable-repair times averaged 24 days, with the shortest being 17 days in 2018 and the longest being 30 days in 2016. Severe delays to cable repairs occurred in 2021 and 2022, when repair times spiked to 53 and 78 days respectively, the longest durations in over a decade. However, the last few years have seen a reduction to 40, 34 and 32 days in 2023, 2024 and 2025 respectively. The latest IISS research report examines the challenges created by subsea cable disruptions and assesses policy responses. Read the latest research now: go.iiss.org/4dg7uLf ✏️ @darshanabaruah, @R_Schulenburg, @Wakana_Asano