Hasan T. Alhasan حسن الحسن

In our latest for ⁦@ForeignAffairs⁩, ⁦we⁩ examine the consequences of the new regional disorder - aggressive & unrestrained Israel, weakened but vengeful Iran and unpredictable US - for the Gulf states' interests. Bottom line: not looking good. foreignaffairs.com/israel/middle-…

“Iranian regime believes it can outlast Trump and therefore has no real reason to compromise” There are 3 camps emerging in the Gulf @HTAlhasan tells me regarding the approach to the Iranian regional threat * Accommodative (Oman). Compromises need to be made to a large neighbor who isn’t going away * Confrontationists (UAE, Bahrain). Diplomacy has failed. Military deterrence needed - somewhere in the middle (KSA, Qatar, Kuwait) ultimately no alternative to an immediate de-escalation as military strikes haven’t achieved political effects Watch here: bloomberg.com/news/videos/20…

"A group of four regional powers – Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye – are closing ranks...The new Middle Eastern quadrilateral appears to be an attempt to counterbalance Israel’s designs to ‘redraw’ the map of the Middle East and to address shared security concerns, most notably the United States–Israeli war with Iran," @HTAlhasan writes iiss.org/online-analysi…

As Kuwait and Qatar report fresh attacks, the Arab Gulf states risk being drawn into prolonged low-intensity warfare by Iran and Iran-backed militias in Iraq — a danger intensified by Trump’s seemingly desperate push to put a lid on the war ahead of his meeting with Xi.

Since the recent conflict in Iran, a new geopolitical bloc involving Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye has been forming in the Middle East. While not formalised, the four states are poised to tackle shared security concerns together. Read the latest analysis by @HTAlhasan: go.iiss.org/4evtnY3

The Egypt–Pakistan–Saudi Arabia–Türkiye quadrilateral formed as a reaction to Israel’s aggressiveness and the fallout from the US/Israel war with Iran. My latest for @IISS_org 👇 iiss.org/online-analysi…

@NicoleGrajewski @RumleyGM Always a pleasure Nicole

Really enjoyed this panel with @HTAlhasan, Matthew Tavares, and @RumleyGM — a great discussion on Russian and Chinese military support to Iran.

Once Trump's attention shifts elsewhere and the US draws down its military presence in the region, there will be little to stop Iran from exercising economic blackmail against the Gulf states (and many others) by threatening to block Hormuz, even if selectively. 3/3

Assuming Trump prefers a face-saving exit over war, it is unlikely he'll prioritise the Gulf states' security concerns including Iran's missiles, UAVs or support for regional militia networks which were always intractable issues anyway. 2/3

Realistically at this stage, the Gulf states can at best hope to avoid a bad outcome where Trump concedes too much - e.g. withdrawal of US forces, lifting of sanctions, etc. - in return for nuclear concessions and return to normalcy in Hormuz. 1/3 reuters.com/business/energ…

Wouldn’t a US swap/loan be preferable to the alternatives? Borrowing now is more expensive due to war premium - Abu Dhabi has raised $4.5bn since March - and liquidating SWF assets may lock in losses. Politically, the UAE may feel the US owes it the show of solidarity. 2/2

Valid points, but here’s a slightly different way of framing it: why wouldn’t the UAE seek cheaper access to USD from the Treasury/Fed? The UAE Central Bank’s forex reserves cover 5-6 months’ worth of imports. Not bad but could be stretched thin in wartime. 1/2

“Different Gulf states want different things,” @HTAlhasan tells me, stressing there is no unified GCC position on what an Iran endgame should look like. (1/2)

Enter the era of Gulf hyper transactionalism. Subtext of Dr Gargash’s post: UAE will scrutinize support (or lack thereof) shown by allies and partners during war and recalibrate relations accordingly. Reflects widely shared sentiment of abandonment in the Gulf by key partners.

Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has climbed to its highest level since the conflict began, but most of that growth is still being driven by Iran-linked trade, and transits remain far below normal levels

Missing context: by March 24, the date of the first alleged US missile launch from Kuwait, Iran had rained over 800 missiles and UAVs on Kuwait for over three weeks straight, damaging its airport, refineries and other civilian and military infrastructure.

Excellent work by IISS -Middle East’s Noor Hammad on the proliferation of AI-enabled military tech in the region. Here, she zeroes in on the connections between Israel’s AI-enabled military networks and big tech commercial providers, highlighting lapses in corporate governance.

Leaving the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian control amounts to handing Iran the keys to global energy markets and security, I told @BeckyCNN. The Gulf states share the global collective interest of securing a deal to end the war that restores normal passage through the strait.

Trump has apparently chosen the worst of all possible options for the Gulf states: a gratuitous escalation that will result in more Iranian attacks against the Gulf states while leaving the Strait of Hormuz hostage to Iran, I told @BeckyCNN.

Sheer and utter madness

Ending the war in the near future while Iran still controls the crucial waterway would be a geopolitical disaster for America’s allies and partners in the Middle East and beyond, said Hasan Alhasan, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Iran would be able to enforce selective sanctions on whomever it wants and whenever it wants, and essentially hold the flow of shipping through the strait at risk if it desires to do so,” Alhasan said. “This would ensure indefinite Iranian leverage over the Gulf states’ economies and over global energy security, and it would leave Iran in a state in which it is still capable of posing a threat, wounded, embittered, and in a hostile posture vis-à-vis most countries in the region.” @HTAlhasan wsj.com/world/middle-e…