P3Guy ✝️ 🇺🇸⚓✈️ 🌪️⛑️ 🇺🇦🇮🇱

@dilanesper I'm not convinced of that. The threat environment is diverse. Also, important is to have some uncertainty for any potential attacker. But Joe Rice is right, the big crowds have long been a major terrorism vulnerability - good place for anti-personnel attacks.

The dirty little secret is a lot of TSA security is theater and we could lighten the touch a fair amount and it would be faster and planes still would not blow up.

@Michael56411049 @ArmsControlWonk BTW, I also would sit outside and watch the fireworks. It is pretty hard to create a large enough radioactive exposure to bother me. OTOH I had 22 REM (old unit) of radiation last year and again so far this year. So I'm already glowing.

@JMooreP3 @ArmsControlWonk Exactly. The rhetorical power of your illustration is dependant on the assumption that Iran is not aware of the poor CEP of their IRBMs and therefore will never up-arm them with warheads more appropriate to the application.

At 4,000+ km, I would happily sit in a lawn chair on the tarmac at Diego Garcia with a bottle of wine while Iran fired two conventionally-armed IRBMs at me. My only hesitation would be the quality of the wine.

@Michael56411049 @ArmsControlWonk What illustration? I think you meant to respond to Dr. Jeffrey Lewis.

@Michael56411049 @ArmsControlWonk That is not conventional

@ArmsControlWonk By "conventionally-armed", you mean tipped with toxic radioactive by-products of their nuclear enrichment, yes?

@JesslovesMJK How about those people whose immune systems were totally messed up by single or repeated COVID infections?

VAERS works. It's just ignored. Those are rates per 100,000 total counts of AEs per year. I am looking into what the most reported AE types are by category. Considering the Bexsero data sheet states that altered immunocompetence might mess up responses to Bexsero (for example), it's worth asking the question, what of the people who's immune systems were totally messed up by the COVID-19 shots? hashtag symptom laundering

@Lessbelievable @MarioNawfal @mercoglianos Yes, it's a tough bird. But against even Vietnam era weapons like radar directed ZSU-23-4, it would be in trouble.

@JMooreP3 @MarioNawfal @mercoglianos Sometime look into just how much punishment the rest of the plane can take and still fly. Most systems have two or three redundancy systems.

🇺🇸🇮🇷 The ugliest plane in the Air Force is the perfect weapon for Hormuz The A-10 was built for exactly this kind of fight. It flies low enough to spot fast-attack boats hiding in coastal inlets, carries a 30mm cannon that fires 3,900 rounds per minute, and is wrapped in a titanium bathtub that shrugs off ground fire. It can loiter for hours waiting for IRGC boats to make a move. The Pentagon tried to retire it for years. Iran made it relevant again. Source: AiTelly

@DorinCheptea @SHELLYJACOBS @ThetiMapping US forces have no doubt already achieved much of this. It's a whack-a-mole game. Most moles have been whacked. Note the dramatic decrease in rate of Iranian fire.

@JMooreP3 @SHELLYJACOBS @ThetiMapping It's probably a matter of scale. Current US forces would probably achieve this result in 5 years. All NATO forces - in 6 months. But politically they want it done in 1 month. The math does not add up.

👇Many people are wondering how Iran continues to fire a steady amount of ballistic missiles both at Israel and the GCC on a daily basis, even managing to increase the rate of fire recently. I've mapped out the most popular Iranian missile bases used for such launches. - Green icon = most frequently used launch sites - Yellow = intermittent launches, a few recorded incidents over the past 1-2 weeks - Red = launches on rare occasions This map shows how the center of gravity for Iranian launches on Israel quickly shifted away from major silos the western part of the country (Tabriz, Urmia, Kermanshah & Dezful) towards the center. The most frequent launches come from the Koohestan (Yazd) missile base, located at least 1730km away from Israel. Yesterday the US dropped bunker busters on this facility, targeting above-ground structures and tunnel entrances. Over the coming days we'll see whether this actually has an effect on the launches. Other popular firing posts towards Israel include Shiraz, Isfahan, and Tehran. There are at least 3 separate launching points near each of those cities. I would wager the number in the Tehran metro area is even larger, and I have some theories as to where additional BMs are stored, but I can't verify it with satellite imagery. In all likelihood I've missed a handful of bases, but at least I compiled all the publicly known ones (30 that are at least somewhat active as of the past fortnight). The blue lines represent potential trajectories from the most popular launch spots. It can be seen that there a few bases located at exceptionally long ranges, such as Shahmirzad & Shahrud. The damage to these sites is insignificant, and their importance will increase when Iran decides to preserve its remaining stockpiles and TELs in the central part of the country. There are even rare instances where a single launch comes out of the western missile bases. This is possible if most of the preparation is done underground and the TEL shoots and scoots, returning to hardened tunnels covered by dozens or even 100+ meters of granite. But such a manuever is risky due to strong Israeli recon UAV presence in western Iran and frequent aircraft sorties along the Iraq border. So far Israel's been more effective in suppressing missile fire from western Iran than CENTCOM has been along the southern coast. Even bases that are basically tangent to the Persian Gulf remain relatively active. Over the past 3 days the US has tried to remedy this by focus much of their firepower on underground weapons depots at tactical airbases, anti-ship missile storage, and ballistic missile sites. Most notably, there were heavy strikes on the Borazjan missile base in Bushehr Province.

@DimitriffD23376 @SHELLYJACOBS @ThetiMapping So is letting Iran continue to attack civilians and the worlds energy supplies with those missiles. We did that in View. It didn't hurt our alliances.

@JMooreP3 @SHELLYJACOBS @ThetiMapping Sería un terrible precedente de dominio y control mundial,de 2 paises contra el mundo..."o estás conmigo o estás contra ni"

@cattturdd2 @donK101stAB @SpencerGuard @IDF Way too many bombs would be needed.... Many square miles.

@JMooreP3 @donK101stAB @SpencerGuard @IDF I’m obviously no army or navy general, but wouldn’t it be an idea to just bomb the whole coast line at the straight?

“Decapitation strikes don’t work,” they say. “The strategy isn’t working,” they say after 5, 10, or 20 days. Strategic effects are cumulative. Impatience is not analysis. Let's review just what Israel has stuck in Iran according to @IDF 🧵

@dilanesper Yea, and then we do what we should have done... Get rid of the death cult regime and all it's crazies.

By the way, let's say the new rule is "no country we consider an adversary is allowed to develop a rocket that could go more than 3000 miles". does that mean going forward we destroy Iran's space program and deny it the right to have one?

@SHELLYJACOBS @ThetiMapping Interesting analysis. But… how about attacking the tunnel entrances, and maintaining real time observation of the areas to detect other entrances. This could include anti-personnel mines to slow down repairs. This seem so obvious that I must be missing something.

Nuclear explosives—specifically earth-penetrating nuclear warheads (nuclear “bunker-busters”)—would neutralize the vast majority of Iran’s underground missile storage and launch facilities (“missile cities”), including those buried at the claimed maximum depths of ~500 meters. Iran’s tunnel complexes are excavated into mountains or rock, often unlined or lightly reinforced. Conventional bunker-busters like the GBU-57 MOP penetrate only ~8–25 meters into medium rock (or up to ~60–80 m in ideal soil) before exploding, which is why even repeated strikes in 2026 have only sealed entrances, collapsed access tunnels, or damaged shallower sections—leaving deeper chambers and dispersed assets intact enough for residual barrages. Nuclear earth-penetrators (e.g., the U.S. B61-11, with variable yield up to ~300–400 kt) work differently and far more effectively: - They penetrate only a few meters (2–15 m depending on soil/rock) before detonating. - Most of the energy couples directly into the ground as seismic shockwaves and overpressure (15–50× more efficient than a surface burst). - This creates a crushing ground-shock radius that collapses lined tunnels down to ~300 m depth and unlined rock tunnels down to ~550 m (per declassified physics modeling for a 320 kt yield). - At 500 m claimed depths, a single well-placed higher-yield strike (or sequenced lower-yield ones) would generate enough seismic energy to destroy stored missiles, launch rails, fuel mixers, command nodes, and ventilation/power systems across large sections of a tunnel complex. The site becomes unusable long-term due to structural collapse, fire, and radiation contamination. Deeper/harder sites (rare, but possible in granite mountains) or those beyond ~500–700 m would require even higher yields (low megaton range) or multiple warheads, but no publicly verified Iranian facility exceeds the effective range of existing U.S. nuclear EPWs. However, this would NOT neutralize “all” missile storage and launch threats completely: - Iran’s network is highly dispersed (dozens of major sites + hundreds of smaller tunnels across multiple provinces), with many decoys, mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) that operate outside fixed bunkers, and pre-dispersed missiles. - Precise geolocation of every deep chamber is imperfect; horizontal tunnels inside mountains are hard to map fully from orbit. - Residual production, command-and-control, and road-mobile forces would survive unless struck separately. - In the current March 2026 conflict, conventional strikes have already degraded ~60–90% of launchers and production; nukes could finish the fixed underground portion rapidly but would leave a fragmented, mobile remainder. Catastrophic downsides make this a last-resort option only: - Massive radioactive fallout from ground-coupled bursts (venting is unavoidable at practical penetration depths). - Widespread civilian casualties and long-term contamination across Iran. - Extreme escalation risk (potential Iranian retaliation if they have any nuclear assets, or broader regional/international nuclear involvement). No nuclear weapons have been used in the 2026 campaign—everything remains conventional precisely because of these thresholds. In pure technical terms, nukes are the only current tool capable of reliably defeating Iran’s deepest hardened missile infrastructure; conventional airpower can attrit but not eliminate it.

@posctamu11 @iwasnevrhere_ Why no stealth. You can operate close in with stealth.

The additional keyword to this is what General Cain mentioned regarding the change in operation from Stand-Off to Stand-In. This means utilizing short range weapons and not utilizing the stealth capabilities. Thus makes it easier to find aircraft even like F35 and target it with infrared weapons

A look at the thermal reality behind the F-35’s supposed invincibility. While stealth is optimized for radio-frequency evasion, it cannot hide the intense heat signature produced by the Pratt & Whitney F135 engine. Reports indicate that Iran most likely utilized the 358 anti-aircraft missile (SA-67), a hybrid loitering munition that acts as a kamikaze drone for the sky. By loitering in a figure-eight pattern and using passive optical and infrared sensors rather than radar, this system is designed to bypass stealth coatings entirely.

@1D10Two @iwasnevrhere_ Seeker blinding laser tech is a lot cheaper, and already used in U.S. aircraft.

@iwasnevrhere_ Rear position microwave battery will solve all of this something around 200 megawatt should do it, but I'd have to run the numbers on I'm just guessing and don't even know if they exist.

@JIsnogood @HemanNamo @SpencerGuard @IDF Seriously dumb idea. US military would strongly disagree with u.

@HemanNamo @SpencerGuard @IDF USA right now has at least two hands tied behind their back because of a Government whose loyalty to it's own military is questionable.

@donK101stAB @SpencerGuard @IDF The straight takes very little to close. The tech isn’t new, it was already in inventory. . The grip on the population is weakening, with the Israeli strikes om Basij, IRGC and top leadership, plume covert Israeli subversion ops.

@SpencerGuard @IDF Please explain to me how a nation supposedly on the brink from all of these 'decapitation' strikes manages to effectively close the strait, introduce new tech nobody thought they had into the war and still has an iron grip on their population?

@Jon44444444 @SpencerGuard @IDF Mossad is talking to people like that, in very convincing ways.

@SpencerGuard @IDF I understand all of John's qualifications, but, still, I would have hoped that by now there would have been someone equivalent to a regional IRGC commander to defect.

@Blain_Shinno @SpencerGuard @IDF I’d bet that we have covert assets there now. Israel probably does too… for this purpose, probably not Jews.

@SpencerGuard @IDF How do you fight a nation that views survival as victory? Esp. If they still have enriched uranium. Don’t you need to bring down the regime from inside like Afghanistan - put CIA Ground Branch and SOF on the ground. Can you start with Tehran?

@FadeTheXX @MarioNawfal I have seen A-10s fitting right past me in Arizona, we get lots of sand and dust.

@MarioNawfal If the A10 flew into a cloud of sand/particulate matter, the engines likely would be dunzo no?

@cremieuxrecueil The key phrase is "well nourished."

This was such a surprising headline until the last four words. I expect diminishing returns for practically everything you can supplement, calcium not excepted.