Sabitlenmiş Tweet
Doubled my $IREN position this week. I think a re-rating is imminent. My gut says they’ll be ordering a second, even bigger batch of Blackwells soon. That’s when the real fireworks begin IMO.
English
Jacques B.
1.2K posts
Jacques B.
@JacquesBahou
Exploiting the disconnect between secular trends and asset pricing.
Dubai Katılım Eylül 2009
611 Takip Edilen1.2K Takipçiler
What’s your average price for $IREN?
I’m sitting at $36.94. Glad I haven’t seen any major deals yet.
Sweetwater 1 hyperscaler hasn’t been announced. Why force an announcement in this environment?
$NBIS made all their announcements then hit shareholders with dilution. Erased all gains.
$IREN took the dilution first. Catalysts are still ahead🤝
English
@Agrippa_Inv @pei_liu3 @Lazarus_Capital Nebius hiding their economics tells investors everything they need to know 🤣
If their moat was real and the economics were good, they’d be showing them off, not hiding them while raising cash.
English
Just use your $73k pricing for 130k units, same story. Off by >$2b. I actually know from insiders that $nbis got the same top-line terms as $iren per GPU.
Which points to the fact that $NBIS must purchase ~132k GPUs... Ironically that's pretty much the exact figure you'd expect for a Blackwell equipped data center at 300 MW (IT).
You are invested in $NBIS based on faulty assumptions, ouh the irony. That's exactly why management doesn't publish their deal figures.
Investors would quickly realize their "software moat" is nowhere to be found in these large-scale HS deals.
English
Why I’m Not Invested in $NBIS
First of all, let me make one thing clear: contrary to what you might think, I’m not an $NBIS bear. But then again, I’m not invested either… and for good reason.
Nebius positions itself as a holistic cloud platform with superior software technology that caters to AI-native start-ups and enterprise clients.
That in and of itself isn’t a problem, but it means they're directly competing against the largest hyperscalers in the world, who are also targeting that exact cohort with their own set of software solutions (Google Cloud, Microsoft, etc.).
Nonetheless, if $NBIS can successfully differentiate itself with its core offerings, it could gain some pricing power, which is the company’s best shot at one day becoming profitable.
The problem is, $NBIS is VERY far away from that…
Looking at the last quarterly filing, the company’s gross expenses + depreciation equaled ~110% of its revenues. In other words, these two cost categories exceeded the value of the underlying revenues ($249.2m vs. revenue of $227.7m).
To be fair, last quarter Nebius still used a 4 year depreciation schedule on GPUs, which is rather short and overstates depreciation.
Adjusting for a 5 year depreciation schedule (industry standard) leads us to $144.6m of depreciation. Then, adding gross expenses of $68.5m on top gets you to $213.1m, which equals 93.5% of revenues.
And keep in mind, this figure does NOT include the hundreds of millions in costs spent on SG&A, R&D, and financing (interest).
So what’s my point with this?
The problem is, these are STRUCTURAL costs, the kind that scale with revenue, meaning you can’t easily grow out of them through sheer scale.
My point is that $NBIS' pricing power is nowhere to be seen, at least not relative to its costs.
Now, most $NBIS investors would probably argue that we are still "early" and that pricing power will show up eventually.
My problem with that argument is that the company seems to be allocating a very large chunk of its pipeline towards servicing hyperscalers through bare metal offerings, the kind of “bulk” service that does NOT command significant pricing power.
That means, fundamentally speaking, $NBIS is likely very far away from actually becoming profitable.
And while right now everyone is focused on headline figures like ARR, the market’s patience will run out eventually... it ALWAYS does for every company.
One day, the market will demand to see real profits flow down to the bottom line, and I’m not sure if $NBIS is structurally positioned to deliver on that any time soon.
To make matters worse, investors can’t even model out the economics of these large hyperscaler deals, because management provides absolutely 0 information on anything except headline figures.
We don’t even know the CapEx associated with these deals, or at the very least, the number of GPUs they have to purchase to fulfill their end of the bargain.
Contrast that with a company like $IREN, which gives you all the necessary information to build an entire P&L and cash flow model over the full course of the contract length, which is exactly what I’ve done extensively for our subscribers on Substack.
I have a VERY good idea of how much actual post-tax net income $IREN is making in every year of their hyperscaler contract.
There are other reasons that further point in the same direction, but I won’t get into them right now.
If they fix their cost structure one day, I’m happy to reconsider my stance.
But as of today, their “black box” approach to publishing details on their largest deals makes them uninvestable for me.
English
Don’t day trade
Don’t use options
Don’t use leverage
Don’t use margin
Buy undervalued companies & focus on the long term
What’s so difficult about this?
English
BREAKING: live satellite image from $NBIS flagship site
wen delivery?
English
@aleabitoreddit Again: IREN will outperform NBIS over the next 2 years, and there’s nothing you can do about it. No amount of useless posts will help. Get over it.
English
$NBIS vs. $IREN.
The difference is night and day.
Nebius: $2B dilution from $NVDA, zero immediate selling pressure to the public float
Iren: $6B dilution from ATM into selling pressure into the open market. This extracts liquidity directly from the public and suppresses momentum
Very clear, which company leads to higher share value appreciation from capex financing.
One is strategic with Nvidia, the other is toxic financing.
English
@21Kwestions Management hasn’t specified, but I’d assume sometime around May or June.
English
$IREN is building a layered capital structure in which each completed project increases the company’s borrowing capacity for the next wave of growth.
The first layer of that model is already visible.
For the Microsoft contract, IREN said the GPU financing plus the customer prepayment covers about 95% of GPU-related capex, and that the facility is expected to be secured by the related GPUs and contracted cash flows. That shows the compute layer is increasingly financed at the asset and contract level rather than through equity.
The second layer begins once construction risk is removed.
After a data center shell starts generating stable cash flow, it becomes a fundamentally different credit asset than it was during development. At that point, IREN can borrow against the infrastructure itself, whether at the project level, portfolio level, or eventually corporate level. In the same Q2 FY26 materials, IREN explicitly said its financing workstreams include GPU financing, data center financing, and select corporate-level initiatives. Management is clearly building this stack in layers.
The third layer is where the model compounds.
As IREN’s asset base grows and cash flows diversify across more tenants, sites, and geographies, its credit profile strengthens. A broader and more diversified pool of hard assets and recurring revenues commands better financing terms than a single project standing alone. In other words, a larger and more diversified IREN gets to refinance and raise debt on better terms over time than a smaller, more concentrated IREN.
That is the core insight: debt capacity is not static. It expands as the platform matures.
First, debt is secured by GPUs and contracted project cash flows.
Then, debt is layered onto completed and stabilized infrastructure.
Later, broader corporate or portfolio debt is supported by the combined cash flows and hard assets of the platform.
So each completed project does not just add revenue. It adds borrowing capacity for what comes next.
IREN is essentially arbitraging cost of capital across different layers of the stack, using its vertical integration and growing asset base to move from narrow, asset-specific financing toward broader, lower-risk platform-level debt over time.
This is also where the $6 billion ATM fits best.
The ATM should not be viewed only as a dilution threat. In IREN’s case, it is optional firepower, not urgent need, especially given that the company is already cash flow positive and clearly has access to other forms of capital.
Within this framework, a large unused ATM still strengthens the financing machine. Even if it is not tapped immediately, it increases balance sheet flexibility, improves counterparty confidence, and strengthens IREN’s hand when negotiating the next layer of debt. Lenders like knowing the borrower has an equity backstop available, even if management intends to use it only opportunistically.
Put simply, IREN is building a self-reinforcing capital flywheel.
It finances the compute layer with customer-backed and asset-backed structures.
It then de-risks the infrastructure layer and adds debt against stabilized assets.
As the portfolio matures and diversifies, it gains access to broader and cheaper corporate or portfolio debt.
The ATM sits on top of that structure as optional equity capacity, supporting negotiations and giving management flexibility to issue shares selectively when the cost of equity is attractive.
In that model, the same equity dollar funds multiple growth cycles instead of being trapped inside a single project.
That means lower dilution than the market assumes and better returns on equity over time as mature assets are refinanced into new growth.
If management keeps turning contracted GPUs into asset-backed debt, completed shells into refinanceable infrastructure, and a growing asset base into lower-cost platform-level borrowing, then IREN’s capital structure becomes one of its biggest competitive advantages.
Jacques B.@JacquesBahou
$IREN is executing one of the most elegant capital arbitrages in the history of digital infrastructure. 1. The Macro The investment thesis starts with a fundamental truth: The demand for compute is infinite. We are attempting to decode the source code of reality—solving biology, physics, and economics with math. To do that, we need uncapped intelligence. But intelligence runs on electrons. While the demand for answers is infinite, the supply of power is capped by physics and bureaucracy. We are entering an era where Power is the currency of discovery. The value of a committed electron in 2030 will be multiple times what it is today. $IREN is a leveraged long position on this specific physical constraint. 2. The "Triple Arbitrage" (The Real Engine) Most investors are missing the Capital Stack Arbitrage that the Roberts brothers (ex-Macquarie infrastructure bankers) have built. They are exploiting pricing inefficiencies across three different markets simultaneously: Arbitrage A: The WACC Gap (Debt vs. Equity) IREN borrows capital at Infrastructure Rates (low-cost debt backed by hard assets like land/substations) but deploys it into Tech Yields (20-30% ROIC on AI/Cloud). Most companies pay Tech costs for Tech yields. IREN pays Utility costs for Tech yields. The spread is pure profit. Arbitrage B: The "Float" (OPM) Microsoft is prepaying billions to secure capacity. A prepayment is a 0% interest loan. They are using the customer’s balance sheet to fund the CapEx. When your Cost of Capital is 0%, your Return on Equity (ROE) effectively approaches infinity. Arbitrage C: The Developer Spread They execute Greenfield Development at Replacement Cost (Commodity pricing for steel and chips). Once that center is stabilized with a hyperscaler tenant, it re-rates to an Infrastructure Platform (trading at ~24x EBITDA like Equinix). They capture the massive valuation spread between the risk of construction and the value of stabilization. 3. The “Terminal Value” Kill Shot Conventional analysis depreciates the infrastructure (Land, Power, Substations) to zero over time. This is financial malpractice. In a power-starved world, an Interconnection Agreement is one of the most appreciating assets on the planet. Amazon paid ~$677k per MW to Talen Energy for a hollow shell just to get the power access. IREN owns the "Grid Valve" in a world where the line to get a new valve is 7 years long. The Verdict $IREN is securing one of the scarcest assets in the world (Power) using the cheapest capital in the world (Microsoft’s Float) to generate one of the highest yields in the world (AI Compute).
English
A great summary of the $IREN way.
Well done @JacquesBahou 🔥
Jacques B.@JacquesBahou
$IREN is building a layered capital structure in which each completed project increases the company’s borrowing capacity for the next wave of growth. The first layer of that model is already visible. For the Microsoft contract, IREN said the GPU financing plus the customer prepayment covers about 95% of GPU-related capex, and that the facility is expected to be secured by the related GPUs and contracted cash flows. That shows the compute layer is increasingly financed at the asset and contract level rather than through equity. The second layer begins once construction risk is removed. After a data center shell starts generating stable cash flow, it becomes a fundamentally different credit asset than it was during development. At that point, IREN can borrow against the infrastructure itself, whether at the project level, portfolio level, or eventually corporate level. In the same Q2 FY26 materials, IREN explicitly said its financing workstreams include GPU financing, data center financing, and select corporate-level initiatives. Management is clearly building this stack in layers. The third layer is where the model compounds. As IREN’s asset base grows and cash flows diversify across more tenants, sites, and geographies, its credit profile strengthens. A broader and more diversified pool of hard assets and recurring revenues commands better financing terms than a single project standing alone. In other words, a larger and more diversified IREN gets to refinance and raise debt on better terms over time than a smaller, more concentrated IREN. That is the core insight: debt capacity is not static. It expands as the platform matures. First, debt is secured by GPUs and contracted project cash flows. Then, debt is layered onto completed and stabilized infrastructure. Later, broader corporate or portfolio debt is supported by the combined cash flows and hard assets of the platform. So each completed project does not just add revenue. It adds borrowing capacity for what comes next. IREN is essentially arbitraging cost of capital across different layers of the stack, using its vertical integration and growing asset base to move from narrow, asset-specific financing toward broader, lower-risk platform-level debt over time. This is also where the $6 billion ATM fits best. The ATM should not be viewed only as a dilution threat. In IREN’s case, it is optional firepower, not urgent need, especially given that the company is already cash flow positive and clearly has access to other forms of capital. Within this framework, a large unused ATM still strengthens the financing machine. Even if it is not tapped immediately, it increases balance sheet flexibility, improves counterparty confidence, and strengthens IREN’s hand when negotiating the next layer of debt. Lenders like knowing the borrower has an equity backstop available, even if management intends to use it only opportunistically. Put simply, IREN is building a self-reinforcing capital flywheel. It finances the compute layer with customer-backed and asset-backed structures. It then de-risks the infrastructure layer and adds debt against stabilized assets. As the portfolio matures and diversifies, it gains access to broader and cheaper corporate or portfolio debt. The ATM sits on top of that structure as optional equity capacity, supporting negotiations and giving management flexibility to issue shares selectively when the cost of equity is attractive. In that model, the same equity dollar funds multiple growth cycles instead of being trapped inside a single project. That means lower dilution than the market assumes and better returns on equity over time as mature assets are refinanced into new growth. If management keeps turning contracted GPUs into asset-backed debt, completed shells into refinanceable infrastructure, and a growing asset base into lower-cost platform-level borrowing, then IREN’s capital structure becomes one of its biggest competitive advantages.
English
15 minute calls now available, limit 1 call per week; only $69,420 per call
English
There’s only one certainty in life.
If Jim Cramer. Wallstreetbets. And retail doomposters on X.
All agree on one thing:
Oil to 150-200 and a possible recession.
It’s wrong.
Crude Oil has since dropped 16% intraday from 116 to 98.
Serenity@aleabitoreddit
Am I the only one that just flipped bullish when: - Retail on X - Regards on WallStreetbets - Jim Cramer Are now all doomposting indexes and are: Either are long crude oil contracts or think oil is going to $150-$200?
English
This tourist’s entire thread confuses authorization to issue equity with economic incentive to issue equity.
A large ATM is only dangerous when a company is structurally cash flow negative and needs equity to survive. That is not $IREN.
Ex growth capex, IREN is already cash generative. It is not a forced seller of equity.
Once a company is not a forced issuer, the existence of an ATM simply creates financing optionality.
In IREN’s case, that optionality cannot be analyzed in isolation because the company has a credible alternative that does not require equity issuance: colocation.
Colocation can be financed with high leverage and operating cash flow while still generating attractive returns. That creates a real benchmark against which any equity funded HPC project must be evaluated.
As a result, it is not enough for an HPC project to appear attractive on a standalone basis. It must generate superior risk adjusted returns, after fully accounting for the cost of capital, including the cost of equity, relative to what IREN could achieve through colocation with no dilution.
That naturally implies something else: the ATM only becomes rational to use once the stock price is high enough that the implied cost of equity is low enough to justify it. That threshold is likely materially above the current share price.
Serenity@aleabitoreddit
$IREN $6 Billion ATM is massive. For the people who hold $IREN, the truth you might not want to hear is: -> Wait until existing holders get diluted to oblivion -> Use them to "buy the dip" of $6 Billion in new shares for you. -> Go long after. If you're long now: That inevitable $6B in new shares + selling pressure structurally caps upside in your equity and serves as a overhang in any rally. Companies don’t file a $6B ATM not to use it. They will, and as much as they can on any rally. The reality is that there are other financing methods, but ATMs are the most destructive ones to retail shareholders. $IREN itself is a solid company unlike movie theater stocks, but like excessive dilution referenced: You will likely see the marketcap of $IREN go up back toward $20B, but the your share prices tanking in value. TLDR: The harsh reality is $IREN might fundamentally succeed and build a massive DC footprint. But it's at the cost of heavily diluting retail shareholders. Retail investors should care more about the value of their own stock increasing over the company's value. Disclosure: I have zero economic interest or positions in the company, but I do care about prioritizing retail interest.
English