Kristin Ven Bruusgaard

And for all those who think that 🇫🇷and also 🇬🇧 could do more for European Nuclear Deterrence, @HFayet @andrewfutter & I have some ideas, ... tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…

I believe this deserves significant attention. Thomas Graham, who returned from Moscow last week, has invaluable insight into what Russia wants in Ukraine. His findings align with my own understanding: Putin is not merely interested in seizing territory but in ensuring that Ukraine becomes a “friendly” state. He will not accept any settlement based on a division of the country along a contact line—let alone one that involves Western forces securing it. "I was told in Moscow this is going to be the toughest issue, is what happens to that part of Ukraine that is not occupied by Russia whenever a settlement is reached? It’s quite clear from the Russian standpoint that President Putin wants to control Ukraine, and all of Ukraine. That he wants control over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, to a limited extent its domestic politics. That his vision of a future Ukraine that’s beyond Russia’s physical control is along the lines of the relationship that Belarus has with Russia at this point." cfr.org/event/media-br…

FEBRUARY–MARCH ISSUE OUT NOW! Read the latest analysis from Survival. go.iiss.org/3CZVG0e

Are you a PhD student, junior faculty member or early/mid-career national security practitioner interested in using wargaming as an analytic or teaching tool? Apply for the 2025 @MIT_SSP Wargaming Lab Summer Institute!

The first National Intelligence History Conference, organised by GCHQ and @bletchleypark takes place this November. This academic conference is open to everyone with a passion for intelligence history. For more information visit; bletchleypark.org.uk/nihc/

And spoiler alert: I dont think this content will do much to shift deliberations in Western capitals. END 8/8

Key question is what now? Will we see a document, will it contain more than what Putin has stated? Is this a trial balloon or is this the shabang? If so; curious that changes were so little if one were to go through the motions of updating the doctrine. 7/

Adding my two cents on the doctrinal developments in Russia in the last 24h - for what its worth. A thread 1/

@nukestrat Thanks for the kind words, Hans!

When @KBruusgaard speaks you should really listen! In this piece she elegantly & succinctly covers the complex ways different nuclear-armed states act. She challenges leaders to react to these differences in ways that reduce, not increase, nuclear risks. engelsbergideas.com/essays/the-par…

“If a second Trump administration resumes nuclear testing, Russia and China will surely follow suit—and because they have more to learn from each test, they will erode the United States’ advantage,” writes @ArmsControlWonk. foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…

In other words, the Soviets assumed the West would go nuclear from the outset and plotted to destroy these targets - while the West saw its only nuclear force as a retaliatory tool. Two different views, and a lack of understanding. /11

As part of a Special Issue on Norway, Deterrence, Reassurance and Strategic Stability in Europe, I published a new article on the NATO/Russia deterrent relationship in @jststs. Eprints availble here Deterrence asymmetry and strategic stability in Europe tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…

One Russian newspaper offers a useful guide to Russia’s most prominent “mushroom pickers” – or rather ‘mushroom cloud pickers’: individuals calling for nuclear escalation against the West. #ReadingRussia

Looks very interesting indeed @warmatters

Finally I am organising a small 1.5 day conference on Military Intelligence & PME. This is at @Forsvarshogsk on 17/18 Dec. Attendance is limited to 40 & upto 20 presentations. Prof Mike Goodman @77_msg will give the keynote. CfP below. Drop me a line if you want to present.