Dr Kylie Moore-Gilbert

Such an honour to write for @TheAtlantic In this piece I consider the shadow war of espionage between Tehran and Tel Aviv, arguing that the Islamic Republic's brutal authoritarianism and repression of its own people leaves it exposed to Israeli intel ops on its own territory.

Hilarious but also deadly serious thread on some of the more insane conspiratorial thinking of the IRGC and others over the years. Add to this the accusations that the Miras Parsian conservation NGO employees (some were my cellmates) were using cheetahs and leopards to spy on IRGC missile launching facilities.

7 Such claims are commonly dismissed as Western-fabricated conspiracy theories that the regime doesn't truly believe. Yet virtually all those who've spent long periods of time in IRGC custody have written that such conspiracy theories are a feature of IRGC thinking, not a bug. Among the best accounts of this is @KMooreGilbert's 2024 Atlantic essay: "Selected for ideological orthodoxy, the Revolutionary Guards I interacted with bought into all manner of conspiracy theories, which undoubtedly distorted their understanding of geopolitics and hamstrung their ability to interrogate suspects. I was regularly forced to listen to lengthy tirades about secretive Zionists pulling the levers of the global economy, or Israeli plots to poison the sperm counts of Muslim men in a scheme to achieve demographic supremacy. My handlers admitted to watching spy shows involving the Middle East, such as Fauda, Tehran, and Homeland. These seemed to reinforce their tendency to see the hand of Mossad behind every calamity that befell Iran, man-made or otherwise." theatlantic.com/international/…

Quite baffled that the @australian wrote an article out of one of my tweets without even approaching me for comment first theaustralian.com.au/nation/univers…

An ANU @ouranu academic co-authored a paper with none other than Mohammad Javad Zarif urging Western governments to “reduce their sanctions pressures” on Tehran and revive the 2015 nuclear deal (which Zarif himself negotiated). This paper was put out under an ANU byline and indexed in ANU's own “research output” portal. This seems to be an example of soft power foreign influence par excellence. Both ANU and the Australian security agencies must investigate the academic concerned. How does he have access to the former Iranian foreign minister? How was it that they came to co-author an article together which, not coincidentally, advances Tehran's agenda on sanctions under the guise of scholarly 'research'? As any academic who touches on Iran will tell you, this sort of thing is just the tip of the iceberg. Universities are the soft underbelly, and continuing to do nothing about foreign interference and transnational repression is no longer an option. theaustralian.com.au/nation%2Fanu-l…

Whether or not the Iran-associated group that claimed this attack is indeed behind this & previous anti-Jewish attacks, its claiming the horrific attacks & promoting such claims on pro-Iran channels constitute inciting further anti-Jewish violence. Iran & antisemitism go together

Add to this the further development of the Saudi East-West pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea

The UK needs to follow @AlboMP 's lead here and expel the Iranian ambassador

Three scenarios for where we go next on Iran. All point to the same conclusion: the best option is to take a deal to reopen the Strait in exchange for ending the blockade. They also underscore how misguided it was to start this war in the first place. 1. Base case: we eventually reach the obvious deal — end the blockade for reopening the Strait and a ceasefire. Could take 1 month or 6+. Meanwhile, global economic damage mounts. Better to cut this deal now. 2. Iran concedes and a broader deal follows (including nukes). Possible, but unlikely. The US lacks leverage, and Iran rarely backs down once it draws a line. The blockade also strains US military resources and shifts focus from Europe and the Indo-Pacific. It can’t go on forever. 3. Escalation resumes. Trump and Iran don’t want it, but incremental Iranian pressure (attacks on tankers sporadic drones at the Gulf states) could trigger US responses, with Bibi pushing escalation. We climb the ladder again. But we likely end up back where we started. That’s the point: there’s no real victory here. This was always ill-conceived—thousands dead, no progress on nukes/missiles/proxies, major US military costs, allied rifts, and global economic damage—only to end roughly where we began

My op-ed in today's @theage @smh examines the implications of having a "cardboard Ayatollah" as Supreme Leader- "unable to impose his authority from either morgue or hospital bed, Trump may have to wait for the regime’s squabbling hardliners to have it out before meaningful progress can be made on bringing the war to an end..." theage.com.au/world/middle-e…

This was an excellent discussion on the UAE’s OPEC withdrawal & GCC responses to the Iran War. Sharing top insights I heard from all 3 speakers. 🧵 1. “Gulf states, which are highly populated, were treated as operational military zones for the US military,” said @HAlthunayyan

My comments to @SBS : "The Janfada campaign to me is just another facet of the sophisticated media disinformation campaign propagated by the regime in what has become another theatre of war. The war online and in the information sphere, including Iran's viral use of memes and trolling, is in part designed to generate support for Iran, behind enemy lines, including in Australia. In my view, all Western governments have been asleep at the wheel when it comes to state-sponsored disinformation and propaganda, and we should take active steps to shut down such campaigns on the grounds of national security." sbs.com.au/news/article/i… @niv_sadr

I was in prison with Golrokh Iraee, and she features in my book. She is brave, staunch and uncompromising. I didn't always agree with her methods, but I am pleased to see her honoured with an international prize. Iranian women are formidable! @pen_int @golrokhiraee

Transnational repression is a particularly insidious problem insofar as there is little that democracies like Australia can do to stop what authoritarians like China do in China to overseas critics visiting China and their families. However, that does not mean that nothing can be done in democracies to mitigate TNR risks: - Education institutions need to stand firm on academic freedom. They need to discipline students and even academics who perpetuate TNR (whether wittingly or unwittingly). They have to be more vigilant in monitoring any student or staff groups that may be acting at the behest of authoritarian states. They must create environments which minimise the risk of self-censorship (eg no online classes for subjects which might cover sensitive material). - Governments need to be more flexible and understanding on visa requirements. If an international student is eligible to stay in Australia post-graduation under another visa, don’t make them go “home” first and potentially put them at risk of persecution. For those who are proven to be critics of their “home” authoritarian government, there is room for them to bring close family members over on an expedited basis. Democracies also need to be firm in resisting the misuse of things like interpol red notices, as well as ensuring that their financial institutions are not allowed to use “anti-money laundering” as a pretext to bar authoritarian dissidents from access to bank accounts, mortgages and the like. - Law enforcement in democracies need to be alert and be dedicated to tackling TNR. In Australia, for example, dissidents are often caught in no man’s land between (1) the Federal Police, which understands the issues but have no primary jurisdiction to deal with onshore harassment (eg stalking, acts of violence); and (2) state police forces which typically see harassment cases in the context of organised crime, domestic disputes, but know very little about the complexities of TNR. - Those who criticise “home” authoritarian governments from overseas also need to be vigilant. Don’t communicate on apps like WeChat when chatting with fellow overseas-based critics or journalists. Err on the side of being over-cautious about where in the world you can/can’t visit. Be prepared to make emotionally heartbreaking choices like not visiting “home” even for major celebrations, family illnesses and crises, and bereavements. The reality is that if you visit “home” and end up being locked up, you’re not going to be able to attend to the very things which led you to go “home” in the first place. theguardian.com/australia-news…

"This is a warning to observers of the Islamic Republic: be prepared to set aside much of what you thought you knew..." Thought-provoking substack post by Mohsen Amiri @Neshow on shifting perceptions of fear and survival within the regime, and how this new calculus will affect its behaviour into the future neshow.substack.com/p/what-does-no…

Really enjoyed this live recording of @MenziesInst Afternoon Light podcast with @GeorginaDowner at @uommedia Here we discuss the war, the future of the Islamic Republic, Evin prison, China's role, the human rights situation inside Iran and shifts within the regime including its domestic political and IRGC leadership and Islamist ideology. Recording below 👇🏻 m.youtube.com/watch?v=AaqWCa…

Another asymmetric way Iran could disrupt the global flows that make the 21st century economy, is hitting the undersea cables as the backbone of the regional flow of data For a regime that has little to lose, they are ways to further escalate should Trump think he has escalation dominance

Trump extends the US-Iran ceasefire, initially meant to expire Wednesday, indefinitely. Some thoughts: -Both the US and Iran at this point would prefer not to return to war, each for different reasons. But talks are not progressing because the two sides are very far apart; each perceives it holds the advantage. Despite the heavy power imbalance, differences in their respective tolerance of pain also matters. -Trump would prefer not to return to war for now because the domestic political costs, already growing, would mount even more (even more so should the Houthis join in and block the Bab al-Mandab, on top of Hormuz already blocked). -Iran would also prefer not to return to war; while much attention has focused on its (real) success in closing Hormuz and its perception that it won the war by not losing (true, in a narrow sense), we must also factor in the heavy losses caused by weeks of US/Israeli strikes on military, economic, and other sites. Cumulatively, these hurt a lot; this pain is compounded by the regime's broader vulnerabilities (popular resentment against the regime; an already very weak economy damaged by decades of mismanagement and sanctions). -Both perceive that they hold more leverage relative to the other: Iran, because of its success in closing Hormuz, and the US, because Trump holds a narrow view of US power (US = more powerful = Iran weaker = Iran must concede). -Both misread the other; but the net result is that neither side wants to make the first move, believing the other should concede first. -Key here is each side's tolerance for pain, and each side's perception of the other side's tolerance for pain. Iran can absorb significant pain (more precisely, the regime can pass on that pain to the population); this fight is existential for the regime, so it will be patient, play the long game, and refuse to compromise on what it views as matters existential to regime survival. -Iran also believes, not completely inaccurately, that Trump has a much lower pain threshold - that with domestic discontent mounting (notably within the MAGA coalition) and mid-term elections approaching, Trump will be reluctant to relaunch the war. Iran believes this gives it an advantage. -The result: for now, a fragile stalemate - no war, no serious peace talks, but a volatile muddling along, with neither side willing to concede or to resume fighting (for now).

"Iran is no longer best understood as a state with a powerful militia. It has become, more precisely, a powerful militia with a state – a political order with the IRGC at its core" My look at Ahmad Vahidi as the new man at the helm of Iranian statecraft theconversation.com/who-is-calling…?

The data analyst, who is now an Australian citizen, is the daughter of an Iranian diplomat implicated in a money-laundering scheme providing funds to to aid Hezbollah. Read more: bit.ly/4csFSkc