Sabih

Imam al-Razi notes the arrangement between the following verses of Surah al-Baqarah: - يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ اعْبُدُوا رَبَّكُمُ الَّذِي خَلَقَكُمْ وَالَّذِينَ مِنْ قَبْلِكُمْ - وَإِنْ كُنْتُمْ فِي رَيْبٍ مِمَّا نَزَّلْنَا عَلَى عَبْدِنَا فَأْتُوا بِسُورَةٍ مِنْ مِثْلِهِ - وَبَشِّرِ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ أَنَّ لَهُمْ جَنَّاتٍ تَجْرِي مِنْ تَحْتِهَا الأنْهَارُ - يُضِلُّ بِهِ كَثِيرًا ويَهْدِي بِهِ كَثِيرًا وما يُضِلُّ بِهِ إلّا الفاسِقِينَ The sequence is: - Recognition of God's Rububiyyah and his right of worship by looking at His signs. - Recognizing miracle of the Qur'an and the prophethood. - The hereafter and importance of doing good deeds and avoiding bad ones. - Predestination. But one could also read in that even after first three are affirmed, there remains the problem of those who are upon misguidance despite claiming to belong to a revealed tradition.

Five Tendencies within the Ashʿarī Tradition 1. Philosophical Kalamists Scholars whose kalām was substantially influenced by falsafah and philosophical terminology. Rather than merely refuting competing systems, they often engaged in taḥqīq, adopting what they deemed sound and rejecting what they deemed unsound. Consequently, they occasionally critiqued earlier Ashʿarī formulations and reassessed inherited metaphysical questions. In some cases, one finds engagement and synthesis with other intellectual traditions, such as the Akbarian school of Ibn ʿArabī. Representative figures include Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī, al-Bayḍāwī, and al-Ījī, while al-Rāzī’s al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyah serves as a representative work of this tendency. 2. Systematic Kalamists Scholars who prioritized rigorous logical demonstration, precise theological definitions, and the systematic organization of doctrine. Within this tendency, taʾwīl generally became the dominant approach to the ambiguous attribute texts. While benefiting from developments in logic, they typically approached rival theological and philosophical systems as errors to be refuted rather than traditions from which doctrine might be synthesized. Representative figures include al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī, and al-Sanūsī, while Sharḥ al-Muqaddimāt serves as a representative work of this tendency. 3. Scriptural Kalamists Theologians who defended Sunni doctrine through kalām while remaining closely grounded in the Qurʾān, Sunnah, and the early Sunni tradition. Their works combine rational argumentation with scriptural evidence and transmitted authorities. While accepting taʾwīl when required to preserve tanzīh, they generally employed it less extensively than later kalām schools and often preferred affirmation of the transmitted wording where possible. Representative figures include Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, al-Bāqillānī, and Ibn Fūrak, while al-Bāqillānī’s al-Tamhīd serves as a representative work of this tendency. 4. Muḥaddith-Kalamists Ḥadīth scholars who also employed kalām, formulated theological principles, and engaged in taʾwīl where necessary. They generally exhibited a stronger inclination toward ithbāt and the preservation of transmitted formulations than many later kalām schools. Much of the Qurʾānic, ḥadīth, and athar-based evidence employed in support of Ashʿarī doctrine is preserved and transmitted within their works. Representative figures include al-Khaṭṭābī and al-Bayhaqī, while al-Bayhaqī’s al-Iʿtiqād wa-l-Hidāyah ilā Sabīl al-Rashād serves as a representative work of this tendency. 5. Muḥaddith-Muthbitūn Ḥadīth scholars whose method was principally affirmation, transmission, and tafwīḍ, with little or no systematic use of kalām. They generally affirmed the revealed texts, rejected tashbīh and takyīf, and avoided extensive theological speculation. Their outlook is often more closely approximated by al-Ibānah than by the later manuals of systematic kalām. Representative figures include Abū ʿUthmān al-Ṣābūnī, al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, and Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, while al-Ibānah ʿan Uṣūl al-Diyānah serves as a representative work of this tendency. These categories describe methodological tendencies within the Ashʿarī tradition, not distinct creedal schools. Their adherents shared the same fundamental doctrines but differed in their use of kalām, approach to the divine attributes, and engagement with other intellectual traditions. Nor are these categories strictly chronological; each tendency may be found throughout different periods of Ashʿarī history. Allah knows best.

@KlaarZev Stick to the topic, how does that flow frm the def of Iman and it's not an Ash'ari view.

@Nazaratives Its a sufi view. Since ahluh bidah came together you can call a sufi an ashari or an ashari a sufi. Nowadays they are known for asharism combined with sufism. They officialy married in the time of al Ghazali. Sufis were athari before, like Abdur Rahman al Sulami anti kalaam

"Ustad" Abdul Rahman al-Hasan claims that Abu Talib died a Muslim according to the Ash'aris (around 07:00). Could any of his fans dig in reasonable evidence to prove that Abu Talib is considered a Muslim in the Ash'ari school? Most of anti-Ash'ari stuff on internet by Salafis is absolute junk, just that someone with a decent knowledge did not yet get the time to take them to account. youtube.com/watch?v=rRSJDu…

@QassamiQadiri12 Your hand picked guys arent considered mu'tabar later view in the Ash'ari tradition. Even that has got nothing to do with definition of Iman.

Later Asharis believed he died upon Islam and indeed he did.

Exactly, that's the crux, these other late people simply did takalluf, they definitely did not argue for Abu Talib's Iman based on Ma'rifah being sufficient whereas our definition of Iman necessitates an additional component of Iz'aan and failure to provide verbal testimony when demanded results in nullification of the testimony, legally as well as infront of Allah. ARH is misreading the example, the example is of someone who has (a)submission in the heart, so he considers himself a Muslim but did not have the opportunity to verbally state it and (b) he was not demanded testimony. Say, he was just convinced after a debate, in his heart, holds that I am a Muslim and passes away before verbalizing Shahadah. That person is a believer infront of Allah. Abu Talib's case is opposite, he didn't have iz'an and he was demanded the testimony.

@Nazaratives @namelessfard Exactly Those that held the view that he is a mumin doesn't believe that his knowledge about the truthfulness prophethood makes him one ARH thinks they believe that he is a mumin cuz he knew the truthfulness of the prophethood!!

@abolore12345 @namelessfard Those individuals must have given other textual evidences which isn't the point. This view is not Ash'ari and most importantly, it doesn't follow from Ash'ari position on Iman. It shows the severe ignorance on part of ARH.

@namelessfard @Nazaratives Not only that, it isn't valid The proofs are weak as feathers

@Stauntan It isn't an Ash'ari view even if someone claiming to be an Ash'ari may hold that view for one reason or another. The claim of ARH is that Ash'aris believe so and so.

@Nazaratives I've seen some people state this, though idk specifically if they were asharis, but it's not exactly crazy that there are people out there who will twist whatever they can to make any family members of the prophet to be Muslims, even if confirmed kuffar.

@FznSG I think I should block you, you seems like a brain dead barelvi who read some thing and can't engage in what I wrote in Front of you. I am literally quoting to you the later Maturidi position (not Ash'ari position), are you an idiot?

@Nazaratives -- that kalam nafsi is necessarily truthful.

The classical Deobandi position aligns with the later Maturidi view that God has Qudrah over lie in Kalam Lafzi but his wisdom makes actualization of such impossible (it is impossible li-ghayrihi). The typical counter argument is to appeal to the definition of Kalam Lafzi which definitionally represents Kalam Nafsi (where lie is intrinsically impossible). However, this counter argument does not protect against a case where God may allow deception to occur which becomes a lie respective to us. The Maturidi view of Hikmah tackles this in principle, although, there is a difference between early Maturidis and some later ones. The early ones assume that God's Qudrah itself does not connect to what is "Qabih", whereas, the later one (like Bayadhi, Shamsuddin Samarqandi, etc) say that Qudrah does connect but actualization is impossible. The Ash'aris have a different way of tackling the issue.

I am telling you the Maturidi Position and you are going North and South. Of course, we know that the Quran is true because God's wisdom rules out: - deceiving people into thinking something false is His speech. - giving miracles to a false prophet. - allowing people to do Kufr/Shirk then punishing righteous and rewarding Mushrikun. While such instances REMAIN attached to the Qudrah. All of your rants are aimed at repeating endlessly that if Qudrah attaches then possibility of occurence cannot be ruled out. But that's precisely the faulty/shitty reasoning you are employing for which you havent provided anything. Imam Bayadi states when discussing sudur of Qabih: والحُسن بمعنى الأمر والنهي لحكمة الآمر الناهي، والحُسن بمعنى كون الفعل بحيث يدرك بالعقل اشتماله على عاقبة حميدة، والقبح بمعنى كونه يدرك به عدم اشتماله على ذلك لما يتصوّر أن يفعله الله تعالى، لكنه لحكمته لا يفعل ذلك كما في التبصرة والتعديل والتسديد while qubḥ is in the sense that [the act] is perceived through it [i.e., the intellect] as not entailing that — it is conceivable that God, exalted is He, could do it, but by His wisdom He never does it.

No, it's not a deception. So who is disputing it's not a Naqs? You are profoundly lacking in understanding modality. Of course, acting against wisdom is Naqs in Maturidi understanding. But Naqs is of two kinds; one upon which Qudrah has no meaning, it's intrinsically impossible like God taking a son, other, upon which affirmation of Qudrah is perfection but it's takwin (actualization) is Naqs like giving miracles to a false prophet, deceiving humans and angels into thinking something is His speech but it isn't, and so on. You are severely deficient in not being able to understand the difference between having Qudrah over something and the possibility of actualizing it (takwin).

@osman_abdigamid If you accept attributes subsisting with God then there is no reason to not accept the meanings susbsisting with God and that's not the same as Iradah because God can will for Abu Talib to die as a disbelieved but command Him to believe and the meaning of Amr subsists with God.

The similarity of a particular idea does not automatically mean that our justifications for that idea are the same. The same conclusion can be reached within completely different sets of premises. The Mu‘tazilites arrive at this conclusion based on their own premises: they generally deny the real existence of divine attributes, and therefore they deny an attribute such as kalām. I, however, being an Ash‘arite, affirm the reality of the divine attributes and approach the issue of kalām within a different framework of premises.

@osman_abdigamid Your view is mu'tazilite on the issue of Kalam.

I identify myself as an Ashʿarī; however, I do not accept the traditional Ashʿarī doctrine regarding the attribute of kalām. In particular, I do not regard kalām as an independent ṣubūtī (positive) attribute, nor do I accept the classical distinction between kalām nafsī and kalām lafẓī. It seems to me that the phenomenon of divine speech and the revelation of the Qur'an can be explained by reducing it to Allah's three fundamental attributes – knowledge (ʿilm), will (irādah), and power (qudrah) – without the need to posit a separate attribute specifically for this purpose. In this sense, I even consider myself "more Ashʿarī than the Ashʿarīs themselves." If one looks at the history of Islamic kalām, the Ashʿarīs are particularly known for placing primary emphasis on divine power and will. While the Muʿtazilīs primarily emphasized divine justice and the Māturīdīs divine wisdom, the Ashʿarī tradition revolves around the centrality of knowledge, will, and power. For that reason, I find it more consistent to explain all other theological questions through these fundamental attributes rather than introducing additional independent attributes. To me, this issue is analogous to the classical Ashʿarī-Māturīdī debate over ṣifat al-takwīn. The Māturīdīs regard takwīn as a distinct ṣubūtī attribute, whereas the Ashʿarīs generally understand it as an abstract taʿalluq (relation) of the attribute of power (qudrah), rather than as an independent attribute. Likewise, I believe that what is traditionally called ṣifat al-kalām can instead be understood as an aspect or implication of the divine will (irādah), rather than as a separate ṣubūtī attribute. Of course, this is a very extensive topic, and it is impossible to present the full argument here. Overall, however, I have always found the classical doctrine of the attribute of kalām rather strange and ultimately unconvincing.

This is absolutely false. The impossibility of a lie in Kalam Nafsi is not because its Qabih or Sudur of Qabih, it is because Kalam Nafsi is eternal essential attribute which cannot contradicts God's complete knowledge. The lie in kalam Nafsi is inconceivable like a squared circle. As for sudur of Qabih like deception,nwhich is an occurent, then its impossibility is grounded in God's wisdom, it is not intrinsically impossible. As for the point of perfection then it is part of perfection that God has Qudrah over Qabih but its Sifah of takwin does not attach to the Qabih, due to His wisdom. Even you naming the thing 'imkan kidhb' shows your jahl, in the Maturidi system, the attribute of Qudrah is not sufficient to actualize something, the Sifah of Takwin is needed, the Qudrah over Qabih can be affirmed while still believing in its impossibility (li-ghayrihi). This is the position of many later Maturidi scholars, for e.g., Shamsuddin Samarqandi says: لكن لم قلت: إن فعل القبيح من غير حاجة محال؟ فإن أردت أنه محال لذاته فذلك غير مسلم، لأنا نعلم ضرورة أن ذلك الفعل لا يقتضي عدمه لذاته، بل نعلم أن نسبة وجوده وعدمه إلى ذاته واحدة. وإن أردت أنه محال، لأن الله تعالى قادر حكيم لا يريد أن يفعل مثل ذلك الفعل، فذلك مسلم، لكن ذلك لا يوجب انتفاء القدرة عليه، بل يتركه بقدرته وإرادته

@Nazaratives there’s no qudrah*

A principled madhabist answer would be to accept that differences in furu' are ijtihadi matters and we cannot say with certainty that so and so madhab is correct in its entirety. But we can say with certainty that we should follow a madhab. Madhab being developed by men or having ijtihad of men or not having each mas'alah decided by certainty does not entail lack of obligation of taqlid. Say for example, how the Jam' of Qur'an was done at the time of 'Uthman(ra), the particular Harf or Ahruf to keep, was decision of humans but we are obliged to abide by that decision. I know that Yasir Qadi does not even hold the traditionalist view on Ahruf, still, he must abide by the consensus of Shadh Qira'at being impermissible to recite. So long as that is the case, a Madhabist can equally make his case. As far as I can judge, this is the most weak of attacks against taqlid, in comparison, those who argue along the lines of need in particular areas still have a relatively better point than what Qadi is latching on to.

Same point is repeated by al-Ghazali that Sihr cannot extend to certain types, for e.g., turning of staff into a snake. This point of al-Ghazali is not limited to Sihr but it is excluded from Qudrah of creations.

pg:251 of Mujarrad Maqalat of Imam Abul Hasan al-Ash'ari, Ibn Furak notes that it is obvious that raising of the dead, splitting of the sees, etc., is not something people can acquire (under any circumstances) and Ash'aris argue that such is known by necessity, otherwise, we would ve no way of recognizing a miracle in the first place.[2]

However (please note @Haqiqatjou) , this does not imply that there are no Khasais where 'kasbi' abilities of creations are ruled out, so long as that is the case, the 'power being granted over universe' is a misattribution towards the Ash'aris. Sayf Al-Asri is ambiguous towards it in this particular clip but if he had the an unqualified view on the matter then his view is simply discarded as being not in line with Ash'arism. Here are only few references, one of it is from Ibn Furak who is quoting Ash'ari's position himself, other is from al-Ghazali and another is from Abu Mansur 'Abdul Qahir and that too is selected by me for the sake of brevity, otherwise, same point is repeated by every single Ash'ari authority.