Passos Pessoa

Gente alguém tem explicação desse surto de autismo? Tem como descobrir antes de nascer? Como vão ficar quando não tiverem mais os pais? A população vai ser 80% autistas nos próximos anos?

Muito cara vai argumentar que Zelda é mais impactante e importante pra indústria mas NÃO É kkkkkkkkk GTA já é MUITO maior e mais importante pra industria dos jogos faz uns 20 anos

Cada vez mais observo q o problema dessa galera altamente intelectualizada é medo de trabalhar. Eu tbm leio francês, mas tb ja tive que vestir personagem embaixo de sol quente pra ganhar 90 reais na época q comecei o mestrado.

empresa ruim tem que falir, inclusive isso é bom pra economia

Lots of discussion around the Information International survey recently released on Lebanese public opinion (data collected Apr 28 – May 5 2026). I wouldn’t dismiss the survey as the organization is reputable & has previously put out good polls (incl on parliamentary elections). In my 1st post on this survey, I’ll examine public opinion on negotiations w/ Israel, peace agreements & normalization (I plan a 2nd post focused on Hizballah & the war). I’ve compiled the data from the survey in the table below on 5 key questions (note: black numbers are from survey results; green numbers are my calculations using very reasonable assumptions). TLDR: ▪ Public opinion on peace agreement & normalization has significantly shifted between Aug 2025 & May 2026, almost surely due to the re-ignition of full-blown war after March 2nd 2026 ▪ The country is split on these issues, not only along sectarian lines, but also along generational lines ▪ However, caution is warranted in terms of interpretation, & people shouldn’t jump to conclusions too quickly (important discussion below). Before delving into results, some remarks on methodology: ▪ In-person survey of 2000 Lebanese citizens >21 yrs old (Lebanese voting age) ▪ Sample distributed proportionally to size of governorate & across Lebanon's 26 districts; note that sampling took into account displaced population, particularly Shia respondents (historically, Information International has used multi-stage probability sampling, but unclear here) ▪ Appropriate sectarian representation within each district (see table for sectarian splits). Splits look pretty similar to 2022 Parliamentary elections, but not certain (if so, you can debate whether voter or alternative splits are best used for this survey). ▪ Rejection rate: 26% (excellent) ▪ Margin of Error: +- 3.2% (typical) Results: 1) What is your position on direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel? ▪ Essentially split, w/ no clear Lebanese majority (49% support, 44.5% opposed) ▪ Shia overwhelmingly opposed (92.9%); slight majority of Sunnis (54.4%) supportive; Druze (72%) & Christians (74.7%) very supportive ▪ Note huge generational divide: younger people (21 – 29 yrs) support it at only 35%, but older generation (>70 yrs) support it at 79% ▪ Question is this: direct negotiations w/ Israel to what end? Apparently, not to normalize relations w/ Israel, which is clearly still rejected by majority; see next question(s). 2) What is your position on normalization in Lebanon i.e. establishing economic, trade and cultural relations with Israel? ▪ Majority clearly rejects normalization (59.3% opposed; 30.4% support). ▪ However, clear shift over last ~8 months, when opposition to normalization was at 78.8% & support at only 13.2%, based on Aug 2025 Information International survey. Note that Aug 2025 survey results consistent with other high-quality polls I’ve seen (recall the 2025 Arab Opinion Index poll that showed that 89% of Lebanese oppose recognizing Israel, w/ only 9% in support) What explains this shift? o This is almost surely due to re-ignition of full-blown war after March 2nd 2026. o The other hypothesis – that pre-March 2ndsurveys reflect preference falsification – are not supported by quantitative evidence, w/ counter-evidence against them; I don’t want to totally dismiss the hypothesis, but re-ignition of the war is the obvious candidate for the shift in my opinion ▪ In May 2026 survey, Shia overwhelmingly opposed normalization (94.3%); also, strong opposition by Sunnis (73.8%); slight majority in support for Christians (51.9%); Druze very supportive (79%) o Focusing on Christian support for normalization, whereas it was clear from previous surveys that Christian support for recognizing Israel or normalizing w/ Israel was a minority position, this seems to have changed now to a slight majority post March 2nd; however, important caveat below on interpreting these theoretical results (for Christians and non-Christians), as concretizing these policy positions into real tangible examples results in further opposition (see next question) ▪ Note same generational divide w/ young folks strongly opposed (73%) vs older generation less so (42.1%) 3) What is your position on the opening of an Israeli embassy in Beirut? ▪ Strong majority clearly rejects Israeli embassy in Beirut (66.6% opposed; 20.9% support), a clear emblem of normalization. o This often happens in surveys: people’s opinions on a more theoretical question (e.g. theoretical normalization) shifts when an example that they can concretely imagine is presented as an implication (e.g. Israeli embassy in Beirut). Perhaps next time, the survey should ask whether Lebanese support partying in Tel-Aviv or Israelis partying in Beirut to really drive the point home. ▪ Shia overwhelmingly opposed (96.0%); same w/ Sunnis (86.4%); Christian support is tepid (36%) w/ equal opposition (36.3%); only Druze strongly support (70.1%). o It’s worth discussing Druze public opinion. First, methodologically, they only represent 5.7% of the sample, so only 114 people would have been surveyed out of a sample of 2000 if proportional sampling was done, which means error bars are large for their results (think +/- 10%); still, even including margin of error, there is consistent support for normalization, peace etc. The question is why? § Jumblatt has not publicly stated his support, and one can argue he’s opposed to the idea. § My hypothesis is this: after the crimes against humanity committed against the Druze population in Sweida by Syrian govt security forces in July/Aug 2025 & Israel’s intervention to prevent further massacres, there has been a dramatic shift in Druze opinion vis a vis Israel, not only in Sweida – which is vocal and visible – but also in the occupied Golan, where we’re starting to see many Druze accepting Israeli citizenship (something they’ve historically resisted), and apparently now in Lebanon. This is a deeply tragic and painful development relative to (non-Israeli) Druze’s historical Arabist position & one that could have been avoided w/ a less antagonistic approach by the Syrian govt that devolved into massacres (although it’s clear that Hikmat al-Hijri also bears some of that responsibility & he was on Israeli payroll before the massacres). ▪ Same generational divide w/ young folks strongly opposed (81.5%), and older generation less so (42.1%) ▪ So, if (vast) majority of the Lebanese public doesn’t support direct negotiations to normalize relations w/ Israel (which is one of Israel’s stated goals from these negotiations), to what end does ~half of the population support these direct negotiations? Perhaps to sign a “peace” agreement? See next question. 4) How would you react if the President and the government signed a peace agreement with Israel? ▪ Essentially split, w/ no clear Lebanese majority (48.9% support, 46% opposed) ▪ Clear shift over last ~8 months, when opposition to a “peace” agreement was at 68.4% and support at only 25%, based on Aug 2025 Information International survey ▪ Shia overwhelmingly opposed (92.1%); slight majority of Sunnis (51.6%) supportive; Christians (74.1%) very supportive, as well as Druze (84.2%) ▪ Same generational divide w/ young folks only supporting at 37.5% and older generation much more so at 68.5% ▪ Question is this: how are Lebanese interpreting “peace” agreement w/ Israel? o Clearly, it’s not equivalent to a bilateral “peace” agreement that normalizes relations w/ Israel, as we’ve previously seen. So, this would actually exclude “peace” agreements like the Abraham Accord between the UAE and Israel, and also “peace” agreements between Jordan / Egypt and Israel, which come w/ full normalization (embassies, economic ties etc). o I suspect that a “peace” agreement w/ Israel is being interpreted by some as either an indefinite armistice-like agreement (e.g. the 1949 armistice agreement or a return to the status quo ante pre-Oct 7), or an agreement that formally ends the state of war w/ Israel but stops there (no normalization etc). This is unclear & future surveys would do good in teasing out this nuance. o However, it’s important to note that when the additional option of negotiating “peace” w/ Israel via the broader Arab Peace Initiative is introduced into the survey, the appetite for Lebanon pursuing a separate peace agreement significantly declines; see next question. 5) Do you think Lebanon should adhere to the Arab Peace Initiative (API) or pursue a separate peace with Israel without the Arabs? ▪ A plurality (37.4%) prefer Lebanon to adhere to the Arab Peace Initiative (which was endorsed by the full Arab League, and which called for normalized relations by the Arab world w/ Israel in return for full Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab lands, the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank & Gaza w/ East Jerusalem as its capital, and a just resolution to the Palestinian refugee problem); in close second are those who don’t want any peace w/ Israel (32.8%), w/ only a small minority preferring a separate peace w/ Israel (24.8%). ▪ A Sunni majority (59.5%) prefers the API option; a strong Shia majority (77.1%) refuses to make peace w/ Israel; a strong Druze majority (66.7%) prefers a separate peace w/ Israel; Christians seem to be split between adhering to the API (e.g. Maronites at 41.8%) vs pursuing a separate peace w/ Israel (43.7%), w/ no clear majority either way. ▪ Note the same generational divide w/ young folks preferring either no peace w/ Israel (44.5%) or the API (36%), w/ older folks preferring the separate peace option (42.1%) ▪ What therefore becomes clearer is that when the additional option of signing a peace treaty w/ Israel as part of a broader Arab coalition is introduced into the survey, appetite for pursuing a separate peace w/ Israel significantly declines. o However, it should also be stated that the API option feels more theoretical given the lack of movement in that direction for years, and so it is likely the case that in the absence of such an option in practice, there will be some Lebanese who support the bilateral “peace” option w/ Israel, presumably because they believe that a “peace” agreement w/ Israel would stop the war(s).

O maior medo da pessoa branca de um país de 3 mundo é ser tratada como não-branca em um país desenvolvido Por isso cria essas teorias pra se autoafirmar, no fundo, branco Pq sabe que só é branco dentro da América Latina e quando chegar na América do Norte/Europa, deixará de ser