Rich Maney

@TSXDivStock But they easily cover their dividend and it trades at a depressed valuation to what a private buyer would purchase their real estate per square foot for.

True North is a small cap office REIT that trades at an extremely low valuation (4.1x FFO, 41% disc to NAV), but is struggling with vacancies and high debt. CIBC reduces their target: $TNT.UN

@RagweedCapital Yes. I sent an email stating maybe the company would be better served (and us as shareholders) with a new set of eyes. Got no response which I expected. But common you cannot state for 3 years profitability coming and doesn’t. At least try to right size the business.

@RMXtrade Yeah...token buys. Better than nothing!

$NAII CEO Mark LeDoux makes additional open market purchases.

@mr_deepvalue What would a private investor pay for this?

Been re-reading dozens of early-Buffett investments this week. Some of the stuff he put his money into was utterly horrifying. But he almost always made decent returns because of how cheap the price was...

@chasericker3 Totally see your perspective. I've been holding for a bit under a year. Don't have a huge position, but looking more at liquidation value. My back of envelope has this worth at least $7 a share as a liquidation. Maybe a catalyst at some point....or not.

@RMXtrade Interesting where are you at with your expectations for the business? After holding for 2ish years I'm having a hard time in this position after latest earnings

Mark Ledoux taught me that a manager can just lie quarter after quarter about “expecting net income in the next few quarters” with no consequences $NAII results are a disappointment yet again

@SFarringtonBKC I'm long also and not changing a thing.

So I'm still early (wrong) about $NWL apparently

@dirtcheapbanks I DM'd you as I am not an expert on this and don't want to put this out because I am sure some inaccuracies, but the gist is there.

What is the lowdown on EPIC banks being able to cancel their prefs at pennies on the dollar? Someone link me up.

@dirtcheapbanks If it makes you money then your time may be construed as productive and worthwhile.

The worst thing about being a bank investor is doing the analysis on banks. Holy smokes. What a boring industry.

@Valuehunte Not a lot but the book The Snowball.

Does anyone know any resource where I can learn more about Bill Scott? Buffett's first analyst at the Buffett Partnership.

@SFarringtonBKC @CapitalValor and cheap from a balance sheet perspective. would add more in the 14's.

@CapitalValor I am also not a chem analyst, but I like their domestic supply chain and sales footprint. Not eager for Europe or Asia exposure.

So are we buying $ASIX? Largest producer of caprolactam in the US. Not a chem analyst, so welcome thoughts.

@dirtcheapbanks Wrong bank about debt sorry

@RMXtrade Not concerned on debt here

I wrote up $CBBI. Here would be my game plan as an activist investor. People will say it is impossible to do with the 27% insider control block. But from my experience, if you start rattling some cages, you get things done. Here is my playbook to make changes. The first step would be accumulation, not agitation. At less than half of tangible book value, the stock offers asymmetry that does not require immediate confrontation. Liquidity is thin, but that cuts both ways. A patient buyer can build a meaningful position without telegraphing intent, especially when the shareholder base is small and passive. The goal is not control. The goal is credibility. Once you own enough stock, the conversation changes. The second step is private engagement. This is a relationship-driven bank serving a concentrated community. Public letters and social media theatrics would be counterproductive. The initial engagement should be direct, data-driven, and narrow in scope. Not a laundry list of complaints. One central argument. The argument is simple and impossible to refute. The bank trades at less than 0.5x tangible book value. At that valuation, every dollar used to repurchase stock buys roughly two dollars of tangible equity. By contrast, every dollar deployed into acquisitions at or near book value destroys per-share value. This is not philosophy. It is math. Capital allocation is the core failure here, and it is the easiest to fix. The message to the board would be explicit. As long as the stock trades materially below tangible book, acquisitions should stop. Growth is not value creation when ROE is subpar and capital is mispriced. The correct use of capital at this valuation is aggressive share repurchases, not balance sheet expansion. Continuing to do otherwise guarantees that the stock will remain discounted. The dividend would be the next target. Paying a dividend while trading below tangible book is inefficient capital management. A dollar paid out returns a dollar. A dollar used to buy back stock at half of tangible book creates two dollars of tangible equity for remaining shareholders. Cutting or suspending the dividend in favor of buybacks is not a popular decision, but it is an accretive one. Over time, it materially lifts tangible book per share and mechanically improves ROE. That is how valuation gaps close. From there, the focus shifts to expenses, because this is where the fastest earnings improvement lies. Noninterest expense running north of a 70 percent efficiency ratio at a $2 billion commercial bank with no consumer platform and limited branch complexity is indefensible. Salaries, professional fees, and third-party processing costs are too high relative to the revenue base. A credible activist does not demand austerity. They demand accountability. A third-party cost review, branch-level profitability analysis, and compensation tied explicitly to ROE and efficiency metrics would surface savings quickly. Every ten-point improvement in the efficiency ratio adds roughly five million dollars of pre-tax income. That alone can move ROE into double digits without taking incremental credit risk. Stability in leadership would be another priority. The revolving door at the CEO and senior executive level has undermined execution and delayed necessary decisions. Banks do not re-rate when leadership is constantly changing. This is not a business that needs reinvention. It needs consistency, cost discipline, and capital return. The board must make it clear that asset growth without measurable improvement in ROE will no longer be rewarded. Compensation should reflect that reality. Importantly, none of this requires a hostile fight. The insider ownership block actually makes change easier if approached correctly. Insiders own a large percentage of the stock. They are suffering from the same discount as everyone else. The goal of an activist here is not to seize control, but to align incentives around per-share value creation rather than institutional inertia. The near-term rate cycle provides an opportunity, but it is not the solution. As rates decline, deposit costs should fall faster than loan yields, and net interest income should benefit modestly from repricing. That tailwind buys time. It does not fix the valuation. Without changes to capital allocation and expense discipline, any earnings lift will be temporary and the discount will persist. The path to tangible book value does not require heroics. It requires halting value-destructive acquisitions, redirecting capital toward buybacks, cutting the dividend, reducing noninterest expense, and stabilizing leadership. Those steps can move ROE from six to seven percent into the low double digits within a reasonable timeframe. Banks earning sustainable double-digit ROE do not trade at half of tangible book value. If the board acts, the stock will re-rate. If it does not, this is exactly the type of situation that eventually attracts more forceful activism. Either way, the math will win.

@marginofdanger @dirtcheapbanks Looks like book value has steadily grown over last 10 years. I'm intrigued.

New CEO seems solid, did a really good job in the East region. $CBBI performance has been roughly in line with its LA Korean peers but its valuation is significantly lower bc of lack of trading liquidity, OTC listing and obstinance on stock buyback. There is no room for activism here given the holder base / control.

What are the idiots at $CBBI doing? Management turnover is insanely high. Losing non-interest bearing deposits to CDs. Very high CRE concentration. Sharp slowdown in SBA fee generation. Elevated operating expenses. Has done really dumb acquisitions above book value when their own equity is way below book. Stock is pretty darn cheap and this is overcapitalized. Will the new management team turn things around here or will they be fired and moved on in eight months. Need an activist investor badly here.

@dirtcheapbanks Enjoy your write ups

What dirt cheap bank should I look at next?

@dirtcheapbanks How about MFBP which should see its BV increase after redeeming ECIP preferred or MGNO trading well below BV

@RagweedCapital To add to Jerome's info on the balance sheet, CFO responded that inventory was insured at replacement cost, so what is stated on the books is what it's insured for.

$EDUC Balance sheet following the $32 million sale of the "Hilti Complex". Instead of paying interest on $30 million of debt, the company will now pay a smaller amount in rent. The true value of inventory is always a concern. Here's some conversation on the subject from the 3q26 earnings conference call: Paul Carter: "So I know most of your titles are things like zoo animals or whatever that don't go out of date. But like do you have a sense for what percentage of your inventory could be out of date and therefore, worthless in like 3 or 5 years if there's not a lot of sell-through in certain titles?" Dan O'Keefe, CFO: "...our track record has been we've carried inventory sometimes for in excess of 10 years on certain titles before we sell through them. And we've never historically written down inventory, and we've never basically offloaded the title or gone into the remainder market to sell the title. So that's kind of reflected in our reserve. Our reserve is very small on our short-term inventory and also on our long-term inventory because our history says we typically don't participate in the remainder market and don't have topics, as you mentioned earlier, that go stale or out of favor." Heather Cobb, Chief Sales & Marketing Officer: "Yes. Paul, unless you know something we don't, and they're going to change the alphabet on us, I think we're fairly safe."

@RagweedCapital @leevalueroach Started a position friday

@leevalueroach They did. Clean balance sheet in their latest q.

Slowly adding to my $EDUC position here. Success is dependent on a) maintaining a solid distributor relationship with Usborne, and b) rebuilding its direct sales force. The balance sheet work has already been done. Stock trades at 26% of BV, so 2x or 3x is low hanging fruit.

@bgtennisnation Yes Brad but he is starting to play off his back foot and no longer taking it to Sinner like he did the first set. Also, he needs a refund from his sport psychologist for not stepping on the gas when Sinner was cramping. I hope he takes it to a fifth!

Spizzirri doing excellent job putting a ton of returns in play and is very good on the run 🏃‍♀️ on both sides

@leevalueroach When I was in the trading pit I stood next to a younger guy who loved to bet sports constantly. A trade came into the pit which was complex but had "edge". A bunch of us jumped on it, he said he didn't think enough was in it. After the dust settled it was a $250k winner.

I’m finding dollars for fifty cents all over in the microcap space right now. I think there’s more opportunity in this space today than any other time in history because there’s an infinite amount of places to put your money. Most young guys I know are doing options, sports betting and crypto. You tell them you are buying companies trading under the cash on the balance sheet and they gloss over. Perfect time to be a value investor.