Rick Joe

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Rick Joe

Rick Joe

@RickJoe_PLA

if you type long enough into the abyss, the abyss will type back

Katılım Ağustos 2015
18 Takip Edilen17K Takipçiler
Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@teortaxesTex Thing is, for J-20 versus J-20A/S, they are "different models" (i.e. major variants). It's an aerospace literacy issue. But it is also true that even within major variants, under the hood upgrades get implemented between production batches (e.g. a J-20 made in 2023 vs 2018)
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Teortaxes▶️ (DeepSeek 推特🐋铁粉 2023 – ∞)
Rarely made point: Chinese military equipment is changing, significantly and rapidly, even within the same model. J-20 commissioned today is likely way more capable and more "5th gen" than J-20 in 2018.
Teortaxes▶️ (DeepSeek 推特🐋铁粉 2023 – ∞) tweet media
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA

Among other recent oddities in PLA tacair discourse, is the lack of interest on the changes from vanilla J-20 to J-20A/S. Even without considering WS-15, all of the other changes from 20 to 20A/S are likely comparable or greater in scale to F-35 Block 3F and the vital Block 4.

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Geoffrey Jefferson
Geoffrey Jefferson@GeoffreyJeffe13·
@RickJoe_PLA Hopefully someone who knows what they're talking about will write an article about the differences, I hear the Diplomat is a good place to publish such things.
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
To clarify, when I say "PLA tacair discourse" I'm referring to global/English-language (i.e.: non-Chinese/PRC) discourse. (That's why I posted it on Twitter and wrote it in English) Obviously the PRC side are way more ahead of things than global/English-language understandings.
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@PosiTroll @AlexLuck9 That boat has probably sailed long ago, and the idea of JMSDF operating two full sized carriers would require a restructuring of their fleet to such a degree that it would be a multi generational effort (procurement-wise)
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Posi Troll
Posi Troll@PosiTroll·
@RickJoe_PLA @AlexLuck9 What would be funny is JAP and FRA teaming up for a carrier capable FCAS, Japan buying 2 PANG, and the Eurofighter nations continuing with EF and Tempest ...
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Alex Luck
Alex Luck@AlexLuck9·
"Tokyo’s main aim is to produce a new fighter by the mid-2030s, whereas London and Rome are more interested in GCAP producing a cutting-edge “system of systems” — a jet that operates in concert with a swarm of drones — over a less rigid timetable..." ft.com/content/c3de1d…
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@AlexLuck9 Indeed, from a procurement and industry pov it's not wise. But imo Japan's urgency is more because they recognize on some level they're staring down the barrel of 1000ish PLA 5th gens by 2030 (god knows how many by 2035), while the others face a much lighter environment.
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Alex Luck
Alex Luck@AlexLuck9·
@RickJoe_PLA I think Eurofighter illustrated how disastrous kicking the can down the road is with committing hard funding to measurable progress. As such any reluctance to tighten schedules IMO just betrays deeper unseriousness about the entire effort vis a vis requirements.
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@AlexLuck9 Tbf out of all of them, Japan faces arguably the most pressing air challenge by a longshot. The others can afford to dillydally a bit.
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Alex Luck
Alex Luck@AlexLuck9·
Going off the Franco-German FCAS issues, frankly one of my key impressions is that every time someone talks about "system of systems" and "less rigid timetables", they are not in fact all that concerned over fielding a next gen combat aircraft ASAP.
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@blob_watcher Best way to see it imo, is that the capabilities of a system should always be viewed in context of the threat they're facing. A system may roflstomp one threat in a given mission or theatre, but might be fighting for survival a different threat in a different mission or theatre.
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Tacos and Airplanes
Tacos and Airplanes@blob_watcher·
Patriot/THAAD/AEGIS (I worked on a system that plugs into AEGIS in a past life) are fantastic systems, but not perfect. AD is arguably one of the foundations of modern war. But.. (1/3)
Jason Dean@_Jason_Dean_

One level of cope is believing that Taiwan has a snowball’s chance in hell of resisting reunification The deeper (more truthful) level of cope is recognizing that the modern day CCP is closer to the KMT in terms of ideology, so Chiang wins either way

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NX4EU
NX4EU@Polar000077·
Commission. USS US NAVY
NX4EU tweet mediaNX4EU tweet mediaNX4EU tweet mediaNX4EU tweet media
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@nuhor_lir_guren Visible changes: -outer mold line and structure (nose, dorsal fuselage, likely internal) -new engines; WS-10C2 for first batch or so, WS-15 after -new chin EO sensor Rumoured/likely changes: -2020s era materials tech rather than 2010s -wholesale avionics overhaul -PTMS overhaul
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
Among other recent oddities in PLA tacair discourse, is the lack of interest on the changes from vanilla J-20 to J-20A/S. Even without considering WS-15, all of the other changes from 20 to 20A/S are likely comparable or greater in scale to F-35 Block 3F and the vital Block 4.
Rick Joe tweet mediaRick Joe tweet media
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@snekotron Those two specific images are AI. Among other tells, the "generated by AI" watermarks in the bottom right hand corners are definitive. It's still a heavy helicopter (10t class), but these specific images are unlikely to be real.
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@KnowBothSides @AlexLuck9 I could actually see it being expressed in more plain words, to avoid politicians and public misinterpreting it and hearing what they want to hear. The escalation ladder of such a conflict could be world-ending, if there was any situation to be explicit, it would be then.
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Know Both Sides
Know Both Sides@KnowBothSides·
@RickJoe_PLA @AlexLuck9 PRC won't explicitly threaten, but the wording will clearly imply it just like the Korean war warning. There can't be much surprise in this case cuz it's been talked so much how PLA can preemptively strike US bases. The course of action is expected
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Alex Luck
Alex Luck@AlexLuck9·
"The real issue is where the money and where the materials are going." Which incidentally should have repeatedly clarified for the last several years how PLA remains incapable of mounting an invasion (with any reasonable odds of success) of Taiwan by 2027.foxnews.com/politics/us-in…
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@KnowBothSides @AlexLuck9 For public signaling, and for human history, I suspect the PRC would convey clearly if PLA struck US forces first, it would be not be a "surprise attack" but with categorical prior warnings. I could see them laying out geographical+force operations demands to general populace.
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Know Both Sides
Know Both Sides@KnowBothSides·
@RickJoe_PLA @AlexLuck9 Yep. China will make it clear that it's a war of choice for the US. Look at how long it takes US to prep for this Iran war, it's impossible to do w China cuz China won't just sit and wait for US to prep. Back in the Korean War, China warned US 3 times via diplomatic channel
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@KnowBothSides @AlexLuck9 There would be back channels talks. I imagine PRC would seek US forces to "stand down" (not reinforce westpac, low alert etc). If that fails, then I could see public statements made that US westpac activities during TW operations would be seen as aggression and risk PLA attack.
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Know Both Sides
Know Both Sides@KnowBothSides·
@AlexLuck9 @RickJoe_PLA PLA will do fires campaign for as long as it takes to completely soften Taiwan. As for US⬇️x.com/KnowBothSides/…
Know Both Sides@KnowBothSides

@DrewMikola @lymanstoneky China will first warn the US not to prep to intervene: "if we see your military prep via satellites and you don't explain, we assume you will intervene, so we will pre-emptively strike you when you're still in prep so you won't even be able to intervene". US will have to stop

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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@BaryonyxSpace @Alfa_Particle Kinematically, for BVR the ability to maneuver at target speeds is as important as the ability to reach and sustain such speeds...
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stars
stars@BaryonyxSpace·
@Alfa_Particle in terms of kinematics how fast you can go how high you can go is as far as your plane can take you for bvr
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@AlexLuck9 Russia's experience is actually what solidified that thinking for me -- RU dove in hoping for a collapse of govt/organization, rather than waging an initial proper campaign to destroy UKR's material ability to wage war (not that RU had the forces to do the latter TBF).
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Alex Luck
Alex Luck@AlexLuck9·
@RickJoe_PLA Fair point, and yeah, the impossibility of knowing Chinese thinking, and, in any case, the way a conflict evolves, means this very much remains subject to interesting debates. I know I would get more "queasy" the longer a conflict extends, also considering Russia in UA.
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@AlexLuck9 IMO it makes sense from US et al to consider those as contingencies to plan for, but from the PRC pov the idea seems somewhat bizarre -- it offers virtually no benefits but for additional great risk. (It's not even like Russia taking Crimea - at least that was for Sevastopol)
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Alex Luck
Alex Luck@AlexLuck9·
@RickJoe_PLA I would agree and think for these reasons Beijing would rather want to go all in to settle the matter with confidence. That said, I presume politicians everywhere want options and prepare for different actions based on scenarios.
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@AlexLuck9 Yeah I think that's a divergence in our views. My view is longer prep fires+blockade (at least 3-4 weeks, even 5-6 weeks) gives greater likelihood of success -- partly by degrading opposition more, also by taking stock of US/JPN positions to ensure PLA landings aren't "flanked".
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Alex Luck
Alex Luck@AlexLuck9·
@RickJoe_PLA Multi week makes sense to measure effect vs outcome before/while amassing adequate naval/landing assets. However, operationally speaking I think a week or two are the maximum to not lose the initiative, ensure an effective blockade and avoid any intervention. So thats a friction.
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@AlexLuck9 Tbh I don't really see any benefits for the outlying islands even if the PRC wanted to make a statement. Though yes, taking them in isolation would be a proverbial roflstomp, but at geostrategic cost and likely not greatly deterring the relevant elements in Taiwan.
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Alex Luck
Alex Luck@AlexLuck9·
@RickJoe_PLA Tbqh in my view by 2027 PLA can confidently take any islands held by Taiwan apart from the main & probably Penghu (which they could take, but would risk significant exposure to retaliatory fires). Should Beijing feel like they need to make a "statement", IMO thats a real option.
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Rick Joe
Rick Joe@RickJoe_PLA·
@AlexLuck9 I agree PRC as risk averse and seek overwhelming force -- in context of prep fires, what timespan do you see that being? I ask, b/c my opinions re the conditions for successful invasions (2027 and in last few years) occurs after a multi-week fires campaign before amphibs cross.
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Alex Luck
Alex Luck@AlexLuck9·
@RickJoe_PLA I think these are all part of the known unknowns, hence subject to different views. In mine Beijing would presumably be highly risk averse, and hence want to deploy an overwhelming force. Prep fires would need to be time sensitive & limit civilian damage, hence face restrictions.
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