Rush Doshi

I've watched @amanpour on TV for decades. So I was grateful for the opportunity to sit down with her for 15 minutes. Our interview aired on @CNN this weekend. We talked China policy, Trump's approach, and why this decade is the decisive decade in the competition.

@PaulJHeer I must quibble with your choice of words. This discussion doesn't "sidestep" anything. China's effort to punish Japan for increasing its defense spending is a subject manifestly worth considering in its own right. Dismissing it is odd.

@RushDoshi The focus on Xi's screed about Japan's "remilitarization" sidesteps the question of how Takaichi's policies toward Taiwan are consistent with Tokyo's normalization commitments to Beijing. (Xi probably asked Trump some version of that question. Trump was not equipped to answer.)

Presented without comment.

"My post was about your chart crime." There was no chart crime. "I am saying that what needs to be explained is not a Chinese military buildup but rather the exact opposite. Japan’s military buildup is less concerning to me than the statements coming out of the PM office." It seems that since you are unable to defend the claim of a "chart crime," you opted to invent a new justification for your post at the bottom of this exchange. You continue to defend China's buildup are treat Japan's as illegitimate; that accommodationist stance is not particularly sound, but I would like to see you build it into a platform that could generate a real debate. "The issue is not posturing. It is reconciling means and ends, which you have not done." I am afraid you are not in a position to make this claim since you have not properly understood what I am advocating, if not deliberately distorted it. You mistakenly assert I am for a Cold War and arms races when I am on the record for quite some time saying the exact opposite, for example, "The entire idea of arresting China’s rise needs to be abandoned." No one, and certainly not me, has proposed that, for as long as I've been writing on China policy. But China should be balanced. Once again, I invite you to stop railing against straw men and debate things as they are. --- Throughout this conversation, I think you have tried to position yourself as a truth-teller against some hawkish madness you attribute to others. If you'd like to debate my actual views, that's fine. But there is not much to be gained in debating what you imagine my views to be. And your views, for what it's worth, are almost entirely grounded critique rather than something affirmative.

My post was about your chart crime. I am saying that what needs to be explained is not a Chinese military buildup but rather the exact opposite. Japan’s military buildup is less concerning to me than the statements coming out of the PM office. If Japan is proposing to fight for Taiwan, they need to know that any such military struggle will result in the destruction of Japan and of the US position in Asia. Everything else is downstream from this stubborn fact. The issue is not posturing. It is reconciling means and ends, which you have not done. Any policy that can actually work would be superior. A policy of ganging up on China cannot. It will result in military catastrophe for the West. Here is what I do know about US China policy. The entire idea of arresting China’s rise needs to be abandoned. Otherwise we’ll end up like the UAE in the Gulf.

I have read your work, including your big note with Campbell. Your proposal cannot work for military reasons, now established beyond reasonable doubt by the Iran war. It is not possible to do what you guys are proposing to do. If we keep up with the stupid chips controls and Quad and the rest of the Jake cold war agenda, we are going to get physically kicked out of Asia by China. See my policytensor.substack.com/p/an-equilibri….

I believe you have taken us quite far away from your original post. That post was a defense of China's buildup and an assertion, implicitly, than Japan's minor increase was illegitimate -- a neo-accommodationist framing that aligns with Beijing's policy preferences. You then imputed views to me that, upon your own supplied evidence, I clearly do not hold. Yes, perception is as important as reality. It is important to avoid perceptions of containment and perceptions of accommodation. I think the greater risk right now of Beijing's overconfidence, and that is measurable in Party texts if you focus on key measures of the international balancer of power. Finally, you have suggested any effort to secure U.S. interests was "Cold War" ( a pejorative, not an analytic argument) when there is a world of space between accommodation and Cold War. It is in that space that true statecraft lives.

@RushDoshi You do realize Rush that it doesn’t matter if you don’t see that as containment. What matters is that the Chinese see it that way. And just to be clear: I am not opposed to deterrence by denial in principle. I am opposed to it bc it is unworkable as an empirical fact.

@policytensor It is telling that you see things as a binary: either "Cold War" or accommodation. Politics is indeed more complex, and there is a middle ground between those two extremes, both of which I reject.

No offense intended, but your post leaves me thinking you have either deliberately misread my work or (more likely) inadvertently misunderstood it. First, in the security space, this highlighted section is a policy of federated deterrence by denial not a call for an arms race. The trends in warfare are towards greater precision, range, lethality, and autonomy. These can favor defense, as the Ukraine conflict shows. Second, in the economic space, it is generally a call for protecting scarce demand from China's excess capacity so our industries survive. Building "allied scale" less to beat China but to withstand it. I gather your proposed approach is what we might call neo-accommodationism, given your defense of China's arms buildup and your criticism of Japan's limited efforts to defned itself. If that is true, you are in good company, as many others support that view. I hope you flesh it out so we may have something to respond to. My preferred approach is "managed competition" bilaterally and "allied scale" multilaterally. For more on managed competition, see this: foreignaffairs.com/responses/what…

@policytensor In fact, I have long been *against* an arms race or Cold War approaches, which make no sense given the unique challenge China poses. My writings on this subject are abundant and self-evident if you would like to look them up.

I’m afraid your analysis is flawed in two respects: 1) You repeat the PRC talking point that, in Japan’s case, we should look at a percent change from a small base as relevant rather than the absolute quantity of defense spending that China is undertaking. That is move from strategic empathy to apologia. China vastly outspends Japan, threatens its existence in state media, and threatens to behead its PM in diplomatic declarations, so it is a bit rich for it to complain about a truly marginal increase in Japan’s defense spending. Perhaps you believe the correct course for Japan is to give up and bandwagon and submit, I don’t quite know. 2) On this question of “winning an arms race” you may be unfamiliar with my writing because you seem to impute to me arguments that are the very opposite of my actual public views, and which are in any case irrelevant in this particular discussion. I do think deterrence is possible through asymmetric investments, but I don’t advocate trying to “win an arms race” against the world’s dominant manufacturer.

Oh look, 2% of gdp grows at the same rate as gdp! Did you know?

Some are saying we shouldn’t overindex on SECNAV, but that gets the chronology wrong: — it was clearly paused before the summit — it’s not yet moving, per the President, who said it was a negotiating chip — SECNAV then said it was paused to Congress — no one from USG contradicted SECNAV on the record Congress should ask senior officials to address all this on the record.

Trump administration indeed pausing arms sales to Taiwan. Unclear what, if anything, Beijing offered in return. Allies will see it (rightly) as further evidence that the US approach to Beijing is conciliation and accommodation.

A few relevant points: - China vastly outspends Japan - China harasses Japan’s vessels and aircraft - China’s CG in Osaka advocated beheading Japan’s PM - China’s state media has threatened the complete destruction of Japan - China’s neighbors fear Beijing, not Tokyo

Big “me sowing vs me reaping” energy here. Where does Xi think the (halting, insufficient) Japanese interest in remilitarization came from? A weird ideological tic? A surplus of money to spend? Would be interesting to hear his theory.

@JustinTLogan @NewDealHawk2 🤔

blame because they lack stamina to stay the course against the Russians who are “Sparta to our Athens.” @RushDoshi includes this anecdote in the conclusion of his book, "The Long Game"

Just read this, very interesting but China is just the mercantilist hegemon in the traditional sense but with much stronger state capacity to distort the financial markets. The “liberal” hegemon perhaps was an aberration

“China’s dominance may be closing off the traditional manufacturing-led development path for low- and middle-income countries.”

I generally agree with @RushDoshi & this @CFR_org piece. IF the US takes on #China alone, China's manufacturing capacity will likely win out. But when combined with the capabilities of others, a group of allies will exceed China. #Realism cfr.org/articles/balan…

Very important.

@james_a_lewis On industrial metrics the comparison is correct. That’s the main point of the comparison.

This misstates the case. 1900 Britain and 2026 US are not comparable: "the American position today is closer to Britain’s in 1900." This discounts US advantages compared to what Britain faced in 1900 at the end of European imperialism and how strength is measured