Sanjay

There is a certain genre of writing that substitutes accusation for argument. It begins by assigning motive, then arranges facts,real, distorted, or imagined, to fit that conclusion. The recent commentary on my views on India-Pakistan relations follows that familiar script. Let me state the essentials clearly. To argue that India must combine deterrence with engagement is NOT to diminish the reality of terrorism, nor to excuse it. It is to recognise how serious nations manage adversaries. India has, across governments and decades, done precisely this, responding firmly to terror while retaining channels of communication where necessary to prevent escalation and miscalculation. This is not sentimentality. It is statecraft. The suggestion that engagement grants “impunity” rests on a false binary, that one must either talk or act. In practice, states do both. To collapse that complexity into a moral accusation may make for forceful prose, but it does not make for sound policy. The caricature of a women’s caucus is equally misplaced. It is not proposed as a substitute for national policy, nor as a solution to entrenched conflict. It is a modest Track II initiative, one of many possible avenues, to widen dialogue, reduce hostility, and explore areas where cooperation may still be possible. Such efforts do not require approval from those who see every form of engagement as capitulation. Invoking the suffering of victims of terrorism to argue against any form of dialogue is particularly troubling. Their loss demands seriousness, not rhetorical deployment. Accountability is not strengthened by narrowing the space for thought. The claim that an idea is discredited because it is welcomed by a Pakistani voice is also a curious standard. If the merit of an argument is to be judged by who agrees with it, then independent judgment itself is surrendered. Ideas must stand or fall on their own logic. Beyond the rhetoric lies a more fundamental question: what is India’s end game with Pakistan? If it is to reduce Pakistan to rubble, that is fantasy dressed up as toughness. It is not going to happen, and any attempt to move in that direction would risk catastrophe for the entire region, not least for India. Nuclear geography is a stern schoolmaster. It does not indulge chest-thumping. The real end game has to be containment, deterrence, internal strengthening, and selective engagement. In plain words: India’s objective should be to make Pakistan’s use of terror too costly to sustain, while preventing the relationship from sliding into permanent uncontrolled escalation. That means four things. First, raise the cost of terrorism. Through intelligence, border management, diplomatic isolation where warranted, calibrated military response when necessary, and relentless exposure of the infrastructure of proxy violence. No illusions there. Second, deny Pakistan veto power over India’s future. We should not let our growth, our diplomacy, our regional ambitions, or our internal confidence be held hostage by a single hostile neighbour. The greatest strategic answer to Pakistan is a stronger, more cohesive, more prosperous India. Third, manage the conflict, not romanticise it. There will be no grand reconciliation in the near term. But neither can every interaction be reduced to rage. Ceasefire mechanisms, back channels, water safeguards, crisis hotlines, and limited functional engagement are not signs of softness. They are instruments of control. Fourth, keep open the possibility of a different future without betting on it. That is where dialogue belongs. Not as wishful thinking, not as “aman ki asha” balloon releases, but as disciplined statecraft. You talk not because you trust, but because you must understand, signal, warn, probe, and occasionally de-escalate. So the end game is not rubble. It is a Pakistan that is deterred, constrained, denied easy success, and unable to derail India’s future. Fury is a mood. It is not a policy.

There is a certain genre of writing that substitutes accusation for argument. It begins by assigning motive, then arranges facts,real, distorted, or imagined, to fit that conclusion. The recent commentary on my views on India-Pakistan relations follows that familiar script. Let me state the essentials clearly. To argue that India must combine deterrence with engagement is NOT to diminish the reality of terrorism, nor to excuse it. It is to recognise how serious nations manage adversaries. India has, across governments and decades, done precisely this, responding firmly to terror while retaining channels of communication where necessary to prevent escalation and miscalculation. This is not sentimentality. It is statecraft. The suggestion that engagement grants “impunity” rests on a false binary, that one must either talk or act. In practice, states do both. To collapse that complexity into a moral accusation may make for forceful prose, but it does not make for sound policy. The caricature of a women’s caucus is equally misplaced. It is not proposed as a substitute for national policy, nor as a solution to entrenched conflict. It is a modest Track II initiative, one of many possible avenues, to widen dialogue, reduce hostility, and explore areas where cooperation may still be possible. Such efforts do not require approval from those who see every form of engagement as capitulation. Invoking the suffering of victims of terrorism to argue against any form of dialogue is particularly troubling. Their loss demands seriousness, not rhetorical deployment. Accountability is not strengthened by narrowing the space for thought. The claim that an idea is discredited because it is welcomed by a Pakistani voice is also a curious standard. If the merit of an argument is to be judged by who agrees with it, then independent judgment itself is surrendered. Ideas must stand or fall on their own logic. Beyond the rhetoric lies a more fundamental question: what is India’s end game with Pakistan? If it is to reduce Pakistan to rubble, that is fantasy dressed up as toughness. It is not going to happen, and any attempt to move in that direction would risk catastrophe for the entire region, not least for India. Nuclear geography is a stern schoolmaster. It does not indulge chest-thumping. The real end game has to be containment, deterrence, internal strengthening, and selective engagement. In plain words: India’s objective should be to make Pakistan’s use of terror too costly to sustain, while preventing the relationship from sliding into permanent uncontrolled escalation. That means four things. First, raise the cost of terrorism. Through intelligence, border management, diplomatic isolation where warranted, calibrated military response when necessary, and relentless exposure of the infrastructure of proxy violence. No illusions there. Second, deny Pakistan veto power over India’s future. We should not let our growth, our diplomacy, our regional ambitions, or our internal confidence be held hostage by a single hostile neighbour. The greatest strategic answer to Pakistan is a stronger, more cohesive, more prosperous India. Third, manage the conflict, not romanticise it. There will be no grand reconciliation in the near term. But neither can every interaction be reduced to rage. Ceasefire mechanisms, back channels, water safeguards, crisis hotlines, and limited functional engagement are not signs of softness. They are instruments of control. Fourth, keep open the possibility of a different future without betting on it. That is where dialogue belongs. Not as wishful thinking, not as “aman ki asha” balloon releases, but as disciplined statecraft. You talk not because you trust, but because you must understand, signal, warn, probe, and occasionally de-escalate. So the end game is not rubble. It is a Pakistan that is deterred, constrained, denied easy success, and unable to derail India’s future. Fury is a mood. It is not a policy.