Steven A. Cook

Obviously not all think tankers think the same. Straw man aside, when tens of millions of dollars are coming from Pentagon contractors into think tanks, it would be analytical malpractice not to look into the conflicts of interest that creates

Americans largely oppose the war on Iran. But the war is very popular among Washington think tanks, who are flush with more than $44 million from weapons companies since 2019 and act as the war’s loudest cheerleaders across major media networks 🧵

A few remarks regarding the Israeli perspective that may explain the continuation of the policy of decapitating senior Iranian officials. One can agree with it or oppose it, but it is worth at least understanding it, because it will also influence the continuation of the campaign. From Israel’s perspective, there is currently no one among the decision-makers in Iran—neither in the political leadership nor in the military establishment—who can be relied upon to bring about a meaningful change in Iranian strategy after the war. In the view of Israeli decision-makers, the distinction between pragmatic conservatives such as Larijani and hardliners such as Ahmad Vahidi may be relevant to academic Iran watchers, but it has little practical significance. Even the supposedly more pragmatic figures were not prepared before the war—and certainly not after it—to implement a “paradigmatic change,” as some of the more moderate voices outside Iran’s decision-making circles had proposed. In addition, since Israel would oppose any future attempt at any arrangement with the Islamic Republic, the question of whether one Iranian official or another might be more or less willing to agree to such a possible arrangement is irrelevant from Israel’s perspective. Given this assessment, the military campaign proceeds from the assumption that the Iranian leadership will likely continue the same policies pursued by the Islamic Republic under Khamenei—perhaps even in a more extreme form—unless Israel’s preferred (and less likely at this stage) scenario materializes: regime change or regime collapse. Therefore, Israel’s assessment focuses on three components: 1. The intentions of the Iranian leadership: Here, as noted, Israel sees no meaningful difference between the different Iranian officials regarding the issues that concern Israel most—nuclear capabilities, missiles, and regional policy. 2. The skills and abilities of the Iranian officials: From this perspective, Larijani may be considered no less dangerous than someone like Saeed Jalili, because he is perceived as having greater influence, experience, and abilities. 3. The military capabilities that will be available to the Iranian leadership after the war: In this context, one can understand the effort to degrade not only Iran’s strategic military capabilities but also its ability to rebuild them after the war. In sum, since Israel cannot ensure that Iran’s leadership after the war will meet the minimum necessary requirements to its national security, any kind of undermining and weakening of the regime—alongside the degradation of its military capabilities—is considered a valid objective.