Timmy Tyler

$ASTS "production advancing through spacecraft 41"

This is the second part of my analysis of $ASTS ’s recent convertible-note issuance. The central question is whether the proceeds are primarily needed to absorb higher launch costs following the New Glenn launch-pad explosion, or whether management is preparing to fund a new business opportunity. To answer that question, I will reconstruct AST’s original launch plan, compare it with the revised deployment schedule, and estimate the incremental cost of replacing delayed New Glenn capacity with Falcon 9 missions. On March 2, 2026, during the earnings call, Andy Johnson said that AST was fully funded to manufacture and launch more than 100 satellites. The company was targeting 45–60 Block 2 satellites in orbit by the end of 2026 and had 12 additional launches under contract across several launch vehicles. AST did not disclose which provider was assigned to each launch, but we can infer a plausible allocation from the number of missions, assumed batch sizes, and target number of satellites. For this model, I assume that AST planned to launch three satellites per Falcon 9 and six per New Glenn, allowing it to approach the upper end of its 45–60-satellite target. BlueBird 7 was scheduled to fly alone, leaving 11 stacked missions. Total missions: Falcon 9 launches + New Glenn launches = 11 The number of Block 2 satellites deployed, including BlueBird 6 and BlueBird 7, would have been: 2 + 3 × Falcon 9 launches + 6 × New Glenn launches The combination closest to 60 without exceeding it is: 2 + 3 × 3 + 6 × 8 = 59 satellites The inferred allocation of the 12 additional contracted missions was therefore: - 1 - New Glenn launch carrying BlueBird 7 - 8 - New Glenn launches - 3 - Falcon 9 launches This is the most mathematically consistent reconstruction of the original plan under the assumed batch sizes of three and six satellites. Fast-forward to May 28, 2026. New Glenn exploded and destroyed the launch pad. Following its assessment of the damage, Blue Origin reported that it was targeting a return to flight by the end of 2026. AST management could not simply wait for New Glenn capacity to return; it needed to adjust the deployment plan. The relevant question for investors was: how much did this disruption cost AST? On July 15, 2026, AST announced a revised deployment target. Based on expected launch availability, the company is now targeting ~45 BlueBird satellites in orbit by early 2027. For this model, I interpret "early 2027" as March 2027. I also assume that the target includes the first five Block 1 satellites already deployed. Following the loss of BlueBird 7 and the successful June launch of BlueBirds 8–10, AST has nine BlueBird satellites in orbit: five Block 1s, BlueBird 6, and BlueBirds 8–10. To reach 45 satellites by the March 2027, I assume that New Glenn returns in January 2027 and supports two originally planned missions during the first quarter. Those missions would carry 2x6=12 satellites. AST would therefore need Falcon 9 to carry: 45 − 9 − 12 = 24 satellites At three satellites per Falcon 9, this would require: 24 / 3 = 8 Falcon 9 launches These eight launches would need to occur between August 2026 and March 2027. Under the original inferred plan, AST had three Falcon 9 missions in total. One was completed in June, leaving two originally planned Falcon 9 missions, including the confirmed August flight carrying BlueBirds 11–13. The number of incremental Falcon 9 missions would therefore be: 8 required remaining launches − 2 originally planned remaining launches = 6 additional launches Now assume that AST pays the full published price for each additional launch. SpaceX’s pricing sheet lists a standard Falcon 9 payment-plan price of $74M through 2026. For simplicity, I apply that price to all six incremental missions: 6 launches × $74M = $444M Under this deliberately conservative scenario, AST would require ~$450M of additional gross launch funding to secure the six incremental Falcon 9 missions. The convertible offering is expected to generate ~$887M after fees and hedge costs. The estimated $450M launch requirement would therefore represent roughly 50% of the net proceeds. Even under this worst-case model, only half of the proceeds can be explained by the need for additional launch capacity. The remaining half would be available for the growth initiatives and strategic opportunities described by management. Now let’s unfold the aggressive implicit assumptions made to produce the $450M estimate. - AST receives no refunds, credits, or other relief from Blue Origin. AST continues to reserve cash for 100% of its original Blue Origin obligations and purchases the additional Falcon 9 missions on top of them. If six Falcon 9 missions simply replace three New Glenn missions valued at an assumed $80 million each, the incremental economic cost falls to: $444M − $240M = $204M - AST receives no volume discount from SpaceX. The model applies the full $74M public price to all six incremental missions, despite the size and repeatable nature of the order. - AST receives no meaningful benefit from the BlueBird 7 insurance recovery or its contractual rights against Blue Origin. This assumption disregards AST’s statement that it expects the cost of the lost satellite to be partially recovered under its insurance policy and that it expects to receive a replacement launch under the terms of its contract with Blue Origin. The $450M estimate therefore requires several highly conservative assumptions to hold simultaneously. Now we can estimate the base-case. Starting from the $204M incremental economic cost, assuming $80M replacement-launch credit and a conservative $25M insurance recovery (only 15% of company’s stated cost of BlueBird 7), the incremental cost estimate reduces to ~$100M. Allowing for uncertainty in these offsets and launch pricing, I use a base-case range of $100–150M. Issuing convertible notes under unfavorable market conditions solely to fund $100M incremental launch costs would have been a highly inefficient financing decision. It would also create a serious inconsistency with management’s March funding statement. Forecasting launch cadence and mission success is difficult when a partner’s launch vehicle is still maturing. But estimating available cash and existing contractual obligations is considerably straightforward. If AST was genuinely fully funded to manufacture and launch more than 100 satellites, a capital shortage to finance unexpected six additional Falcon 9 missions would represent a major forecasting error. The financing therefore suggests that management is preparing for an unexpected capital-intensive commercial or strategic opportunity beyond merely replacing disrupted launch capacity. This interpretation is also consistent with the order in which management listed the intended uses of proceeds in the official announcement: 1. "Pursue an expanding universe of growth initiatives" 2. "Mitigate risks associated with third-party launch providers" That leaves the final question: what strategic opportunity could require over $700M of capital expenditure this year? P.S. I excluded Vulcan from the analysis because its role remains highly uncertain. There is a substantial possibility that it will be used for DoW-related contracts that directly cover launch costs and therefore do not burden the company’s cash balance. I also excluded any Falcon 9 surcharge associated with a priority launch requirement. In one of his posts, Elon stated that AST was charged the market price. The analysis assumed no discount to list price, which already represents a premium and is consistent with the "market price" described in Elon’s post.

I plan to convert a large portion of my portfolio into cash at the end of the year. Why? Not because I’ve lost conviction in my holdings. Not because I’m bearish. I’m doing it because I want to live a simpler, lower stress life. I’ve reached a point where I’m no longer focused on chasing exponential gains at all costs. Health. Family. Peace of mind. Those things are worth far more to me than doing a 5x with my portfolio. I’ve become very good at selling options, and if I can consistently generate 1.5% to 2% a month with relatively low stress, why wouldn’t I? I don’t need more money to be happy. I’m already happy. Money is just a tool. As I get older, I’m realizing the goal was never to accumulate the biggest portfolio possible. The goal was to build a life where I have the freedom to spend my time on what matters most. So over the next year, you’ll probably see me slow things down a bit. Less chasing. More living. The real wealth in my life is my family, not the amount of money I have. Time to lifemaxxx

$ASTS: FCC opening up more devices for D2D use? 😁

Cathie Wood’s ARKK fund is down ~$40 million on its SpaceX $SPCX holdings.

$ASTS There ain't no way this was just a standard ABC pull back to the 0.618 Fib for Wave 2. It can't be that easy. Potential bottom is in.