Todd Harrison

@tomkarako Did he say that publicly? If he did, I must have missed it.

@ToddHarrisonDC An important piece of context related to the $185 B is that it is apparently over ten years, not five.

The #GoldenDome cost figure Gen. Guetlein revealed today ($185B) is roughly in line with Architecture 1 in the paper I published last September.

It's hard to say, but I think it must be similar in scope because costs can't change that much. You can only buy so much missile defense with a given amount of funding. What the $185B figure makes clear is that it will not be capable of "forever ending the missile threat to the American homeland. And the success rate is very close to a hundred percent." govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DC…

@ToddHarrisonDC Do you think the scope matches too, from what you know?

With renewed talk of a large supplemental request, here’s the recent history of DoD supplemental funding in both constant and then-year dollars. #DefenseBudget #SupplementalFunding

That architecture consisted of a limited capability (far less than an impenetrable shield) at a cost of $175B over the first five years for the initial capability and a total cost of $471B over 20 years including O&S and replenishment costs. The details and the mix of capabilities within that topline figure can certainly vary--more of one thing, less of another--but the overall scope gives you an idea of the capability they envision. #page=12" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">aei.org/wp-content/upl…

Iran's Operational Satellites spacedata.aei.org/share/7lCb7D_u… via @ToddHarrisonDC

For comparison, here is the number of US operational satellites over time. (As of today, 9,814 of these are Starlink satellites.) US Operational Satellites spacedata.aei.org/share/nyxFQyPD…

I see stories out today saying that China has 1,900 satellites. That's not true. Even if you include all Chinese satellites (commercial, military, civil), it only adds up to 1,187 operational satellites. In comparison, the US has 11,323 operational satellites. It is true that China has almost 500 surveillance satellites (430), which compares to 525 for the US. See for yourself. China's Operational Satellites spacedata.aei.org/share/kJd9WJh1…

I added some new features to the Space Data Navigator tool, including a guided tour to show what it allows you to do and the ability to share links (like this) to custom charts you make. NRO Starshield Satellites spacedata.aei.org/share/lEMJhoyP…

Progression of GPS capabilities by generation of satellites spacedata.aei.org

ASK HAL: "How many SSA satellites does Russia have?" Answer: Not as many as they used to!

Got a space-related data question? ASK HAL: "Show me Chinese military satellites by mission area." spacedata.aei.org

Kennedy / Cape Canaveral is by far the busiest spaceport the world has ever seen. Plesetsk peaked at 70 launches in a year back in 1977. Congrats to the team that made 100 (and counting) possible!

My central argument is this: "The nuclear deterrence mission is too important to be a secondary responsibility within any service, and the Air Force simply does not have the bandwidth to modernize its fighters, bombers, tankers, and ICBMs simultaneously. Reassigning the ICBM mission to the Army would give each military department responsibility for one leg of the nuclear triad, relieve the Air Force of an unsustainable modernization burden, and reinforce the Army’s growing emphasis on long-range fires." In other words, get the Air Force back into flying and get the Army more into missiles.

1) The Army already operates the only other silo-based missiles in the US inventory (GBIs). 2) Army personnel in ICBM jobs would build skills better aligned with other jobs in the Army (long-range fires and missile defense). 3) The Army already has the utility helicopters and force structure needed to take on the ICBM security mission. My bottom line: "Reassigning the ICBM mission to the Army would give each military department responsibility for one leg of the nuclear triad, relieve the Air Force of an unsustainable modernization burden, and reinforce the Army’s growing emphasis on long-range fires." Read the full commentary here: breakingdefense.com/2025/11/the-ti…

In my latest commentary I attempt make everyone mad at me by arguing that now is the right time to move the ICBM mission from the Air Force to the Army. ICBMs are no longer a good fit for the Air Force because: 1) silo-based missiles are simply not core to the Air Force identity or mission; 2) the missileer career field has no natural synergy with the rest of the Air Force; and 3) maintaining a separate fleet of helicopters and supporting career fields just to protect the ICBMs is wasteful. It's a better fit for the Army because...

I asked the question: how long are Starlink satellites lasting and how many are "duds?" Just 0.4% of Starlink sats decayed within the first month after launch, and 2.6% decayed within a year after launch. The mortality rate goes way up starting around the 4th year on orbit (~47 months).

This is encouraging. Or maybe they just figured since we were in a shutdown we might not maneuver? 🤣 "China reached out to NASA to avoid a potential satellite collision in 1st-of-its-kind space cooperation" | Space share.google/rOU6j9aCt60rLe…

The Pentagon is holistically unprepared for a new era of warfighting. In a new report, @AEI's Elaine McCusker, John G. Ferrari, and @ToddHarrisonDC argue that the Pentagon must shed the processes, structures, and capabilities that have long held it back.

Looking forward to this discussion in just a few minutes. We'll be talking about what needs to happen in the defense budget versus what's likely to happen and what capabilities we should be investing in versus current investments.