

Tom Chivers
77.2K posts

@TomChivers
"Far too nice to be a journalist": Terry Pratchett. Lead writer, Flagship. Semafor. chiversthomas(a)gmail. Third book, Everything is Predictable, out now!




In the name of public service, and as ex-economics editor of BBC Newsnight, I offer to do a zoom call, tonight, with any Labour MP who wants to understand why bond markets do not "fall into line" with governments. 1/









Welcome to the Home Office @NatalieFleetMP.



For 45 years, Berkeley built virtually no new housing. By the mid-2010s, it was the most expensive college town in America. Shortly thereafter, YIMBYs took over and kicked off a building boom. Today, nominal rents are below 2018 rates—remarkable progress on affordability.



the general public overestimate the margins businesses make

At my company we stopped doing code reviews. There's no point now

if u really believed in agi u would stop wearing sunscreen

Hi Marc. I know the heatmap meme, but I think the study it comes from ( nature.com/articles/s4146… ) is saying something really interestingly different from the meme version. The study finds (see Figure 1) that liberals care about their friends more than conservatives do*. However, the moral circle question later on, which produced the heatmap, asks people to rate the maximum boundary of the moral circle. So if you said you cared about self/family/friends only, you landed in circle 4. But if you said you cared about self/family/friends/acquaintances/countrymen, you landed in circle 7. There's no implication that the people in 7 cared about their family *less* than the people in circle 4. It just meant that, in addition to caring about their family, they also cared about countrymen. The heatmap showed a higher percent of liberals in circle 7 compared to circle 4 (ie caring about countrymen+friends, rather than only friends) but it still isn't making any claims about whether liberals care more/less about their friends than conservatives. And again, in the raw data, we find they care more. (@-ing @JonHaidt, co-author of the study, who can check if I'm understanding it correctly) I realize that study methodology is boring, but my tweet was trying to make the same point. People act like this is a zero-sum game, where caring about family means you can't care about friends, or caring about friends means you can't care about strangers. But it's not true - in most cases, there's no tradeoff. If you see a stranger drowning, you can jump in and save them, with no effect on whether you're also kind to your friends and family. In the types of government situations that I'm sure we're both thinking of, there theoretical tradeoffs - money spent on one budgetary item won't be spent on another - but in the real budgetary regime, these are so weak as to be meaningless (I owe you an ACX post on why this is true). So I think the data presentation error is the same as the philosophical error and (to tie it back to current events) the error involved in this weekend's tariffs - the world isn't so zero-sum that hurting foreigners necessarily implies you're helping people close to you. (*) I can't tell whether I'm making the same mistake here - the study doesn't mention that this is relative, but it presents it close enough to love of family that it's possible these are relative values in some kind of friend-vs-family construct.




I got my Claude to do a UK version. … Fun prompt. Below is my honest swing at it for the UK. Caveat upfront: "fix everything switch" overstates things — these are policies where I think the case is unusually strong and the standard objections look weak relative to the upside, not magic wands. Confidence ratings are about "this would meaningfully improve UK welfare/growth if well-implemented," not "this is politically easy." 1. Radical planning liberalisation (housing + infrastructure) Confidence: Very high. Reasoning: The UK's discretionary planning system is the single biggest unforced error in British policy. It drives the housing crisis, suppresses productivity (workers can't move to high-wage cities), worsens regional inequality, slows clean energy buildout, kneecaps infrastructure, and arguably depresses fertility. Most rich-country peers build more housing per capita. Moving to a zoning/rules-based system with by-right approval, looser greenbelt around stations, street votes, and curtailed judicial review on planning would be transformative. Why not done: Homeowners are an enormous, high-turnout voting bloc whose paper wealth depends on scarcity. Greenbelt is politically sacred. The losses are visible and concentrated (a new block next door); the gains are diffuse and slow. Both main parties have flirted with reform and flinched. 2. Council tax revaluation and property tax reform Confidence: Very high it's needed; high it would be beneficial. Reasoning: Council tax bands are still based on 1991 property values. A flat in Hartlepool can pay more council tax than a mansion in Westminster. This is regressive, distorts the housing market, and starves councils. Revaluing — or better, replacing council tax and stamp duty with a proportional property tax or land value tax — is one of the most-endorsed-by-economists reforms going. Why not done: Revaluation creates visible losers (London/South East homeowners) and quieter winners. Treasury also fears the transition. The Mirrlees Review laid this out in 2011 and basically nothing has happened since. 3. Abolish stamp duty on primary residences Confidence: High. Reasoning: Stamp duty has among the worst deadweight losses of any UK tax — it taxes transactions, so it discourages downsizing, labour mobility, and matching people to suitable homes. The empirical literature on this is unusually unified. Why not done: It raises ~£12bn and is invisible to most voters most of the time. Replacing it (ideally with #2 above) needs political capital nobody wants to spend. 4. Build clean energy and grid infrastructure fast Confidence: High. Reasoning: UK industrial electricity prices are among the highest in the OECD, which is quietly hollowing out manufacturing. Cheap, abundant electricity is the most undervalued input to almost every modern industry. Streamlining onshore wind, solar, nuclear (SMRs and large), and especially grid connections and transmission would compound for decades. Connection queues currently stretch into the 2030s. Why not done: Planning (see #1), Ofgem incentives that historically rewarded keeping grid investment low, judicial review, NIMBYism around pylons, and a regulatory culture that treats new build as risky and the status quo as safe. 5. Devolve real fiscal and policy power to cities and regions Confidence: High. Reasoning: The UK is one of the most fiscally centralised democracies in the OECD. Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds, Glasgow are dramatically underpowered relative to peers like Munich or Lyon. Mayors with proper tax-raising power, transport authority, and skills budgets would let cities tailor solutions and compete. Most evidence on agglomeration economics suggests this matters a lot. Why not done: The Treasury genuinely hates losing control of money; this is a deep institutional preference that survives changes of government. Westminster MPs don't like rival power centres either. 6. A genuinely competitive high-skilled immigration regime Confidence: Medium-high. Reasoning: Top-talent immigration is close to a free lunch for receiving countries — fiscally positive, innovation-boosting, and concentrated in tradeable sectors. The UK has the language and the universities; it's leaving money on the table with slow visas, high fees (the NHS surcharge plus visa costs for a family is brutal), and a Global Talent visa that's narrower than it looks. Why not done: Immigration politics is toxic and the public doesn't reliably distinguish high- from low-skilled flows. Total numbers have been high recently, which makes it hard to argue for more of any category even when the composition matters more than the total. 7. Childcare cost reform Confidence: Medium-high. Reasoning: The UK has among the highest childcare costs in the OECD as a share of household income. This depresses female labour force participation, suppresses fertility, and acts as a giant marginal tax on the second earner. The recent expansion of "free hours" helps but the supply-side problem (provider economics, ratios, planning for nurseries) isn't fixed. Why not done: It's expensive, the sector is politically diffuse, and ratios/quality regulations have genuine trade-offs that aren't easy to legislate around. 8. NHS productivity reform plus sustained capital investment Confidence: Medium. Reasoning: NHS productivity has fallen meaningfully since 2019 even as funding rose. The UK has unusually few CT/MRI scanners per capita, old buildings, and weak digital infrastructure. Capital investment with productivity-linked reform (better IT, more diagnostic capacity, GP/secondary care interface) is probably higher-ROI than another marginal headcount increase. Why not done: The NHS is genuinely a political third rail; structural reform gets framed as privatisation regardless of content. Capital is the easiest budget to cut in any given year, so it gets cut repeatedly. 9. Curtail judicial review of major infrastructure Confidence: Medium. Reasoning: HS2, Heathrow, nuclear, transmission lines — UK infrastructure costs are 2–4x peer countries partly because of endless legal challenges and the consultations that anticipate them. A narrower "did the decision-maker follow the process" standard, with tight time limits, would lower costs without sacrificing core rule-of-law protections. Why not done: Constitutionally fraught, lawyers and the legal establishment push back hard, and any government doing this is accused of authoritarianism — sometimes fairly. 10. Reform the pensions triple lock and the wider intergenerational settlement Confidence: Medium-high on the need; medium on whether reform alone "fixes" much. Reasoning: The triple lock ratchets state pension spending up faster than wages or prices and is a major driver of long-run fiscal pressure. Combined with NI exemption for pensioners and protected pensioner benefits, the UK has built a fiscal regime that systematically transfers from young workers to older asset-holders. Untangling this would free fiscal space for investment in #4, #7, #8. Why not done: Pensioners vote at roughly 75% turnout; under-30s at roughly 50%. The maths is unforgiving. A few honourable mentions I cut: tax simplification (genuinely good but rarely "fix everything"), proportional representation (large effects but unclear sign), drug policy reform (good evidence base, narrower scope), regulator growth duties / a serious bonfire of Quangos rationalisation, and reforming the apprenticeship levy. The pattern. Almost every item above is blocked by the same underlying thing: a system that makes losses visible and concentrated while gains are diffuse and slow, in a country where homeowners and pensioners vote heavily. The "switch" in the meme exists; it's just wired to a circuit that the median voter has a strong short-run reason to leave alone. That's not a reason not to flip it — it's a reason the case has to be made repeatedly and honestly. Standard disclaimer: reasonable people disagree on all of this, especially #6, #9, and #10, and "well-implemented" is doing a lot of work in every line above.




Asked Claude: 'There's a meme called the "fix everything easily switch". What policies do you think are the best candidates for being a real fix everything switch in the US? Give me your top ten, your confidence, your reasoning, and why a given policy has not been implemented.'