Lincoln Warshington retweetledi
Lincoln Warshington
8.4K posts
Oh my god. Nobody cares.
*Walter Bloomberg@DeItaone
TRUMP: WE WILL BE RELEASING UFO FILES IN THE NEAR FUTURE
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Lincoln Warshington retweetledi
@adamtaggart I am inspired by the fact that you get professional portrait photography done with just you and your dog...and not the people in your immediate family.
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This young lady -- my best friend, Thoughtful Money co-founder & Chief Love Officer -- just turned 10!
Nothing in this world beats a good dog
...except a great one ❤️
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This is exactly the kinda attitude that led to the Black Monday in 1929: complacency. It was also a Swiss vol trader who triggered the avalanche almost 100 years ago. It’s all in Andrew Ross Sorkins’s book 1929, which I’ll definitely read at some point. #1929 vibes.
david@sdav1986
Can’t wait to hear your takes on how we crash on Monday this weekend. Much appreciated.
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Lincoln Warshington retweetledi
Many adults can learn good sportsmanship from these two.. 😊
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@prpl8 I think privacy concerns would be the biggest impediment for them.
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Lincoln Warshington retweetledi
Imagine denying dinosaurs after seeing this
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Love the smile from Joe at the very end.
Guitar Gods Unleashed@UnleashedG23066
Joe Walsh makes it look easy because it is for him.
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proving out in the go forward
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش@citrinowicz
Before Striking Iran: Defining Achievable and realistic Objectives Before considering a military strike against Iran, it is essential to be realistic about what such a campaign can actually accomplish. There is little doubt that Iran is not a peer competitor to the United States militarily. The U.S. retains overwhelming conventional superiority and operational dominance across domains. However, Iran should not be underestimated. As demonstrated in previous limited confrontations, particularly in missile warfare, Tehran possesses meaningful asymmetric capabilities — especially in its ballistic missile arsenal and regional proxy network. The core question, therefore, is not whether the United States can inflict damage. It is: What strategic objective is realistically achievable? 1. Regime Change Even senior U.S. officials have acknowledged that regime change would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve. There is no unified, viable opposition inside Iran capable of stepping in and governing. Moreover, regime change would almost certainly require a prolonged campaign, potentially including ground forces — something the American public and policymakers have shown little appetite for after Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent a willingness to commit to a large-scale, long-term stabilization effort, regime change is not a credible objective. 2. Destabilizing the Regime to Trigger Internal Uprising A military campaign could weaken the regime and create internal pressure. However, Iran’s leadership — particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — has no exit option. The regime’s survival is existential for its core leadership. History suggests they would respond to internal unrest with overwhelming force. For destabilization to translate into meaningful political change, a sustained and prolonged campaign would likely be required. Even then, the most probable outcome may not be democratic transition, but internal chaos — potentially pushing Iran toward civil conflict. That scenario carries significant regional and global risks. 3. Destroying Iran’s Nuclear Program A military strike could significantly damage nuclear facilities. Precision strikes may delay progress and degrade infrastructure. But strikes cannot eliminate scientific knowledge, human capital, or political will. Nor is it certain that all highly enriched material could be located and destroyed. At best, military action may delay the program. It is unlikely to eliminate it permanently. Iran would almost certainly attempt reconstruction — potentially with greater determination and fewer constraints. 4. Eliminating Iran’s Missile Capabilities A broad campaign could substantially degrade Iran’s missile inventory and production infrastructure. However, Iran’s missile program is domestically based and central to its defense doctrine. It is viewed as a pillar of deterrence against superior conventional forces. Even after heavy losses, Tehran would likely prioritize rebuilding these capabilities. The result may be temporary degradation rather than permanent removal. 5. Forcing Iran Back to Negotiations on Better Terms There is an assumption that military pressure could coerce Tehran into accepting a more favorable agreement. Yet past confrontations suggest that the Iranian leadership may choose endurance over capitulation. The regime may calculate that time increases political pressure on Washington to de-escalate, particularly if the conflict becomes prolonged or regionally destabilizing. Rather than producing immediate concessions, military action could harden Iran’s negotiating position — or eliminate diplomatic channels entirely. 6. Targeting Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Some might argue that removing the Supreme Leader could fundamentally alter Iran’s trajectory. However, decapitation strikes often produce unpredictable outcomes. Iran’s political system is institutionalized, not purely personalist. Removing Khamenei could trigger retaliation from Iran and its regional proxies and potentially force the United States into a much broader conflict. It is also unclear whether such a move would moderate Iranian policy. It could just as easily radicalize it. The Strategic Bottom Line There is no question about U.S. military superiority in a direct confrontation. The real issue is strategic clarity. For the first time in decades, the possibility of direct U.S.–Iran military confrontation raises the prospect of open interstate war rather than proxy conflict. That demands disciplined thinking about ends, ways, and means. No available objective appears easily attainable. All carry significant second- and third-order effects. Many outcomes could be unpredictable — and not necessarily favorable to U.S. interests. Thus, before initiating military action, policymakers must clearly define what “success” looks like — and whether the likely costs, duration, escalation risks, and regional consequences align with America’s broader strategic priorities. Military capability is not the same as strategic advantage. #IranRevolution2026 #Iran
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Lincoln Warshington retweetledi
Lincoln Warshington retweetledi
On April 18, a hacker minted 116,500 rsETH tokens out of nothing. Not stolen from a wallet. Created from a forged cross-chain message, a phantom packet that told Kelp DAO’s bridge to release real tokens backed by zero collateral. The attacker deposited those phantom tokens as collateral on Aave and borrowed $236 million in real ETH against them. Within hours, $5.4 billion fled Aave. The protocol’s ETH pool hit 100% utilization. AAVE dropped 19%.
Then Justin Sun withdrew $154 million from Aave. After securing his own exit, he posted publicly: “Kelpdao hacker, how much you want? Let’s just talk. You can’t spend $300 million anyway.”
The man who extracted first offered to negotiate second. But that is not the deepest layer.
The deepest layer is this: April 2026 just produced a single month in which every major system failure on earth was caused by the same mechanism. Not hacking. Not force. Verification Cost Inversion. Every system trusted a representation of value instead of verifying the value itself. And every system collapsed at the exact point where trust replaced verification.
The rsETH was a representation of staked ETH. Nobody verified the cross-chain message that created it. A single DVN verifier, a 1-of-1 trust assumption, was the entire security model for a bridge holding $292 million. The representation said “backed.” The reality said “phantom.” Aave accepted the representation.
Five days earlier, Brent futures represented oil at $95. HSBC’s CEO revealed a barrel reached Sri Lanka at $286. Insurance twentyfold. Shipping plus $40. War premiums uninsurable. The benchmark had diverged from physical reality by 200%. Every central bank and sovereign budget trusted the representation.
Seven days earlier, Apple’s App Store represented a Ledger Live app as reviewed and approved. The reality was a phishing tool that drained $9.5 million from fifty-plus victims who trusted the store’s representation of safety.
That same week, RAVE token represented a $6 billion market cap. ZachXBT documented 95% of supply in nine wallets. When those nine sold, $6 billion evaporated on $52 million in liquidations. Representation to reality: 115 to 1.
On April 16, a Crédit Agricole vault in Naples represented itself as secure. Three men went through the floor into a 2,500-year-old sewer nobody verified as an attack surface.
The mechanism is identical in every case. Verification costs time, money, and cognitive effort. Trust costs nothing. As systems grow more complex, verification costs rise faster than the systems they are meant to verify. At some threshold, participants stop verifying and start trusting representations. That threshold is where every April 2026 failure occurred.
This is not a security problem. It is an economic law. The cost of verifying has exceeded the cost of trusting in every domain simultaneously. Oil benchmarks trust paper over physical. DeFi bridges trust single verifiers over redundant proof. App stores trust scans over behavioral testing. Token markets trust market caps over wallet distribution. Banks trust walls over geology.
The entire global system is now running on representations that have decoupled from the realities they describe. The rsETH was not staked ETH. The $95 barrel was not $95. The approved app was not safe. The $6 billion market was nine wallets. The vault was not sealed.
When the cost of verification exceeds the cost of trust, every system becomes a representation of itself. April 2026 is the month the representations defaulted. All of them. At once.
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@DrTimBarber @AMAZlNGNATURE Is it just the males that have the aggressiveness?
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@AMAZlNGNATURE They are horrid. They will drown your dog purely for amusement.
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Lincoln Warshington retweetledi
People don’t talk enough about how scary kangaroos are.
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Lincoln Warshington retweetledi
@shortbelly "ODTE allowed me to achieve total consciousness."
Buddha
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@JunkScience I wonder if their longevity is more a reflection of all the walking and exercise they got by virtue of their careers.
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Arnold Palmer often smoked while playing golf. It probably helped his game by controlling anxiety. He lived to be 87, way past today's life expectancy.
Ben Hogan was heavy smoker – reportedly as much as two packs of unfiltered Chesterfields per round. Died at age 84 – also well past life expectancy.
Not advocating. Just pointing out the facts that show EPA hysteria about fine particulate matter (PM2.5) in outdoor air being deadly is not even close to being reality based.
Golf Digest@GolfDigest
Ben Hogan and Arnold Palmer at Augusta National, 1966.
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@skumWgmi @dfwaaronlayman He's going to be getting lousy Christmas presents for years to come as you continue to exercise discipline.
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My boomer dad retired at 62.
Full pension.
Paid off house.
Medicare at 65.
Social security at 67.
Told me at Thanksgiving, I just need to be more disciplined with my money,
I make $71,000.
Rent is $1,900.
I have $4,000 in savings.
I didn't say anything.
I passed the rolls.
But here's what i wanted to say:
Your pension was defunded by lobbyists your generation elected.
Your social security is solvent because mine is still paying in.
Your houseis worth $800,000 because mine costs $600,000.
You didn't build differently.
You just got there first.
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@AlmostMedia You need to be on someone's short list for Secretary of Defense. I can easily imagine you in the situation room and at every instance that a conflict arises, pitching this strategy to the Joint Chiefs. Every time. 😂
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I'm not exactly clear on why we can't send 300 super ripped gay dudes to deal with this situation in Iran.
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