Richard Martin

Extraordinary: I’ve just posted a piece on the latest Court of Appeal case on proscription - it’s just disappeared (is this automated content moderation, because I began with a reference to the name of the organisation?). If anyone else has had this experience I would be interested to know…/1

Highly interesting reflections on writing by legal scholars in Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly. nilq.qub.ac.uk/index.php/nilq…

Following the publication of the Independent Sentencing Review's interim report last week, our Director of External Relations @EllieCumbo considers the challenges ahead: sentencingacademy.org.uk/a-review-of-th…

This volume celebrates 40 years of scholarship by Julian V. Roberts KC (Hon) to mark his extraordinary influence on sentencing and criminal justice. Dive into this collection of essays in his honour edited by @MarieManikis & Gabrielle Watson: oxford.ly/3WOYZhz

Some of the (often depressing) data highlighted in the report from Pivotal discussed in View from Stormont

@LewisGrahamLaw @SeethingMead @__RichardMartin Upcoming judgment in Bodson and Others v. Belgium (hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion…), concerning "criminal convictions for maliciously obstructing road traffic by blocking the Brussels-Aachen section of the A3/E40 motorway, in both directions, at the Cheratte bridge near Liège", in the context of "a general protest led by the FGTB, one of Belgium’s two largest trade unions".

Join us on Friday 10 January for a free day-long event - 'Perspectives on Sentencing' - held in conjunction with @SentencingCCL and @CityLawSchool. Topics include the Government's Sentencing Review and the issue of sentence inflation. Sign up here: eventbrite.co.uk/e/perspectives…

Re Brown [2024] NIKB 109 tinyurl.com/24bjh7fa JR of SofS decisions not to hold public inquiry into 1997 murder of Sean Brown - s1 Inquiries Act 2005 - Ongoing breach A2 ECHR - ICRIR not fit for A2 requirements - Order made to compel SofS to hold public inquiry

Ultimately, the success of the HS appeal in today's Liberty JR turns on convincing the CA that "more than minor" is simply an explanation of what serious disruption is, or means...rather than an expansion that changes the meaning. I cannot see that being made good

Yes, obviously as I've pointed out before, while Perinçek did include the word "normally", there are no actual examples of Strasbourg departing from that general position that an individualised assessment is required. And there are plenty of examples like Elvira Dmitriyeva v. Russia (2019) (hudoc.echr.coe.int/?i=001-192771), §§ 84, 87, and 89, which have not only reiterated the Sunday Times/Perinçek rule in strong terms, but also positively deduced from it that "the need to punish unlawful conduct ... is not sufficient to justify the applicant’s conviction for making calls to participate in an event on a topical issue of public interest". But the very fact that Sunday Times was a UK case illustrates how this is really a tension between fundamental principles of the domestic and Convention systems per se - the common law and UK legislative practice have always held that general rules are required because individualised assessment would apparently give rise to "unacceptable uncertainty" (the phrase infamously used by the House of Lords in Distillers v Sunday Times), and so the transition to a modern 'culture of justification' was always going to be found difficult by a conservative judiciary wedded to the above principle.

@LewisGrahamLaw @SeethingMead @__RichardMartin A further indication that for "national courts [to] interpret the relevant provisions ... very broadly without considering the individual situation" is incompatible with Arts 10 and 11, in the topical context of online encouragement to participate in peaceful protests. "Orders to stop" acts protected by those Articles "require strong justification", with the emphasis being on whether the protests were violent or not. ... 1/

Join us for some fantastic events in the Mannheim Centre for Criminology's seminar series this term 👇👇👇

Final CfP for this great conference @NorthumbriaLaw on Nov 26th on Human Rights in the UK under the Conservative Govt Organised by @ramshaw & @ConallMallory @qubschooloflaw, funded by @legalscholars. Keynotes by @RogerMasterman and … me! Timely topic. Deadline Aug 16th.

Challenges with fixing the Legacy Act. Some summer reading for Hillery Benn:

@Geoff_Pearson V.kind - thank you!

@__RichardMartin Thanks Richard. And while we're dishing out compliments, I thought Policing Human Rights was excellent.

Great article referenced here @Geoff_Pearson A theme I’ve also discussed here in chpt 8, global.oup.com/academic/produ… Important to note though is also how broadly the courts have interpreted necessity - discussed in chapters 8-9.

I don't think it's fair to say that lawyers are 'wilfully ignoring' this factor. I think that many lawyers think the sentences seem very harsh. But let me try and deal with the question directly. I accept that, as is the clear and consistent case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the UK courts and is also the language of Articles 10/11 (freedom of expression/assembly) themselves, the right to free expression and assembly are not unlimited and can lawfully be restricted if the restriction is proportionate, i.e. no more than is necessary to e.g. protect the rights of others, which in these circumstances is what is happening. But, the state also cannot impose any penalty however harsh. And that is where the difficulty here is. It seems indisputable that the sentences for these kind of non-violent but (highly) disruptive protests have been increasing very quickly, and when you put that together with the proliferation of anti-protest injunctions which also lead to long prison sentences when breached, it's a different environment than even a few years ago. That in itself is important to understand and should lead to some kind of pause for thought (see my article verfassungsblog.de/civil-disobedi…). This is in part probably due to the tactics: in previous cases where more lenience has been shown (e.g. Cuadrilla, R v Roberts, R v Jones (where the quote below is from) were 'direct action' situations where the disruptive protest (at a fracking site: Cuadrilla/Jones, at airforce bases (Jones)) was directly aimed at the supposed cause of the problem. In the Insulate Britain/JSO cases, the actions seem not targeted at the individuals who are to blame for the wrong as they see it (impending environmental catastrophe), but aimed to cause wider social disruption which will lead to the government changing its approach. This was highlighted in the Trowland case (see para 74 bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/…): "The further away from the core Article 10 and 11 rights a protestor is, the less those rights merit an assessment of lower culpability or, putting it another way, a significant reduction in sentence" Another factor may be that in recent cases environmental protesters have sometimes decided to represent themselves rather than use lawyers (I think in this case they had lawyers for mitigation of sentencing only). I understand the argument which is that they feel they can speak directly to juries, but this will also lead to difficulties in identifying defences etc. And on a simpler level may wind the judge up, and after all it is the Judge not the jury who sentences. But even taking all that into account, 4-5 years are long sentences in the wider context of these kind of cases. It may be disproportionate even despite the harm to the public caused. From the limited amount I have heard about the case, I am also interested in what appeal points will be taken on whether there is an Article 10/11 defence. It sounds like the trial judge thought there wasn't, but I am doubtful that can be right.

@criminology Shadd Maruna kicking off the first day of the #belfastcrimcon asking who is the ‘real’ criminology expert? Stay tuned and join us for drinks tonight @UlsterUni

Looking for a new job? Interested in policing, evidence based practice, innovation & academic research? Want to work in a brilliant force with fab people? Take a look at this job! @ThamesVP @TVPcareers

Important judgment from the Divisional Court The Government's attempt to define "serious disruption" in the parts of the Public Order Act 1986 which give police powers to impose restrictions on processions and assemblies was unlawful because: (a) The regulations which attempted to make the change went further than the Public Order Act 1986, the primary legislation, would permit (so "ultra vires" - outside of the scope of the power to make regulations) (Ground 1) (b) The consultation process was insufficient (Ground 4) The other, more ambitious, constitutional grounds (2 and 3) failed but the net result is the regulations are unlawful. The regulations are, though, still in force pending an appeal (to the Court of Appeal) which will be expedited. Judgment summary here: judiciary.uk/wp-content/upl… Judgment: judiciary.uk/wp-content/upl… Well done to all involved including @judebunting and @thebrieftweet @libertyhq @publiclawprojct