r

By rejecting Divine Simplicity (Everyone should reject it), we move toward Theistic Activism, which holds that God is the ontological ground of His own attributes. In this model, God's properties are logically dependent upon Him but remain distinct from the divine subject, avoiding the category errors of identity found in classical simplicity The "Who" (God as Substantial Subject): This is the Individual. In your model, God is a concrete, living, and infinite "Someone." He is the Substance that exists in and of Himself (Aseity). He is the "Actor" who logically precedes the "Act." The "What" (Properties as Abstract Objects): These are the Attributes (Omniscience, Goodness, Power). In your model, these constitute His Nature. They are the "What-it-is-to-be-God." Crucially, they are distinct from one another (Mercy $\neq$ Justice) and distinct from the "Who" (the Subject). "However, this does not matter, since the claims of activism do not entail that God creates himself. God stands in a relation of logical dependence to his nature (a trivial result of the strict necessity of both relata). His nature stands in a relation of causal dependence to him. It simply does not follow that God stands in a relation of causal dependence to himself. Relations of logical dependence are always transitive. Relations of continuous causal dependence are always transitive. But we have no good reason to think that transitivity always holds across these two relations. If God creates some bachelor, the existence of this bachelor is logically sufficient for the existence of some unmarried man. It follows that God creates some unmarried man. But the transitivity we thus see across the causal and logical dependence relations holds only in case the unmarried man is one and the same individual as the bachelor. Unless the doctrine of divine simplicity is true, God is not identical with his nature. Since I have rejected the doctrine of divine simplicity, I can reject as well the inference that from God’s nature causally depending on God, and God’s logically depending on his nature, it follows that God causally depends on himself. Thus the view that God is absolute creator of everything distinct from himself does not entail that God is self-caused, or self-created. For example, it yields a subtly new understanding of self-existence. If activism is true, a self-existent being is an uncaused being. A self-existent being is not to be characterized only as a being whose existence follows from its own nature, in the sense that in every possible world in which its nature exists, it exists. For this is true of all necessarily existent abstract objects, which on the view of absolute creation are not self-existent entities. A self-existent being, rather, is a necessarily existent individual caused to exist by no other being. On the view under consideration, appropriately, only God fits the bill"

The Taymi is left with 3 options in regards to the acts that emerge in Allah's essence: 1. They pop into existence without a cause (which is absurd) 2. The act is caused by another emergent act and so on ad infinitum (Which necessitates an infinite regress of causes which...

Well, you don’t have many options. Either divinity is multiply-instantiable, or it isn’t. If it is, then three instantiations = three gods. If it isn’t, then what exactly is identical to the “one God”? If both the father and son are identical to it, then father = son. If only one of them is identical to it, then the other isn’t God. And if neither is identical to it, you’re forced to retreat to partialism or modalism. Or just say the obvious and admit your theology is incoherent.