Aron Lund

🔥 Just out: My new @SCEEUS_UI report on Russia’s Middle East policy after the wars in Ukraine, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. Russia must now make a choice: will it dig down alongside Iran or recalibrate to protect its interests? sceeus.se/publikationer/… @UISweden @ResearchUI

The one man who could have re-opened Hormuz by himself.

Radiopratade om den iransk-saudiska relationen, som för tillfället är lite ansträngd. Samuel Ciszuk förklarade effekterna på energimarknaden. sverigesradio.se/artikel/talamo…

Operation Yakety Sax

A reenactment of the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in #Daraa al-Balad, where people today are portraying the moment when the former Assad regime opened fire on them.

Syria announces that March 18 will be its official Revolution Day: sana.sy/en/presidency/… For years, celebrations were held on March 15, despite the fact that the Deraa uprising happened on March 18, 2011. Here’s my 2021 essay on how that came to be:

Man was not meant to monitor this many situations.

@bassem_attar_77 @DarthHummuss I think that’s completely wrong. U.S. support has been critically important for Sharaa’s regime. Sanctions relief, international legitimacy, terror delisting, post-Sweida deescalation with Israel, overpowering SDF—none of it would have happened if Trump had leaned the other way.

A handful of Arabic-language pundits have been warning for months now that the US would try to pressure Sharaa to invade Lebanon in a bid to crush Hezbollah. I dismissed it as nonsense, in part because no Western analysts would entertain the idea. Well...👇🏻

Oh, to have lived to see a day when people nostalgically reminisce about Bush Jr’s handling of European allies and the Iraq War. @StevenErlanger: nytimes.com/2026/03/16/wor…

@DarthHummuss @bassem_attar_77 Well, that depends on what “it” is. There’s a wide spectrum between a full occupation (which seems both crazy and unfeasible) and engaging in some cross-border shelling and perhaps brief, local incursions (which may still be a bad idea, but carries much less risk).

It would also likely trigger waves of mostly resentful non-Sunni Lebanese refugees while leaving Syrian forces vulnerable to attacks by insurgents across Syria, who will surely exploit the opportunity to test the waters. It would also potentially compromise the SAA's eastern flanks and control over the Iraqi border, making it easier for pro-Iran PMF factions to launch crossborder attacks.

It looked a little haphazard at first, but this Israel-Lebanon 1980s reenactment is really coming together.

US encourages Syrian action against Hezbollah, Damascus is hesitant, sources say – by @TimourAzhari, @GebeilyM, and Feras Dalatey for @Reuters. reuters.com/business/aeros…

Strait of hormuz right now

europeans when asked to help unblock the strait of hormuz

“Well, you read it in the Failing Tasnim News, that’s what some people call it now: ‘the Failing Tasnim News.’ That’s what I call it—but the Kamikaze Boats don’t exist. It’s AI, it’s a computer. And they don’t tell you that on Press TV, which, by the way, has very bad ratings.”

Chattade om Iran med SVT-läsarna. svt.se/nyheter/utrike…

PJAK commander: You’re back? CIA agent: Yes. I want to talk to you about Hormuz.

Donald Trump going to war against Iran.

Lots of great reporting on the Iran War all over the media, but I’m especially happy about having a @FT subscription right now. So good, so many different angles.