Mrxxx
3.9K posts




以后一定是token的天下,token的需求会成指数级增长,这是未来一年最确定的机会。 答应我,大盘短期底部的时候, 请大多小多早多晚多 我们的好朋友 半导体,光模块,储存,PCB和电 半导体 nvda amd 光模块 lite cohr cien poet 储存 sndk mu PCB ttmi sanm 电 be etn 别买在短期顶就好 高beta回调起来也残暴 怕高的都是苦命人







我一个半圈外朋友评价币圈的人: 没有边界感,没有阶级感,没有一个正常人。什么权威不存在的。 没点心理素质怎么来币圈做首席?Musk都要天天被喷,你被喷下咋了? 看看我们币圈曾经的首席-召北老师,水平不说多高,心理素质不知道高到哪里去了。

@lidangzzz d3 k2,肌酸,甘氨酸鎂,这几个怎么样?补了快两年了



Claude explains the $71M @arbitrum clawback: What this transaction is Tx: 0x5618...0f6b on Arbitrum, block 454686044, April 21, 2026 03:35 UTC From: 0x5d39...7Ccc — labeled on Arbiscan as “Kelp DAO Exploiter 1” To: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000DA0 — a special system/recovery sink (not the normal 0x...dEaD burn address) Value: 30,765.667 ETH (~$71M) — effectively the entire Arbitrum-side balance of the attacker’s hub wallet Tx type: ArbitrumUnsignedTxType (EIP-2718 type 0x65 / 101) The “type 101” is the key. That is not a user-signed transaction — a normal EOA physically cannot produce one. ArbitrumUnsignedTxType is an ArbOS system transaction that only the chain itself (via the sequencer / ArbOS upgrade path controlled by the Arbitrum Security Council) can inject. It bypasses the attacker’s private key entirely. The remediation (this tx): Arbitrum’s Security Council used its emergency powers to inject an ArbitrumUnsignedTxType that forcibly moved the attacker’s full 30,765 ETH from the hub address into a protocol-controlled recovery sink (0x...0DA0). Why it’s “extraordinary” Arbitrum did not perform a reorg or historical rewrite — the chain’s ordering is intact. Instead, the Security Council used a privileged state-override transaction type that is part of ArbOS but has essentially never been used before. It is functionally a state-level clawback: the attacker’s private key still signs txs, but that address’s ETH was moved by the chain itself. This is the mechanism Arbitrum’s progressive-decentralization docs reserve for “catastrophic” emergencies (12-of-N Security Council action), and this is one of the clearest public demonstrations of it being invoked. Note that it only recovered the Arbitrum leg of the theft — the ~75,700 ETH on Ethereum is outside Arbitrum’s control and remains with the attacker, which is why Aave is still facing up to ~$230M of potential bad debt on the Ethereum side. Sources: Arbiscan tx: arbiscan.io/tx/0x561804424… Arbitrum Docs — ArbOS / Sequencer forced inclusion: docs.arbitrum.io/run-arbitrum-n… Arbitrum Foundation — progressive decentralization & Security Council: docs.arbitrum.foundation/state-of-progr…







