Doug DeVore

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Doug DeVore

Doug DeVore

@douglas_devore

Husband, father, son, brother, Airman, lawyer, Ute, cougar, who has been across the country and around the world

Katılım Haziran 2016
427 Takip Edilen131 Takipçiler
Nico Perrino
Nico Perrino@NicoPerrino·
The Streisand Effect is undefeated.
Count Dankula@CountDankulaTV

The Afroman Trial. -Cops raid Afromans house for bullshit reasons. -Steal money, break his door, fuck his house up. -No criminality found whatsoever, no charges at all pressed on Afroman. -Afroman spends the next 3 years making songs that make fun of all the officers involved by name, even using footage of the raid from his own CCTV cameras. -Songs had titles like "Randy Walters is a son of a bitch" and "Lick Em Low Lisa" accusing one of the officers of being a lesbian and sleeping with the other officers wives. -During the raid one officer looked like he was about to eat some lemon pound cake sitting on Afromans counter, Afroman made a whole album calling the officer fat. -The cops get mad and file a lawsuit for defamation. -Afroman turns up to court in a whole American flag suit. -Officers performatively mald and cry while listening to the songs really trying to oversell how badly the songs upset them. -One officer was suing because Afroman made a whole song about him saying he was fucking the officers wife. When the officer was asked if Afroman was really fucking his wife, he said "I don't know". Nuking his own case and establishing that there is a non-zero chance that Afroman might actually be fucking his wife. -As his only witness for the trial, Afroman brought a deputies EX FUCKING WIFE. -The jury ruled completely in favour of Afroman. This entire thing has been a great win for free speech and absolutely fucking hilarious.

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Haviv Rettig Gur
Haviv Rettig Gur@havivrettiggur·
This is thoughtful. Let's walk through why it's wrong. I’m going point by point, numbered according to Ilan’s post. 1. Ilan: “The author argues that Iran’s military infrastructure especially its drones and missiles are being systematically taken apart. True. But in the aftermath who is going to keep it that way? ... [Especially when] the region operates at a new unstable normal where all previous taboos on military action are off.” What Ilan calls “previous taboos on military action” were no taboos on anything. They were just fear of Iran. And under that “taboo” system, Iran built and massively armed proxies for a future war it explicitly framed as annihilationist toward Israel and an attempt to dominate the region. It armed Hamas and Assad and sent Hezbollah into Syria. It gave the Houthis ballistic missiles. It funded the Muslim Brotherhood in places like Jordan to destabilize the Jordanian monarchy. The comfortable stasis that Ilan longs for was a systematic Iranian march through the region. You can argue this war will fail. And indeed, it may yet fail. But inaction is a strategic choice too, one with no less dire potential downsides. It’s a decision to retreat. America can make that decision, of course. That was the Obama vision: Retreat and hand Iran, which they saw as impregnable and undefeatable, control of the Middle East and its oil supply. Better to negotiate on Iran’s terms than to challenge its regional hegemony. Alas, Israel doesn’t have that option. Iran didn’t give it that option. But America also doesn't really have that option, not in the long term. Iran’s regime is constructed on a vast theological discourse that is inherently and definitionally anti-American. Actually google it, O pundits. Read Khomeini on the “mustakbirin,” or Ali Shariati on the “Red Shia” revolution against the “oppressors.” America is not the "great satan" because it supports Israel. It's the other way around. America is seen as the original evil, and Israel is deemed the "little satan" because it is seen as part of the Western American-led order. If you let this regime spread, it will eventually bring its anti-American ideology and violence to the American homeland. 2. Ilan: “He argues that the nuclear infrastructure had to be disassembled because one president after another had just let Iran’s nuclear program grow. Not true. Obama had managed to dramatically and verifiably reduce Iran’s nuclear capacity through the JCPOA. Trump killed that.” Come on, Ilan. Most of the JCPOA’s restrictions would already have expired by now. The JCPOA itself literally says so. These are the famous "sunset clauses." The UN embargo on Iran's import/export of conventional weapons expired in 2020. UN restrictions on Iran's ballistic missile activities expired in 2023. The full 10-year term of Security Council Resolution 2231 expired in 2025 -- i.e., any remaining JCPOA restrictions on Iran's nuclear program, the "snapback" mechanism for reimposing UN sanctions in case of non-compliance, and UN Security Council oversight. The whole shebang. So if the JCPOA had remained in force, the following restrictions would now be wholly lifted — *under* *the* *explicit* *terms* *of* *the* *deal*. - limits on the number and type of centrifuges Iran can install and operate. - caps on uranium enrichment levels (the 3.67% limit is for 15 years — so still four years away — but oversight would already have ended, so there’d be no way to enforce this). - restrictions on enriched uranium stockpile size bans or limits on heavy-water production and Arak reactor modifications - ballistic missile restrictions - conventional arms transfers restrictions - "snapback" sanctions All gone if the deal had been adhered to. The deal was only ever kicking the can down the road. And we're now well into the post-deal era if the deal was still in force. This might have been a valid argument in 2016. It isn't one in 2026. 3. Ilan: “He argues Iran is self harming by stopping its own oil from going through the Strait of Hormuz. This was always an assumption before the war, but they’ve managed to shut down the Strait for everyone else while still exporting 1 million bbls per day of their own stuff. That makes this much more sustainable.” It also lowers the global oil price shock, lowering the cost of the war for domestic consumers, for China, for India, etc. I think all oil should stop. It's all or nothing at this point. But I nevertheless get the US logic for letting it continue to flow. 4. Ilan: “He argues that Iran’s proxy networks are dramatically weakened. True, but also as we’ve learned from previous conflicts they will regenerate and it’s impossible to root them out with a military strategy alone if there is no political follow up to create a better alternative.” Weaken them enough and a political follow-up becomes possible. If you can't weaken them, why would they ever acquiesce to any limits you'd try to impose with your "political follow-up?" You'd just get another JCPOA -- agreeing to everything they want, if only they'd delay it by a couple presidential terms. This is the point: Those who say military force never works also have no political strategy they can actually articulate. Ilan: “That is why Israel is on the verge of a major campaign in Lebanon only a year and a half after supposedly setting back Hezbollah for a generation.” This is kind of the crux of it. Iran, Hezbollah et al have long argued that Westerners, because they “love life” and live in relative luxury in individualistic societies, don’t have the resilience to see things through. They are thus always defeatable through sheer stubbornness. Harass them persistently enough, endure their occasional air strikes -- and even the mightiest of democracies will ultimately submit to your will. This is called the “muqawama,” the grand "resistance" strategy. I have a two-hour lecture diving into its intellectual and religious roots and its strategic brilliance. And until October 7, it was more or less working. Israel was playing the same game the Western commentariat still plays. These enemies were a tolerable nuisance, ultimately deterred and never worth the cost of confronting head on. But on October 7 we learned that these kinds of movements are not deterred -- are actually fundamentally undeterrable. That they will always and forever, and irrespective of the costs to their polities and societies, bring an ever-escalating war that will eventually, once they’ve built up enough firepower and tormented you enough to weaken your resolve, deliver their divinely mandated victory. They mean what they say, this will only ever end in October 7s at one scale or another, and they are thus an absolutely intolerable threat. The muqawama that sought to break Israel is now the driver of Israeli resolve. It's the main gap between what Israelis see and what Western commentators like Ilan see. I suppose we will soon learn whether the Israelis have better understood the nature of this enemy, or if they've merely fallen into their trap and the Ilans were right all along. Ilan: “These fights are costly Pyrrhic victories that will just need to be fought again and again and again unless there is a political strategy to consolidate victory which both Israel and the US have failed at since October 7th.” Everyone keeps saying this. I’d love to know what this political strategy might be. How do you make a sustainable political order with Hezbollah still in the mix, with Iran still spending billions to export its permanent 47-year “revolution” overseas? If the war must come -- if the ayatollahs and Hezbollah and Hamas and their ilk have decreed that there is no sacrifice too great for them to remain on this path of permanent zero-sum war forever -- then I'd rather fight it on my schedule than on theirs. 5. “Finally, the author argues that we need to ignore the President’s own words about regime change and the Iranian people rising up and focus on what the military is doing. But that’s not how war works. War is fought to achieve a political objective.” Both Trump and Netanyahu have been very clear about how much they *want* regime change, but also that only Iranians can bring it about, and therefore this war has two objectives: Rob Iran of its capacity to project power while also diminishing its internal oppression capabilities enough to make a popular uprising possible — possible but not certain. Both men have said that explicitly. I personally heard them. You can argue it’s going to fail, but you can’t keep repeating this empty claim that there’s “no clear objective set out by the political leadership.” Again, we don’t know how history will go. This war is being fought with astonishing competence. It serves regional and global US interests: China’s main ally and instrument in the region is being disarmed. And there were always going to be costs in going after the regime in this way. And the combination of what the Israelis showed was possible back in June and what the Iranian people showed was possible in January are good reasons to think this was a window of opportunity that shouldn’t be missed. And it all might still fail. But no, the JCPOA wasn’t a solution to anything happening now. And sitting back and letting Iran’s proxies grow and metastasize and collapse country after country in the region is not itself the “safe bet” that the left pretends it was. And no one has yet articulated any clear “political strategy” that has no military element for rescuing the Middle East from that fate — or even any military element that could somehow be contained to less than the current war. What kind of lesser military pressure would have done anything but expand Iran's offensives on all fronts? There’s a lot of rhetoric here, but no real alternative to the present course.
Ilan Goldenberg@ilangoldenberg

This article is compelling and smart. I’ve seen it forwarded around a lot. Let’s walk through why it’s wrong.  1. The author argues that Iran’s military infrastructure especially its drones and missiles are being systematically taken apart.  True. But in the aftermath who is going to keep it that way? After the 12 day war Israel and Trump declared Iran’s capacity to make war “obliterated” and set back for a generation. Less than a year later they went back to war because of how quickly Iran was rebuilding. This campaign is much more comprehensive, but the same problem still applies. How to avoid being stuck in the aftermath in a “mow the lawn” scenario where the US has to expend tremendous assets that could be directed elsewhere in the world - especially towards the Indopacific. And where the region operates at a new unstable normal where all previous taboos on military action are off. 2.  He argues that the nuclear infrastructure had to be disassembled because one president after another had just let Iran’s nuclear program grow. Not true. Obama had managed to dramatically and verifiably reduce Iran’s nuclear capacity through the JCPOA. Trump killed that. 3. He argues Iran is self harming by stopping its own oil from going through the Strait of Hormuz. This was always an assumption before the war, but they’ve managed to shut down the Strait for everyone else while still exporting 1 million bbls per day of their own stuff.  That makes this much more sustainable.  4. He Argues that Iran’s proxy networks are dramatically weakened. True, but also as we’ve learned from previous conflicts they will regenerate and it’s impossible to root them out with a military strategy alone if there is no political follow up to create a better alternative. That is why Israel is on the verge of a major campaign in Lebanon only a year and a half after supposedly setting back Hezbollah for a generation. These fights are costly Pyrrhic victories that will just need to be fought again and again and again unless there is a political strategy to consolidate victory which both Israel and the US have failed at since October 7th.  5. Finally, the author argues that we need to ignore the President’s own words about regime change and the Iranian people rising up and focus on what the military is doing.  But that’s not how war works. War is fought to achieve a political objective. If there is no clear objective set out by the political leadership it’s impossible to translate battlefield victories into a consolidated win.  By setting the bar at regime change Trump has made it extraordinarily hard for the US to be perceived as winning even if the military executes the plans. Perception is a big part of the battle in war. And again the costs are incredibly high. And as the author argues, the only way this works is if there is a plan to contain and keep Iran down in the aftermath. Do we have any faith in Trump to do that? Again that is going to be incredibly expensive and require a presence like what the US left in the Middle East after the first Gulf War to contain Saddam.  That’s something we could afford in 1991 when the US was a unipolar power. But not in 2026 when we have a real competitor in China that we need to manage.  aljazeera.com/amp/opinions/2…

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Ilan Goldenberg
Ilan Goldenberg@ilangoldenberg·
This article is compelling and smart. I’ve seen it forwarded around a lot. Let’s walk through why it’s wrong.  1. The author argues that Iran’s military infrastructure especially its drones and missiles are being systematically taken apart.  True. But in the aftermath who is going to keep it that way? After the 12 day war Israel and Trump declared Iran’s capacity to make war “obliterated” and set back for a generation. Less than a year later they went back to war because of how quickly Iran was rebuilding. This campaign is much more comprehensive, but the same problem still applies. How to avoid being stuck in the aftermath in a “mow the lawn” scenario where the US has to expend tremendous assets that could be directed elsewhere in the world - especially towards the Indopacific. And where the region operates at a new unstable normal where all previous taboos on military action are off. 2.  He argues that the nuclear infrastructure had to be disassembled because one president after another had just let Iran’s nuclear program grow. Not true. Obama had managed to dramatically and verifiably reduce Iran’s nuclear capacity through the JCPOA. Trump killed that. 3. He argues Iran is self harming by stopping its own oil from going through the Strait of Hormuz. This was always an assumption before the war, but they’ve managed to shut down the Strait for everyone else while still exporting 1 million bbls per day of their own stuff.  That makes this much more sustainable.  4. He Argues that Iran’s proxy networks are dramatically weakened. True, but also as we’ve learned from previous conflicts they will regenerate and it’s impossible to root them out with a military strategy alone if there is no political follow up to create a better alternative. That is why Israel is on the verge of a major campaign in Lebanon only a year and a half after supposedly setting back Hezbollah for a generation. These fights are costly Pyrrhic victories that will just need to be fought again and again and again unless there is a political strategy to consolidate victory which both Israel and the US have failed at since October 7th.  5. Finally, the author argues that we need to ignore the President’s own words about regime change and the Iranian people rising up and focus on what the military is doing.  But that’s not how war works. War is fought to achieve a political objective. If there is no clear objective set out by the political leadership it’s impossible to translate battlefield victories into a consolidated win.  By setting the bar at regime change Trump has made it extraordinarily hard for the US to be perceived as winning even if the military executes the plans. Perception is a big part of the battle in war. And again the costs are incredibly high. And as the author argues, the only way this works is if there is a plan to contain and keep Iran down in the aftermath. Do we have any faith in Trump to do that? Again that is going to be incredibly expensive and require a presence like what the US left in the Middle East after the first Gulf War to contain Saddam.  That’s something we could afford in 1991 when the US was a unipolar power. But not in 2026 when we have a real competitor in China that we need to manage.  aljazeera.com/amp/opinions/2…
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Ben Smith
Ben Smith@semaforben·
Most convincing argument I've read recently that the Pentagon knows what it's doing, from ... Al Jazeera aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/…
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Doug DeVore
Doug DeVore@douglas_devore·
@TheBMax Would my esteem increase if I told you that his father-in-law is my mom’s first cousin? He is a great one.
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Brian Maxwell
Brian Maxwell@TheBMax·
It's not every day that you run into the greatest DT in NFL history. Very cool of Haloti Ngata to take this pic with my kid.
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John Elwood
John Elwood@johnpelwood·
Sometimes the most effective amici are the surprising ones. Magicians Penn & Teller (with the UT Clinic) just filed an amicus brief for a Texas death-row prisoner convicted partly on “hypnotically enhanced testimony,” arguing it’s the same technique they use to trick audiences.
John Elwood tweet mediaJohn Elwood tweet media
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Casey Mattox
Casey Mattox@CaseyMattox_·
You folks will never believe this. But you know those evil trees that everyone hates, smell like death, fall apart, and everyone is allergic to? Guess which Presidential administration funded the collection and importation of seeds that produced them? WOODROW FREAKING WILSON!
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Cassie Clark@dogwoodblooms

Dear Transplants & Developers: These trees emit a foul odor to attract flies, their primary pollinators. Do not plant these stankin’ a$$ things in North Carolina. The proper way to deal with the Bradford Pear is not to plant them. It’s to chop them down and burn them with fire. Thank you, The Locals

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Utah Mammoth
Utah Mammoth@utahmammoth·
USA WINS GOLD!!!! Clayton Keller 🫵 are an Olympic Gold Medalist! 🥇
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Doug DeVore
Doug DeVore@douglas_devore·
@jpodhoretz Peyton beat Eli by one year, but Eli had his second ring before Peyton did. So I guess it’s a draw?
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John Podhoretz
John Podhoretz@jpodhoretz·
Elle Fanning getting an Oscar nomination before Dakota is like Eli Manning winning more Super Bowls than Peyton.
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Doug DeVore
Doug DeVore@douglas_devore·
@KevinRDuncan I’m glad to see the resumption of these posts. They are a highlight of my social media feed. Thanks!
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Kevin R. Duncan
Kevin R. Duncan@KevinRDuncan·
The Atonement of Jesus Christ is infinite in breadth—reaching all humanity—and intimate in reaching the furthest depths of your heart. Each day, seek to more fully understand His sacrifice for you.
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Jason Stapley
Jason Stapley@jstaples01·
Very solid first half for the Utes with some momentum going into the break. Have to finish now. #GoUtes
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Andy McCarthy
Andy McCarthy@AndrewCMcCarthy·
The Jets should: Bowl John Harbaugh over with money and control over coming array of high draft picks. The Jets will: stick with Aaron Glenn — who has done nothing to earn any confidence — and watch Harbaugh get the Giants into the playoffs next year.
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Doug DeVore
Doug DeVore@douglas_devore·
@AbeGreenwald You or @jpodhoretz will have to add a segment to the Commentary podcast entitled: “What has the mayor done now?” My first choice for a segment was “You won’t believe what the mayor has done,” but, I think his ineptitude will exceed even my lofty expectations.
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Jim Bennett
Jim Bennett@StallionCornell·
It’s not just that he’s the worst President of the United States of America. It’s that he’s the worst person in the United States of America.
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Doug DeVore
Doug DeVore@douglas_devore·
@RyanQualtrics Keep us in mind for the next time…my son successfully returned from his mission over the weekend, but he got sick after getting home!
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Ryan Smith
Ryan Smith@RyanQualtrics·
It’s the holiday season and if you’re behind on Christmas shopping … we’ve got you. We have 4 courtside seats for tonight - 2 sets of 2. Reply and tell us who you’d bring and why, and we’ll pick some people to celebrate with!
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