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@ejhong

https://t.co/lW9pRrlyfK

Katılım Şubat 2009
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eugene
eugene@ejhong·
Unus Mundus
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Ryota Kanai
Ryota Kanai@kanair·
What consciousness science lacks is anomalies. Particle physics made progress when experiments revealed phenomena that existing theories could not explain. Consciousness research needs the same kind of empirical pressure to develop new theories.
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eugene@ejhong·
Jonathan - I really enjoy your talks with Kripal and he is the man for sure. I think you will find the work of Walter Lucadou particularly interesting in your quest for proof re: anomalies. I think Walter creates a more systematic framework to capture what Kripal is getting at. These articles summarize a bit of his framework. This is more popular in the European PSI community than the American one. ejhong.substack.com/p/beyond-proof… ejhong.substack.com/p/model-of-pra… ejhong.substack.com/p/entangled-mi… ejhong.substack.com/p/paradox-avoi…
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Johnathan Bi
Johnathan Bi@JohnathanBi·
Two years ago, I witnessed a Christian miracle, but I did not convert. Not because I thought the miracle was fraudulent — I think it was genuine — but because of the existence of other genuine miracles in competing religious traditions. Even more frustrating, these traditions give the same unconvincing explanations of the others’ miracles: demons, fraud or, at best, lesser revelations. Christian holy men tell me Buddhism has been hijacked by Satan. Buddhist monastics tell me Christ is a Bodhisattva for a lesser civilization not ready for the ultimate truth. I don’t find any of these answers compelling. So how is one to decide between competing religious claims? This is the burning question that has motivated my seeker’s journey for the past few years and my guest Rice University’s Jeff Kripal has given me the most compelling response yet. After two years of talking with every religious scholar/practitioner/monastic I could find, it is this interview that I find most convincing by far. He figured it out. Now let me be clear, what I find so compelling is less so Jeff’s answer, and more his method. Jeff takes seriously 1. the miraculous claims of all orthodox religions, but also 2. the modern critiques of those religions: biblical criticism, science, Freud, Feuerbach. And last but not least he also integrates 3. the contemporary supernatural: near death experiences, remote viewing, UAPs, telepathy, reincarnation research. Jeff is the only religious scholar I know who not only takes these three seemingly incompatible spheres seriously but has integrated them into a unifying theory. And if you are at all curious about the religious question I cannot recommend Jeff’s work enough for both scholars and seekers. Timestamps: 4:07 Against Western Monotheism 33:58 Against Eastern Religion 52:50 Against Materialism 1:23:11 Fraudulent Miracles? 1:31:52 Dual Aspect Monism 1:49:47 The Historicity of Miracles 1:55:39 The Ethics of Mysticism
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eugene
eugene@ejhong·
@MiddleWayApp And I don't think children should be placed in a demonstration position.
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eugene
eugene@ejhong·
@chris_percy Is Penrose noncomputable arg on your site?
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Chris Percy
Chris Percy@chris_percy·
If you're interested in actual arguments for & against this view (computational functionalism) - and common counter-args, then check out cf-debate.com If you don't like the arguments there or think you can do better, you can submit alternatives - win up to $100 each
Eliezer Yudkowsky@allTheYud

Simple way to see this is wrong: If you view a system as having inputs (like hearing something) and outputs (like saying something) then you can divide system properties by whether or not they affect I/O. Claude's weights somewhere storing "Paris is in France" affect I/O if you ask a question about Paris. The exact mass of the power supply to the GPU rack for that Claude instance doesn't affect I/O. That Claude instance being made out of silicon instead of carbon, or electricity in wires instead of water in pipes, doesn't affect I/O given a fixed algorithm above the wires or pipes. Nothing Claude can internally do will make anything get damp inside, if it's running on electricity. Nothing about "electricity vs water" can affect Claude's output for the same reason. It always answers the same way about France. Nothing Claude can internally compute will let it notice whether it's made of electricity or water flowing through pipes. When someone says "a simulated storm can't get anything wet", they are unwittingly pointing to the difference between the physical layer and the informational/functional layer. Things that the computer physics affect without affecting output; things that affect the output without depending on the exact computer-physics. The material it's made of doesn't affect the output. The output can't see the material because no algorithm can be made to depend on the choice of material. You can always run the same algorithm on different material, so you can't make the algorithm depend on that, so the output can't depend on that. By reflecting on your awareness of your own awareness, the fact of your own consciousness can make you say "I think therefore I am." Among the things you do know about consciousness is that it is, among other things, the cause of you saying those words. You saying those words can only depend on neurons firing or not firing, not on whether the same patterns of cause and effect were built on tiny trained squirrels running memos around your brain. You couldn't notice that part from inside. It would not affect your consciousness. That's why humans had to discover neurobiology with microscopes instead of introspection. Consciousness is in the class of things that can affect your behavior and can't depend on underlying physics, not in the class of direct properties of underlying physics that can't affect your behavior. A simulated rainstorm can't get anything wet. Running on electricity versus water can't change how you say "I think therefore I am." And that's it. QED.

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eugene
eugene@ejhong·
Impressed to see a computational functionalist understand and respond about this possibility (Penrose) in this manner.
Eliezer Yudkowsky@allTheYud

@Benthamsbulldog This position requires noncomputable physics being carried out at the brain's low energies, therefore extremely nonstandard physics, therefore it is unlikely, but I agree that it is conceivable.

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eugene
eugene@ejhong·
@PalmerLuckey Please check out this paper on possible artificial orbiting satellites pre Sputnik. Would be great to see if they are still around.
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eugene
eugene@ejhong·
@sebkrier Glad to see some ai folks starting to push these important ideas.
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Séb Krier
Séb Krier@sebkrier·
An excellent paper for anyone interested in rigorous physicalist argument against computational functionalism. Alex is a fantastic, careful thinker and influenced my views a lot; we're working on a broader blog post breaking these concepts down, stay tuned! 🐙
Séb Krier tweet media
Alexander Lerchner@AlexLerchner

🧵1/4 The debate over AI sentience is caught in an "AI welfare trap." My new preprint argues computational functionalism rests on a category error: the Abstraction Fallacy. AI can simulate consciousness, but cannot instantiate it. philpapers.org/rec/LERTAF

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Alexander Lerchner
Alexander Lerchner@AlexLerchner·
🧵1/4 The debate over AI sentience is caught in an "AI welfare trap." My new preprint argues computational functionalism rests on a category error: the Abstraction Fallacy. AI can simulate consciousness, but cannot instantiate it. philpapers.org/rec/LERTAF
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eugene
eugene@ejhong·
@MiTiBennett Can you comment on relation to Orch or and Penrose Gödel argument. Thank you.
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eugene@ejhong·
@AlexLerchner Can you please comment on how your views relate to Orch or and Penrose Gödel argument.
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Alexander Lerchner
Alexander Lerchner@AlexLerchner·
Since publishing "The Abstraction Fallacy," the most common pushback relies on a deeply ingrained but flawed metaphor: the assumption that the brain is a computer. Here is a brief clarification on why it is not, and why this matters for computational functionalism. 1/5 philpapers.org/rec/LERTAF
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