Greg Kitt

What about going from $32k in Feb 2022 to $48k in April 2022 on its way down from $65k in Nov 2021? That was a 50% recovery before bitcoin went from $48k in April 2022 to $20k in July 2022 and the ultimate bottom in Nov 2022. You are incorrectly assuming the low from March is THE low, which is unknowable.

Every time Bitcoin has recovered 30% from a cycle low, it has never revisited that low. 6 for 6 across 13+ years. The YTD low of $61,303 (bitbo.io) to today's ~$79K is a +28.9% recovery. The +30% confirmation level sits at $79,694. We're at the doorstep.

What a remarkable run. Here is every time since 1928 when the S&P 500 rallied to a record by at least 13% (rounded) in 13 days. Don't take this too seriously.

this is interesting. ppl are being forced to buy crypto to pay iran's toll in hormuz. That creates a lift in bitcoin as new demand surfaces. iran is going to be using that BTC to buy things (war munition, infrastructure, etc). So, Iran is a seller of bitcoin upon receipt to pay for goods. either iran is selling bitcoin for fiat to pay for goods or its delivering bitcoin. if Iran is delivering bitcoin to buy munitions, the seller of war munitions is probably monetizing some of the btc to pay for its costs. i think its reasonable to argue this could create more bitcoin volatility based on the timing of iran's sales of btc. And, i think its reasonable that the forced buying of BTC to enables ships to pass through hormuz creates some incremental demand for bitcoin. 1 incremental BTC bought probably does not equal 1 BTC sale after Iran sells it. munition dealers to iran may choose to hold at least some bitcoin rather than rubles, for example

IRAN JUST BECAME THE BIGGEST BITCOIN BUYER ON EARTH Iran charges $2M in Bitcoin per ship to cross Hormuz At $72,000 per $BTC, each ship = 27.7 BTC ~130 ships cross daily For context: Miners produce 450 $BTC/day Iran earns 3,601 $BTC/day That's 8x the entire daily mining supply MicroStrategy took 4 years to stack 500K $BTC Iran could do it in 5 months... with a toll booth

@TheMarketStats you're comparing war time events to non-war periods. Its apples and oranges. Today's market is most similar to the 1990 Gulf War and, to a lesser degree, the 1973 OPEC Embargo, 1979 Iranian Revolution, and even more loosely to the 2022 Russia/Ukraine War.

obviously xle did not exist during the gulf war, but the sentiment should be applied to oil prices pre-XLE to actually capture what happened. what about the 1990 gulf war? Oct 18, Oct 19, Oct 22, Nov 30, 1990 and Jan 17, 1991 all displayed a similar pattern. Market bottomed 2 days after the oil peak.

$SPY gapped up 2.6% today while $XLE (energy sector) gapped down -5.7% This is a combination that has never occurred before Historically when $SPY gapped up at least 1% while $XLE gapped down at least 1%, $SPX was lower 3-4 days later

BREAKING - NYC voters are shocked as Zohran confirms he will be moving forward with his campaign promise to tax White people at higher rates to help alleviate burdens on black residents. “The wealth of a White household in the city is $200,000, while that of a black is $20,000.”

Former atheist shares what the “greatest legal mind” said when he was asked to reach a verdict on whether the resurrection of Christ was real. Sir Lionel Luckhoo was the most successful defense attorney in the world. He won 245 murder trials in a row. But one day, someone asked him to apply his legendary legal skill to reach an informed verdict on whether Jesus actually rose from the dead. Luckhoo had been skeptical of the resurrection—but after spending years investigating the evidence, he came to this conclusion: “I say unequivocally that the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus Christ is so overwhelming that it compels acceptance by proof which leaves absolutely NO ROOM FOR DOUBT.” PBD guest and journalist Lee Strobel shared that Sir Lionel Luckhoo’s sister just happened to be one of his neighbors. She showed Strobel her brother’s papers, and it was “ultimately a confirmation” of what he discovered in his own research—that the evidence for the resurrection of Christ was overwhelming.

🤔 👀

If Jesus' Resurrection Were A Hoax

Food for thought. Trump, Hormuz and the End of the Free Ride For half a century, Western strategists have known that the Strait of Hormuz is the acute point where energy, sea power and political will intersect. That knowledge is not in dispute. What is new in this war with Iran is that the United States, under Donald Trump, has chosen not to rush to “solve” the problem. In Hegelian terms, he is refusing an easy synthesis in order to force the underlying contradiction to the surface. The old thesis was simple: the US guarantees open sea lanes in the Gulf, and everyone else structures their economies and politics around that free insurance. Europe and the UK embraced ambitious green policies, ran down hard‑power capabilities and lectured Washington on multilateral virtue, secure in the assumption that American carriers would always appear off Hormuz. The political class behaved as if the American security guarantee were a law of nature, not a contingent choice. Their conduct today is closer to Chamberlain than Churchill: temporising, issuing statements, hoping the storm will pass without a fundamental reordering of their responsibilities. Trump’s antithesis is to withhold the automatic guarantee at the moment of maximum stress. Militarily, the US can break Iran’s residual ability to contest the Strait; that is not the binding constraint. The point is to delay that act. By allowing a closure or semi‑closure to bite, Trump ensures that the immediate pain is concentrated in exactly the jurisdictions that have most conspicuously free‑ridden on US power: the EU and the UK. Their industries, consumers and energy‑transition assumptions are exposed. In that context, his reported blunt message to European and British leaders, you need the oil out of the Strait more than we do; why don’t you go and take it? Is not a throwaway line. It is the verbalisation of the antithesis. It openly reverses the traditional presumption that America will carry the burden while its allies emote from the sidelines. In this dialectic, the prize is not simply the reopening of a chokepoint. The prize is a reordered system in which the United States effectively arbitrages and controls the global flow of oil. A world in which US‑aligned production in the Americas plus a discretionary capability to secure,or not secure, Hormuz places Washington at the centre of the hydrocarbon chessboard. For that strategic end, a rapid restoration of the old status quo would be counterproductive. A quick, surgical “fix” of Hormuz would short‑circuit the dialectic. If Trump rapidly crushed Iran’s remaining coastal capabilities, swept the mines and escorted tankers back through the Strait, Europe and the UK would heave a sigh of relief and return to business as usual: underfunded militaries, maximalist green posturing and performative disdain for US power, all underwritten by that same power. The contradiction between their dependence and their posture would remain latent. By declining to supply the synthesis on demand, and by explicitly telling London and Brussels to “go and take it” themselves, Trump forces a reckoning. European and British leaders must confront the fact that their energy systems, their industrial bases and their geopolitical sermons all rest on an American hard‑power foundation they neither finance nor politically respect. The longer the contradiction is allowed to unfold, the stronger the eventual synthesis can be: a new order in which access to secure flows, Hormuz, Venezuela and beyond, is explicitly conditional on real contributions, not assumed as a right. In that sense, the delay in “taking” the Strait, and the challenge issued to US allies to do it themselves, is not indecision. It is the negative moment Hegel insisted was necessary for history to move. Only by withholding the old guarantee, and by saying so out loud to those who depended on it, can Trump hope to end the free ride.

Writing notes coming out of a conference. There are four credible oil supply shocks going back to 1970. Today is most similar to the 1990 Gulf War due to muted nominal GDP rates relative to other precents examples. I have been shocked how complacent this market seems. Best case is this war ends quickly, the market reverses higher with an oil price peak, and the Fed will have runway to cut rates into softening economic data. In either event, it seems very hard for the US to avoid a recession over the next 12 months.

🚨 JUST IN: The No Kings protestors are being called out as massive hypocrites after waving COMMUNIST FLAGS in NYC They don't like kings — but they like straight-up DICTATORS. The dumbest political movement of our lifetime.

if the world ever had a chance of defeating death, it was through Chuck Norris. Death still only carrying one all-time loss.

The odds of the US entering recession are rising: The probability of a recession over the next 12 months jumped to 48.6% in February, the highest since the 2020 pandemic. The percentage has risen +15 points over the last 6 months. This is based on the leading economic indicator invented by Moody’s, which uses extensive economic data and a machine learning model. The recent surge was primarily driven by the deteriorating job market, with nearly all economic data softening since the end of 2025. Historically, such a high probability has never occurred outside of recessions. Now with oil prices surging in March, the indicator is expected to breach the key 50% threshold, as every recession since WWII, except the pandemic, was preceded by a spike in oil prices. The longer oil prices remain elevated, the higher the chance of an economic downturn.

I follow you now. My argument would be that the debt probably will see a rate increase + I am not sure that incremental debt is available to this company to retire the pref, but I really don't think its available at the 7% number that you cited since there arent sufficient assets to cover the debt and leverage would be >7x with limited cash conversion.

@gregwkitt Yes I agree there. The 18.50 is only relevant on a WEST call which won’t happen. Misread the terms initially. I’m also saying - WEST needs to fund the prefs maturity/put. And that’s going to be costly from go-fwd cash interest perspective.

$WEST. This is going to be a very interesting year. $337m debt matures Aug 2027 and goes ST at the Q3'26 report. $270m of preferred equity is puttable to the company in Feb 2028. I think it will be challenging to refi the debt without addressing the pref. Lenders are likely not going to allow a junior security to get paid before the senior secured lender. The lender is probably not going to refi beyond the pref put date and allow the pref holder to put $270m back to the company before the debt holder gets paid back. And, the lender probably wont give WEST $270m more debt to retire the pref (ala XPOF in Dec 2025) bc its just too much leverage and too little assets (would be ~$700m of net debt on $95m of EBITDA and PPE of $480m). So, WEST could either raise money to pay down the pref to unlock the ability to rollout the debt, OR (what is more likely) try to incentivize the pref holder to push out the put provision to a later date in exchange for some carrot (probably warrants or shares or increase in redemption value) to enable a debt refi. In either event, it will be interesting to see how this cap table gets resolved. $STKL is getting acquired for ~10x 2026 EBITDA and generated similar revenue and EBITDA to $WEST. Both are contract manufacturers. I think that is a pretty good comp. 10x $95m of 2026 EBITDA = $950m EV minus 450m net debt minus $270m pref = 230m cap / 96m shares = ~$2.50. I'm new to this company and could be missing a lot. Just how it looks to me. **not investment advise, my opinions and observations only, caveat emptor

@lurker8679 $WEST has no incentive to call the pref. That’s not going to happen unless the stock is meaningfully over $18.50. That seems highly unlikely. However, pref holders do have an incentive to put it back to the company since it’s 200% out of the money and non interest bearing.

@gregwkitt I see, you are right One other issue with redeeming the pref - it hasn't had a cash coupon, right? That could represent a $20m/yr headwind assuming 7% interest rate

@lurker8679 I’ll read this again. I’m pretty sure the pref is callable by the company and that’s the source of the $18.50 confusion. The pref is puttable at a minimum of $270m, but will be worth $270m + however much the stock is worth over $11.50, which seems unlikely.

@gregwkitt I believe the pref is puttable at maturity if credit agreement blocks. Then it starts PIK'ing at 10%/yr. That gives them some flexibility. Though I think the pref could be >$270m. believe BBH prefs have 18.50 liquidation preference, and they are >60% of pref class

@AggieCapitalist what are you assumptions?

@gregwkitt CP is doing more like $100M of EBITDA

$xpof guided meaningfully worse than expectations for 2026, and the crown jewel (Club Pilates) saw AUVs decline from $1.03m to $966k over the last 12 months as SSS declined to -3% in Q4'26. This AUV issue points out that this is not about struggling to comp over a difficult comp. AUV declined yoy by ~6.5%. This points to the potential loss of relevancy, increasing competition, or something else. CPs Q4'25 results basically remove the ability to explore strategic alts until CP can show stabilizing economics. EWCZ selling itself back to its PE sponsor for 8.5x EBITDA is a pretty reasonable comp to another category leader. XPOF took out $525m of SOFR+675 (10.5%) debt in December to repay $128.5m of 6.5% pref and $376m of SOFR+650 debt, which doesnt seem to make much sense in hindsight. XPOF took out more expensive debt to retire a cheaper, junior security. 2026's EBITDA of $105m will not convert to FCF. Interest of $55m, CAPEX of $5-10m, cash taxes + TRA costs of $4m, FTC settlement of $17m, class action settlement of $22.8m over ~3 years, $9.1m of lease expenses, and other legal spend of $5m + risk of a settlement from the NY AG still looming. All those deductions imply zero FCF in 2026. Disappointing. Worse is that FCF might normalize around $40m in 2027 if SSS do not continue to decline and/or franchisees live up to development commitments. I wonder how much 2026 revenue and EBITDA is assumed from franchisee license terminations because franchisees have not met their development commitments. Any revenue and EBITDA from license terminations is completely non-cash and basically meaningless. ~500 of the 1500 licenses sold and undeveloped are delinquent in their development and eligible to be cancelled. License termination have been a material source of Q3'25 and Q3'26 revenue and EBITDA beats, but, once again, its complely cashless. At this point, XPOF's success is about FCF. Some may argue that a SSS decliner that sees 1/3 of license sales delinquent in development commitments is facing serious challenges. Therefore, a 20% FCF yield is reasonable (EWCZ was trading for more than a 20% FCF yield prior to a mercy-takeout by its 30% sponsor - GA). That implies a $4 stock on 2027 FCF. We could also value this at 6-7x EBITDA, which was the prevailing analyst PT methodology before today. Thats $3.50-$5.50/share. Another alternative is to evaluate what CP is worth. CP is generating $65-70m of royalty revenue. I'm ignoring 0% GM marketing revs since is 0% OM, low GM equipment revenue, and reasonably high margin franchise territory fee revenue. If I aggressively assume that 100% of royalty revenue is flowing through to EBITDA, then I get to $65-70m of EBITDA. The ceiling might be 8.5x for CP's EBITDA (based on the EWCZ transaction, negative comps, and 1000-unit wall). Thats $575m against $460m of net debt, which leaves $115m of value + the remaining brands. I'm not sure there is much residual value for the remaining brands considering CycleBar, Rumble, Lindora, Row House, and Stride were basically sold for immaterial amounts of cash + StretchLab is relatively distressed with -15% SSS in Q4'26. That would value the company around $2-2.50/share. Hopefully this can be turned around in time, but its definitely a turbulent time for XPOF shareholders.