Proud to see this level of conviction behind what we’re building!!
Auryn@auryn_macmillan
500 ETH in this economy? Y'all must really like some privacy.
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HMZA
48 posts
HMZA retweetledi
The $FOLD auction is live.
Eligible participants can now bid through the official Uniswap CCA interface.
The auction closes Friday, July 10 @ 10am ET / 14:00 UTC.
Official link below.
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HMZA retweetledi
The Interfold launch sequence begins.
Registration opens July 6. The FOLD auction begins July 8 on Uniswap, marking the first public milestone in the Interfold's launch sequence.
Read the launch post ↓ blog.theinterfold.com/fold-auction-u…
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HMZA retweetledi
Ethereum should not require users to expose their intent before execution.
The Interfold is joining the Encrypt the Mempool Coalition to support private, credibly neutral transaction infrastructure.
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HMZA retweetledi
MACI made one thing clear:
private inputs and shared outcomes shouldn't depend on one operator.
Voting was the starting point.
The Interfold generalizes that pattern into a network for confidential coordination.
vitalik.eth@VitalikButerin
More people should know about the Interfold. It's basically what I've been yelling at people to build with the MACI ideas ( ethresear.ch/t/minimal-anti… ) for almost a decade, and now it exists, in a generalized form. The idea is: a privacy protocol optimized for things like voting (and other use cases eg. secret-ballot auctions). The mechanism generates a threshold encryption key, and people send in their votes onchain, using a ZKP to prove eligibility. An arbitrary computation on the votes gets run inside FHE, and then threshold-decrypted. From what I can tell (the docs are good docs.theinterfold.com/CRISP/introduc… ), it gets pretty optimal security guarantees: * Voter anonymity can be made unconditional if eligibility is proven with ZK-SNARKs * Censorship resistance is guaranteed by ethereum (votes can be posted directly onchain, and there's a proof that all posted votes are taking into account) * The correctness of the outputted result can be ensured via ZK over FHE * Liveness and coercion resistance depend on M-of-N honesty; unavoidable given present-day technology The main limitation is that today "ZK over FHE" is only properly available for additive vote tallying, as it's too expensive for computations that involve multiplication or other more complicated manipulation at the moment. There's work in progress on slashing-based / optimistic computation for such situations. (And of course ideally in the long term we'd figure out obfuscation so you can get rid of the M-of-N committees😃)
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HMZA retweetledi
Meet Alessandro (@ctrlc03), Senior Engineer at The Interfold.
With experience spanning cybersecurity, cryptography, contributions to MACI, p0tion, and @PrivacyEthereum infrastructure, he's helping build the foundations for multiparty privacy at scale.
We're grateful to have him on our team!
blog.theinterfold.com/alessandro-ctr…
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HMZA retweetledi
More people should know about the Interfold.
It's basically what I've been yelling at people to build with the MACI ideas ( ethresear.ch/t/minimal-anti… ) for almost a decade, and now it exists, in a generalized form.
The idea is: a privacy protocol optimized for things like voting (and other use cases eg. secret-ballot auctions). The mechanism generates a threshold encryption key, and people send in their votes onchain, using a ZKP to prove eligibility. An arbitrary computation on the votes gets run inside FHE, and then threshold-decrypted.
From what I can tell (the docs are good docs.theinterfold.com/CRISP/introduc… ), it gets pretty optimal security guarantees:
* Voter anonymity can be made unconditional if eligibility is proven with ZK-SNARKs
* Censorship resistance is guaranteed by ethereum (votes can be posted directly onchain, and there's a proof that all posted votes are taking into account)
* The correctness of the outputted result can be ensured via ZK over FHE
* Liveness and coercion resistance depend on M-of-N honesty; unavoidable given present-day technology
The main limitation is that today "ZK over FHE" is only properly available for additive vote tallying, as it's too expensive for computations that involve multiplication or other more complicated manipulation at the moment. There's work in progress on slashing-based / optimistic computation for such situations.
(And of course ideally in the long term we'd figure out obfuscation so you can get rid of the M-of-N committees😃)
The Interfold@theInterfold
The Interfold Launch Primer starts today. Over the next several weeks, we'll explain the system, the network, ciphernodes, and the path to participation. First: How Interfold works, from private inputs to collective outcomes.
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HMZA retweetledi
Privacy as shield solves one problem:
who gets access.
But it does not solve the harder one:
who controls execution.
That is where coordination breaks.
Confidential Coordination I: Beyond Privacy as Shield ↓
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HMZA retweetledi
The Interfold is a distributed network for Confidential Coordination.
This week, we’re starting a deep-dive essay series on what that means.
Subscribe: blog.theinterfold.com
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HMZA retweetledi
Enclave is now The Interfold.
What we built isn’t a hardware enclave, but a distributed network for confidential coordination.
The Interfold names that network. 🌐
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HMZA retweetledi
We take a slighty different approach at @EnclaveE3.
Each registered ID has a slot to which it can write its vote.
Anyone can write to any slot at any time.
In the case that no vote has yet been cast in a given slot, one must prove they either (a) hold the private key corresponding to the slot, and thus are authorized to write a vote to that slot, or (b) that the preimage to their ciphertext is equal to zero.
In the case that there is already a vote published to a given slot, one must prove that they either (a) hold the private key corresponding to the slot, and thus are authorized to over-write the ciphertext in that slot, or (b) that the ciphertext they are publishing is equal to the previous ciphertext + 0.
Critically, the verifier cannot know which pathway, (a) or (b), a given proof satisfies. Inspired by @kostascrypto's zkAuthenticator paper: eprint.iacr.org/2025/921
Essentially, this allows anyone to add noise to any/all votes and gives plausable deniability to all voters for any updates to their slot.
An attacker cannot know whether a given voter cast or changed their vote, or whether it was some other party adding noise to the system/masking votes.
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HMZA retweetledi
HMZA retweetledi
How do multiple parties compute on sensitive data without revealing it, while still proving correctness?
This diagram maps Enclave’s answer:
Encrypted Execution Environments (E3s) 💫
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HMZA retweetledi
HMZA retweetledi
New post: the first entry in our Enclave Cryptography series.
It examines a core issue in hybrid FHE–ZK systems:
how to prove that a ciphertext actually encrypts the value referenced in a ZK witness.
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HMZA retweetledi
Private voting protects participants.
Verifiable secret ballots protect the process.
We’re thrilled to partner with @EnclaveE3 to begin work on expanding Aragon’s privacy stack, introducing confidential, verifiable voting that removes trusted intermediaries.
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HMZA retweetledi
🌀 Enclave devnet is live
Encrypted execution for multi-agent systems.
Build programs for private coordination, verifiable compute, and shared logic — all without exposing data.
Confidential by default. Provable by design.
Here’s what’s live and how to get started:
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