Franz-Stefan Gady

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Franz-Stefan Gady

Franz-Stefan Gady

@HoansSolo

Modern Warfare | Military Analyst | Author of ‘The Return of War’ & ‘How the United States Would Fight China: The Risks of Pursuing a Rapid Victory‘

Vienna, Austria Katılım Mart 2009
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Franz-Stefan Gady
Franz-Stefan Gady@HoansSolo·
Heute erscheint die komplett überarbeitete Taschenbuchausgabe meines Buches ‚Die Rückkehr des Krieges‘. Der überarbeitete Text beinhaltet ein komplett neues Kapitel, neue Anekdoten, neue Analysen — und vor allem einen neuen Satz gegen Ende des neuen Vorwortes, den nur ein Österreicher über Deutsche und Deutschland schreiben kann. Link: thalia.de/shop/home/arti…
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Francis Farrell
Francis Farrell@francisjfarrell·
Amid all the front line optimism, it’s important to remember that Russia is still attacking fiercely, and in areas like the sector of @7corpsDSHV, infantry are often cut off. Political orders from higher command to hold part of Pokrovsk continue to play a role- at a grave cost.
7th Rapid Response Corps of AAF@7corpsDSHV

On the situation at the northern part of Pokrovsk. 7th Corps is still holding some positions here, which are almost cut off. Russian forces control the high ground and the city’s buildings, have deployed their surveillance and electronic warfare systems, and dominate the skies over the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk and northeast of Hryshyne. Our logistics to these positions are minimal and only possible by air — via drones. There is no chance that unmanned ground vehicles can reach them; they are destroyed by enemy FPV drones. The troops on the zero line also need to be rotated. “Rotation” means bringing new personnel to the line of battle contact. There is a roughly 25-kilometer kill zone covered by enemy drone operators working from advantageous launch sites, for example in the industrial areas of Pokrovsk and at the mines beyond Rodynske. The location of these primary strike assets is the key factor in modern warfare. Infantry can protect the “main caliber,” but cannot operate independently without cover. North of Pokrovsk, the enemy holds an unquestionable advantage in this regard. Only a small part of the strike zone can be crossed in armored vehicles under the protection of anti-drone mesh tunnels. These tunnels are also targeted, and gaps are constantly created in the nets. It is an endless battle between shield and sword. Beyond that lies the familiar kill zone, a third of which we managed to cross in armor. “Dismount” takes place about 15 kilometers from the line of battle contact, somewhere near the village of Dobropillia. Any closer, and the vehicles would simply be burned out. The group is visible as if in the palm of a hand. Reconnaissance drones are overhead, followed by ranging rounds from artillery or MLRS. You either move quickly or hide in cover. Note that movement toward the line of battle contact is far from a straight route. Our 15 kilometers turn into 26 kilometers through tree lines and ravines (the условная blue line — for illustration purposes only), where there is at least some cover and a chance to hide. Those 26 kilometers mean at least three days of dashes and hide-and-seek with death. In summer, neither fog nor rain lasts that long. Everything is pre-registered and under observation. Russian drone pilots know every bush like the seventh level of their favorite shooter game. Yes, we can also see our group and track it with our reconnaissance assets, but we cannot protect it. Any injury beyond the notional Shevchenkove line means evacuation on foot only. Further ahead lies the “gray zone” (according to DeepState), where Russian infantry is already present. The group must “walk between the raindrops” for another 8 kilometers through this area. The chances of doing so unnoticed are zero. The very entry into Pokrovsk turns into a frontal assault without armored support or reserves. At the same time, the infantryman is constantly detected and targeted by omnipresent drones whose launch points he cannot see. Russian drone flight times are just a few minutes; ours are around 15 minutes. We cannot destroy all enemy firing positions — that would require continuous air strikes across the city. Therefore, holding the “pocket” near Pokrovsk is no longer a matter of localized counterattacks. To cut off the enemy salient in the Hryshyne area, Pokrovsk itself must become our kill zone while securing our own logistics. Conducting such an operation would require deep flanking maneuvers and the concentration of forces into a dedicated offensive grouping.

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Franz-Stefan Gady
Franz-Stefan Gady@HoansSolo·
Ich finde die Aussage vor allem deshalb bemerkenswert, weil er das erste Regierungsmitglied ist, das den Zusammenhang zwischen möglichen russischen Angriffen und Österreich als strategischer Drehscheibe (für die EU&NATO) offen anspricht. Und das, nachdem letzte Woche eine PDF meines Ende des Monats erscheinenden Buches „Überfall“, dessen zentrale These genau darauf aufbaut, ihren Weg ins Bundeskanzleramt gefunden hat – wie mir eine Mitarbeiterin mitteilte…styriabooks.at/shop/gesellsch…
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Franz-Stefan Gady
Franz-Stefan Gady@HoansSolo·
Ich bin mir nicht sicher, ob die Tragweite der heutigen Aussage des Kanzlers hier verstanden wird. Der österreichische Bundeskanzler sagt hier eindeutig, dass – Neutralität hin oder her – Österreich im Konfliktfall Ziel russischer Angriffe sein wird.
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Franz-Stefan Gady
Franz-Stefan Gady@HoansSolo·
@LawDavF @StevenErlanger He certainly does. Ukraine is arguably in a better military position in May 2026 than it was in May 2025, and Russian problems are more systematic in 2026 than they were in 2025.
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Franz-Stefan Gady
Franz-Stefan Gady@HoansSolo·
In meiner Sonntagskolumne warne ich vor allzu grosser Überschwänglichkeit, was die Lage in der Ukraine betrifft. Ein verbreiteter analytischer Fehler besteht darin, aus einer bestimmten Phase eines Krieges lineare Schlüsse über dessen zukünftige Entwicklung und den Charakter der Kampfhandlungen zu ziehen.
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Franz-Stefan Gady
Franz-Stefan Gady@HoansSolo·
Had a number of requests again to talk about the war game I participated in in December 2025, so I did a short write-up for @ForeignPolicy . No, it did not only take 12,000 Russians to achieve our objectives. More like 100,000+ and a lot of firepower, and Lithuanian resistance, primarily coming from two brigade-sized formations, was factored into the planning. And it all could have ended in a massive failure. foreignpolicy.com/2026/05/15/rus…
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Christopher Miller
Christopher Miller@ChristopherJM·
Zelenskyy says the GUR Defense Intelligence of Ukraine “obtained documents indicating that the Russians are preparing new missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, including, as they describe them, against ‘decision-making centers.’” “Among these are nearly two dozen political centers and military command posts.” He also says intel point to Russia trying to drag Belarus more deeply into the war and potential new attacks from Belarusian territory. He also says Ukraine is preparing to strike back in response to Russia’s deadly strikes this week.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський@ZelenskyyUa

Today, I held a meeting with the heads of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Defense Intelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Security Service of Ukraine. Three key areas were discussed. First, we are defining targets for our next long-range sanctions against Russia over this war and the strikes against our cities and villages. Ukraine will not allow any of the aggressor’s strikes that take the lives of our people to go unpunished. We are entirely justified in our responses against Russia’s oil industry, military production, and those directly responsible for committing war crimes against Ukraine and Ukrainians. I am grateful to our warriors for their dedication to defending Ukraine’s interests, and to all involved Ukrainian institutions for building a truly strong system of our long-range sanctions. This is having a tangible impact. Second, we continue to document Russia’s attempts to draw Belarus deeper into the war against Ukraine. We know that additional contacts have taken place between the Russians and Aleksandr Lukashenko, aimed at persuading him to join new Russian aggressive operations. In particular, Russia is considering plans for operations to the south and north of Belarusian territory – either against the Chernihiv-Kyiv direction in Ukraine or against one of the NATO countries directly from the territory of Belarus. Ukraine has details of the conversation between Russia and Belarus. Ukraine will undoubtedly defend itself and its people if Aleksandr Lukashenko makes the wrong call and decides to support this Russian intention as well. I instructed our Defense and Security Forces of Ukraine to strengthen the relevant direction and to present our response plan, which will be reviewed and approved at the Staff meeting. Third, specialists from the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine obtained documents indicating that the Russians are preparing new missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, including, as they describe them, against “decision-making centers.” Among these are nearly two dozen political centers and military command posts. Of course, we have taken this information into account. But it is worth emphasizing specifically for the Russian leadership that Ukraine is – after all – not Russia. And unlike the aggressor state, where there is a clear author of this war and a long-standing circle around him that sustains his detachment from reality, the source of Ukraine’s defense is the readiness of the Ukrainian people to fight for their independence and for their own sovereign state. Ukrainians deserve their sovereignty just like any other nation. The people cannot be defeated. Russia must end its war and negotiate a dignified peace, rather than searching for new ways to intimidate Ukraine. I thank everyone who is helping. Glory to Ukraine!

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Franz-Stefan Gady
Franz-Stefan Gady@HoansSolo·
Details are important here. As Ed Arnold stated elsewhere reporting on Estonia’s „Exercise Hedgehog“ was misleading: it wasn’t force-on-force, most casualties came from anti-armor ambushes in heavy forest, & the UK HQ was never compromised. Drones were used to find, not strike targets & the exercise was scripted to test specific plans & not to model a more general Ukraine-style drone-saturated battlespace.
🪖MilitaryNewsUA🇺🇦@front_ukrainian

❗️During NATO exercises to defend the Swedish island of Gotland from a simulated “Russian attack,” Ukrainian drone operators completely crushed the Swedish forces. The Swedes halted the drills three times to rethink their tactics. Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces, General Michael Claesson, stated that all NATO armies must urgently learn how to fight with drones directly from the Ukrainians.

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Franz-Stefan Gady
Franz-Stefan Gady@HoansSolo·
‘Russia’s top commanders have convinced Putin their forces could seize the whole of the Donbas by autumn, according to two people in contact with the Kremlin leader, two others familiar with the matter, and a Ukrainian intelligence assessment shared with the FT. … Putin has grown increasingly fixated on capturing the Donbas despite privately expressing a willingness to freeze hostilities on the current front lines at various earlier points in the war, according to two people who speak to him. “I have been pushing him to end at the current front lines. But he keeps saying, ‘No, I can’t compromise on this’,” one of the people said.’
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Franz-Stefan Gady
Franz-Stefan Gady@HoansSolo·
War is a dialectical competition characterized by cycles of adaptions & counter-adaptions at all levels of warfare (technical, tactical etc.), shaped, among other things, by the operational environment (weather, terrain, etc.) that affects the different phases of a conflict. A common analytical mistake is to draw linear conclusions about the future trajectory & character of fighting from one particular phase, especially given that information in an ongoing war is always fragmentary & limited. Media narratives especially have a tendency to swing from gloom to euphoria, with little room for nuance in between.
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Rob Lee
Rob Lee@RALee85·
Updated maps from the past week showing Russian advances east of Kupyansk, east of Kostiantynivka, east of Kramatorsk, northwest of Hryshyne, and near Novopavlivka. #12/48.7385311/37.7582932" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">deepstatemap.live/en#12/48.73853…
Rob Lee tweet mediaRob Lee tweet mediaRob Lee tweet mediaRob Lee tweet media
Rob Lee@RALee85

Updated maps from the past few days from @Deepstate_UA showing Russian advances near Kostyantynivka, east of Prosiana, and east of Kramatorsk. #11/48.8299216/37.9179382" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">deepstatemap.live/en#11/48.82992…

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