Akito

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Akito

Akito

@itsak1to

Money is a choice and a risk, and in crypto, it’s also a game of speed! Collab Manager / Moderator / Community Manager

Degenland Katılım Ekim 2021
313 Takip Edilen803 Takipçiler
Akito
Akito@itsak1to·
@shevaxgod it's a shame we weren't there back then))
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Akito
Akito@itsak1to·
in 2009 Barack Obama went on live TV and called Wall Street bankers "fat cats." he called their $18 billion in bonuses "shameful." he called AIG's payouts an "outrage" - "excuse me, I'm choked up with anger here." "we want our money back," he said, proposing a new tax on the banks. "obscene." then the cameras turned off. by 2010, asked about Jamie Dimon's $17 million package and Lloyd Blankfein's $9 million, the same president said: "I know both those guys - they are very savvy businessmen." he compared their bonuses to baseball salaries. a few years out of office, he took $400,000 for a single speech to a Wall Street firm - then $1.2 million for three more, to Cantor Fitzgerald, Northern Trust, and the Carlyle Group. the same industry he called shameful on camera became the one writing his checks. watch what people do when the cameras are off, not what they say when they're on. the public anger was populist and loud. the private behavior was friendly words, six-figure fees, and a seat at the table with the men he called fat cats. the outrage was for the audience. the savvy businessmen were for the boardroom ↓
Ruuj@RuujSs

x.com/i/article/2066…

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Akito
Akito@itsak1to·
@shevaxgod even Buffett struggled with complexity, that says a lot
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Shevaxgod
Shevaxgod@shevaxgod·
buffett needed five years and $409 million to untangle one derivatives book he owned outright. wall street just spent the summer building an $800 billion version on purpose, live, and calling it the AI trade. the post below is the small version: one dealer, full control, still unreadable. now watch the industrial version being assembled in real time. the loop is simple to say and impossible to price. nvidia invests billions into openai. openai signs huge cloud contracts with oracle. oracle buys thousands of chips from nvidia. the money goes in a circle, and every lap books revenue for all three. today bloomberg reported nvidia is working on a fresh round of deals worth more than $750 billion, including a guarantee of up to $250 billion to help openai lease compute it cannot yet pay for. here is the part that rhymes with the post below. michael burry, the one man who read the subprime footnotes in 2007, is reading these. his verdict is not subtle. he says the chips are being sold through special purpose vehicles, the exact structure that hid enron, with risk pushed to offshore insurers and, eventually, to pension funds. he estimates the hyperscalers are understating depreciation by $176 billion through 2028 by pretending two-year chips last six. buffett owned his opaque book and still could not close it in five years. nobody owns this one. it is spread across a chipmaker, a startup with no profit, a cloud vendor loading up on debt, and a web of SPVs designed so no single balance sheet shows the whole bet. the AI story sells as software eating the world. the financing underneath it is a $800 billion circle that only works while everyone keeps paying everyone. opacity was never a warning sign that got fixed. it got scaled.
Shevaxgod@shevaxgod

someone actually took paul singer's challenge. he had unlimited money, the best analysts alive, and full legal control of the book. it still took him five years and $409 million, and he said he could not have done it with 15 PhDs. that someone was warren buffett. the post below asks who can untangle a bank's derivatives. buffett tried, on a small one, and lost. in 1998 berkshire bought general re. inside was a derivatives dealer, gen re securities. buffett looked at it and did the rational thing: shut it down. simple in theory. the book held 23,218 contracts with 884 counterparties, most of them firms he had never heard of. closing that book, on his own terms, with no crisis forcing his hand, took from 2002 to 2006 and cost berkshire a $409 million pre-tax loss. his verdict is the whole point: "I could have hired 15 of the smartest people, math majors, PhDs, and it wouldn't have worked." that was one dealer buffett owned outright. singer is describing $75 trillion notional sitting inside a live bank that also holds your deposits, run by people who, in his words and in buffett's, do not fully know what is on it. this is the same man who in 2002 called derivatives "financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that are potentially lethal." now the 2026 version. every fund selling an AI that "sees systemic risk in real time" is promising the machine that buffett said could not exist. he had the smartest humans and total control and still walked away. the book did not get more readable since. it got 10x bigger and moved into private credit. singer asked to be shown what it looks like. buffett already answered: from the inside, it looks like something even genius cannot close on time.

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slash1s
slash1s@slash1sol·
LangChain's CEO and CTO spent 43 minutes on stage laying out the harness, the lifecycle and the infrastructure behind agents that actually survive production: · 2:00 - Why building agents is different from building software · 6:34 - What Deep Agents is: the agent harness explained · 14:48 - LangSmith Sandboxes, announced live · 19:20 - The Agent Development Lifecycle, defined · 25:58 - Why agent trace payloads keep getting larger · 29:38 - The architecture of SmithDB · 34:00 - How Clay and Vanta run on SmithDB · 42:50 - Building the platform for the entire lifecycle The harness is only the first of three layers. The article below covers the other two. Watch this before you ship your next agent ↓
beamnxw ./@beamnxw

x.com/i/article/2080…

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Akito
Akito@itsak1to·
@Rossst_03 expected value is one of those concepts that changes how you look at every decision
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Rossst.03
Rossst.03@Rossst_03·
Joe Blitzstein, the Harvard professor who put probability on the map: "Jane Street will pay you $600K for a single trick you can run in your head: knowing what a bet is truly worth before you place it. I hand it out for free at Harvard. ignore it and you become the casino's favorite regular." this free lecture carries the exact "edge" every casino and every hedge fund quietly lives on, taught by a man who dropped his entire Harvard probability course online, where millions have already watched it. on the chalkboard it is almost boring. expected value is just each outcome multiplied by its odds, summed into one number that tells you what a wager pays on average. roulette runs at minus 5.26 percent, so every dollar you slide onto the felt comes back as about 94 cents, and the rest stays with the house. it never shifts, and it never needs to. that is the entire "edge", once you strip the marketing off it. the idea traces back to Pascal, Fermat and Huygens in the 1650s. it has sat in the open for nearly four hundred years. same point as the casino piece above: the house wins because its number is positive and yours is negative, one bet at a time. the math is free, and every fund runs it on every position they hold. what they cannot sell you is the honesty to measure the edge you actually have instead of the one you wish you had. that is the number that quietly decides who ends up broke, and no lecture on earth can force you to look at it.
Voltex@VoltexGar

x.com/i/article/2078…

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Akito
Akito@itsak1to·
Warren Buffett spent 20 years donating $48 billion to the Gates Foundation. this year he gave them nothing. for two decades it was the biggest philanthropic partnership in history - Buffett funneling Berkshire stock to Bill Gates' foundation, an irrevocable lifetime pledge he made in 2006. then it stopped. his mid-year donation this year - nearly $6 billion in Berkshire shares - went entirely to foundations run by his own children. the Gates Foundation received none of it. Buffett called Gates' ties to Jeffrey Epstein "distasteful." the two men, friends for decades and Berkshire board partners for 16 years, reportedly hadn't spoken since the DOJ released the Epstein files in February. when asked if he'd ever give to the foundation again: "I'll wait and see what unfolds." $48 billion over twenty years, ended without a public statement - just an omission everyone noticed ↓
Akito@itsak1to

Leonardo DiCaprio was offered $2.5 million for Titanic. he asked for something else instead - and it turned into $40 million. instead of a bigger check, he took 1.8% of the film's gross. Titanic became the highest-grossing movie in history to that point, and his tiny percentage quietly paid him roughly $40 million - sixteen times his salary. he'd learned the lesson most people never do: the salary is the floor, the ownership is the ceiling. then he ran the same play off-screen. he became an early investor in Beyond Meat before plant-based meat was a thing - it IPO'd at a $4 billion valuation. he backed Mobileye, Rubicon, Diamond Foundry, over 15 startups in all. not lending his name for a fee - taking a stake. which is the strange part. the role that made him a legend was The Wolf of Wall Street - a con man who got rich selling people worthless stock and spending every dollar. DiCaprio built his real fortune doing the exact opposite: owning real things and holding them. it didn't always work. Beyond Meat later collapsed below $1 billion. Casper flopped after its IPO. real equity carries real losses. a fee pays once. a stake pays as long as you hold it. DiCaprio chose the version of wealth with no ceiling - and accepted the risk that comes with it. the man who played Wall Street's most famous fraud got rich doing the one thing that character never could: owning something real ↓

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Akito
Akito@itsak1to·
Leonardo DiCaprio was offered $2.5 million for Titanic. he asked for something else instead - and it turned into $40 million. instead of a bigger check, he took 1.8% of the film's gross. Titanic became the highest-grossing movie in history to that point, and his tiny percentage quietly paid him roughly $40 million - sixteen times his salary. he'd learned the lesson most people never do: the salary is the floor, the ownership is the ceiling. then he ran the same play off-screen. he became an early investor in Beyond Meat before plant-based meat was a thing - it IPO'd at a $4 billion valuation. he backed Mobileye, Rubicon, Diamond Foundry, over 15 startups in all. not lending his name for a fee - taking a stake. which is the strange part. the role that made him a legend was The Wolf of Wall Street - a con man who got rich selling people worthless stock and spending every dollar. DiCaprio built his real fortune doing the exact opposite: owning real things and holding them. it didn't always work. Beyond Meat later collapsed below $1 billion. Casper flopped after its IPO. real equity carries real losses. a fee pays once. a stake pays as long as you hold it. DiCaprio chose the version of wealth with no ceiling - and accepted the risk that comes with it. the man who played Wall Street's most famous fraud got rich doing the one thing that character never could: owning something real ↓
Akito@itsak1to

the man who runs a $1.5 trillion company once had to personally explain why his database kept crashing. he was 19, and the site was called TheFacebook. in 2004 he ran it off rented machines from his Harvard dorm, describing the whole thing like a hobby. "when we first launched we were hoping for maybe 400 or 500 people. now we're at 100,000. who knows where we're going next... maybe we can make something cool." no business plan. no exit strategy. just a coder solving one problem at a time - how to scale to the next university, how to stop the servers from falling over, how to keep people coming back. that "something cool" now serves over 3 billion people. but here's what almost nobody in his position does. he never sold it. Microsoft and AOL reportedly offered him millions for a program he built in high school - he said no. Yahoo offered $1 billion for Facebook when he was 22, with his entire board telling him to take it - he said no. most of his senior team quit within a year. "I don't really like putting a price-tag on the stuff I do. that's just not the point." the people who build the biggest things aren't optimizing for the exit. Zuckerberg wasn't trying to get bought. he was trying to build something people couldn't stop using - and refused every offer to hand it to someone else. every buyout is a bet you're selling too cheap. the price is what someone smarter than you thinks it's worth today. it's the floor, never the ceiling. the billion he turned down at 22 is now a rounding error on what that "no" was actually worth ↓

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Akito
Akito@itsak1to·
the man who runs a $1.5 trillion company once had to personally explain why his database kept crashing. he was 19, and the site was called TheFacebook. in 2004 he ran it off rented machines from his Harvard dorm, describing the whole thing like a hobby. "when we first launched we were hoping for maybe 400 or 500 people. now we're at 100,000. who knows where we're going next... maybe we can make something cool." no business plan. no exit strategy. just a coder solving one problem at a time - how to scale to the next university, how to stop the servers from falling over, how to keep people coming back. that "something cool" now serves over 3 billion people. but here's what almost nobody in his position does. he never sold it. Microsoft and AOL reportedly offered him millions for a program he built in high school - he said no. Yahoo offered $1 billion for Facebook when he was 22, with his entire board telling him to take it - he said no. most of his senior team quit within a year. "I don't really like putting a price-tag on the stuff I do. that's just not the point." the people who build the biggest things aren't optimizing for the exit. Zuckerberg wasn't trying to get bought. he was trying to build something people couldn't stop using - and refused every offer to hand it to someone else. every buyout is a bet you're selling too cheap. the price is what someone smarter than you thinks it's worth today. it's the floor, never the ceiling. the billion he turned down at 22 is now a rounding error on what that "no" was actually worth ↓
Akito@itsak1to

Apple CEO Steve Jobs once paid Microsoft CEO Bill Gates $31,000 for software. twenty years later he begged him for $150 million to keep Apple from dying. in 1977 Microsoft was the contractor and Apple was the client. Gates wrote Applesoft BASIC for the Apple II, took the flat fee, and went home. by August 1997 Apple was weeks from insolvency. Jobs had just come back as interim CEO. his first major move wasn't a product - it was a phone call to the one man everyone assumed wanted Apple dead. Gates could have let it die. instead Microsoft put $150 million into Apple non-voting stock and settled the patent dispute between them. when Jobs announced it at MacWorld, Gates appeared on a giant screen above the stage. the audience booed. "we have to let go of the notion that for Apple to win, Microsoft has to lose." then, on the cover of TIME: "Bill, thank you. The world's a better place." Apple's stock jumped 33% that day. the company is now worth roughly $4 trillion. Gates on the deal a decade later: "that's worked out very well." but this isn't really a story about two rivals. a competitor is not an enemy. Gates needed a healthy Apple to argue Microsoft wasn't a monopoly, and he needed Office to have a second platform. both sides won because both had something the other couldn't get anywhere else. the hardest call is the one that costs you your ego. Jobs got booed by his own people for that deal. he made it anyway, because being right in public is worth less than being solvent. $31,000 and $150 million were the same relationship twenty years apart. the only thing that changed was who needed whom. the man Apple hired as a contractor ended up writing the check that saved it ↓

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Akito
Akito@itsak1to·
@slash1sol risk-reward ratio is often more important than the win rate
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slash1s
slash1s@slash1sol·
A QUANT BUILT AN ALGO THAT IS WRONG ALL THE TIME AND STILL TURNED $16K INTO $70K, THE RATIO DOES THE WORK The secret is one line. R = avg win / avg loss = 2.6 Every trade risks 1% of equity, scaled down when volatility rises. Winners are allowed to run 2.6x further than losers are allowed to bleed. In plain words. You do not need to be right, you need your rights to be bigger than your wrongs. On screen 380 trades over six years grind $16K to $70K while the S&P doubles. Same ratio applied 380 times, that is the entire machine. Minara lets you build that exact behavior by describing it. 500+ factors, risk-scaled sizing, real backtests. The PhD math is real, the wall is gone. I took one plain sentence to a live, backtested strategy & posted every number in the article. Check it ↓
slash1s@slash1sol

x.com/i/article/2069…

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Akito
Akito@itsak1to·
@triiiam yeah, that decision probably changed everything
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Triam
Triam@triiiam·
@itsak1to damn handing back that reebok check at 18 is just insane
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Akito retweetledi
Akito
Akito@itsak1to·
LeBron James was 18 when the CEO of Reebok slid a $10 million check across the table and told him to take it. he handed it back. one condition came with the money. don't talk to Nike. don't talk to Adidas. sign right now. he had never seen that many zeros in his life. he asked for a minute, and they left him alone in the room with his mother. "I still can't believe I left that $10 million." Nike offered him $90 million. a decade later they signed him to a lifetime deal reportedly worth over $1 billion. then he did it again. in 2008 a headphone startup asked him to promote their product. instead of taking a fee, he asked for a small piece of the company. Apple bought Beats for $3 billion in 2014. LeBron's cut was $30 million - more than his entire NBA salary that year, and the largest equity payout any athlete had ever received. in 2012 he put around $1 million into a pizza chain nobody had heard of, then turned down $15 million from McDonald's to focus on it. his Blaze stake is now worth $35-40 million. he became the first active NBA player to reach a billion. the check is the ceiling. the equity is the floor. every athlete gets offered a number, and that number is the most that deal will ever pay. ownership has no such limit. the offer that feels impossible to refuse is usually the one designed to stop you from finding out what you're worth ↓
Akito@itsak1to

Apple CEO Steve Jobs once paid Microsoft CEO Bill Gates $31,000 for software. twenty years later he begged him for $150 million to keep Apple from dying. in 1977 Microsoft was the contractor and Apple was the client. Gates wrote Applesoft BASIC for the Apple II, took the flat fee, and went home. by August 1997 Apple was weeks from insolvency. Jobs had just come back as interim CEO. his first major move wasn't a product - it was a phone call to the one man everyone assumed wanted Apple dead. Gates could have let it die. instead Microsoft put $150 million into Apple non-voting stock and settled the patent dispute between them. when Jobs announced it at MacWorld, Gates appeared on a giant screen above the stage. the audience booed. "we have to let go of the notion that for Apple to win, Microsoft has to lose." then, on the cover of TIME: "Bill, thank you. The world's a better place." Apple's stock jumped 33% that day. the company is now worth roughly $4 trillion. Gates on the deal a decade later: "that's worked out very well." but this isn't really a story about two rivals. a competitor is not an enemy. Gates needed a healthy Apple to argue Microsoft wasn't a monopoly, and he needed Office to have a second platform. both sides won because both had something the other couldn't get anywhere else. the hardest call is the one that costs you your ego. Jobs got booed by his own people for that deal. he made it anyway, because being right in public is worth less than being solvent. $31,000 and $150 million were the same relationship twenty years apart. the only thing that changed was who needed whom. the man Apple hired as a contractor ended up writing the check that saved it ↓

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Akito
Akito@itsak1to·
@Rossst_03 great analogy, the real edge isn’t speed anymore, its what you do with it
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Rossst.03
Rossst.03@Rossst_03·
Richard Feynman, the Nobel physicist who explained what light actually is: "you can spend any number you like. light still travels at one speed, and no amount of money moves that ceiling. the race was always to get closest to a limit nobody can break." this free 1979 lecture holds the entire "$300 million cable" Wall Street is still paying for, explained by the man who won a Nobel for how light works. the cable did not beat physics. it drilled a straighter line so light in glass had less distance to cross. 3 milliseconds saved. that is the whole $300M trade. Feynman's point: light is a hard wall, not a feature you can buy. everyone racing to zero is paying more and more to get a hair closer to a ceiling that never moves. that is why speed stopped being an edge. once every fund owns the straight cable and the microwave tower, the 3ms belongs to all of them, and the advantage is back to zero. the edge left the wire. it moved to the machine deciding what to do inside those 3 milliseconds. that part is not physics. that part is intelligence, and it is the only race still open. Wall Street spent $300 million to reach the speed of light. the next $300 million is going to whatever thinks at the other end of the cable.
Voltex@VoltexGar

x.com/i/article/2080…

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Akito
Akito@itsak1to·
@Frandeeer the hard question for every agent node: what decision does it own, what evidence must it return, and what condition prevents the workflow from continuing? if those answers are vague, adding more agents only multiplies ambiguity.
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Frander
Frander@Frandeeer·
Barbara Liskov, MIT professor and Turing Award winner: Her answer to the software crisis now sits beneath companies worth trillions: break a large system into replaceable parts with strict contracts. Claude agent swarms are failing the same test today. Most teams take one giant prompt and distribute it across twenty agents. The agents share ambiguous context, return free-form text, repeat the same research, and collapse when one model or output format changes. That is not orchestration. It is spaghetti with API bills. Graph engineering applies Liskov’s old lesson to AI: one node owns one decision, one edge carries structured evidence, ordinary code handles deterministic work, routers decide which branch continues, verifiers reject unsupported conclusions, and the strongest model sees only what survives. Now every agent becomes replaceable. A cheap model can handle extraction. A specialist can inspect security. A skeptical agent can attack the result. A frontier model can make the final judgment without carrying the entire workflow inside one context window. The original software crisis was too much code for one person to understand. The new software crisis is too many agents with no architecture between them. The article below is the complete Graph Engineering playbook for Claude Code. The next AI moat will not be one permanent model. It will be a system that keeps working when the model changes.
Gyomei@Gyome1_

x.com/i/article/2080…

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