Mert Baser

Data security and privacy is a must. And @south_summit just approved this necessity ✅

@needim @alpererdogandev Eger onceliginiz guvenlik ve gizlilik ise @TransferChain_ Pass’i onerebilirim :)

@alpererdogandev proton pass ilgimi çekmeye başladı. kullanan bakan inceleyen var mıdır?

1password da benzer bir tarifeye geçti, 2 aya localhost bitwarden akar

The metadata exposure and "zero-access but we scan inbound" contradictions are exactly why blind trust in any provider is risky. At @TransferChain_ our foundation is privacy by design, not just promise. Client-side encryption, data fragmentation on client, distributed storage and blockchain as an immutable auth layer. Built for the paranoid :) The architecture matters more than the jurisdiction slogan.

@Serpico_x0 @ErikExplains @Fernand40206677 @GCOPYNFT @vxunderground @Bitwarden @Proton_Pass Founder of @TransferChain_ Pass here, if you really care about your privacy I recommend checking it out 🔐

@ErikExplains @Fernand40206677 @GCOPYNFT @vxunderground @Bitwarden @Proton_Pass He was asking why pay for a service when Google is for "free". I added the quotes 😀

1Password said, "Hello, we like money, we are going to increase our pricing by 33%. It is now $47.88/year". I said, "Hello, I am terminating my subscription and deleting my account."

@iAnonymous3000 And this is exactly why we built @TransferChain_ #Pass - Client-side & E2EW - Data fragmentation - Distributed storage - Blockchain authorization 🔐

Google Password Manager isn’t end to end encrypted by default. Google holds the decryption keys, meaning they can access your credentials or hand them over in response to a legal warrant. You can enable on-device encryption manually, but it’s buried in settings and most users never touch it. @Brave Sync is E2EE out of the box using a BIP39 seed phrase you control. Brave only stores encrypted blobs and never has access to the keys. That said, storing passwords in any browser carries inherent risks. Infostealer malware specifically targets the known folder paths where browsers store credential databases. One bad download and your entire password vault gets scraped. Malicious or compromised extensions can also intercept autofilled data since they share the browser environment. And if someone compromises your Google account with default settings, they now have your email and every password you’ve saved. Dedicated password managers isolate your credentials from both your browser environment and your email provider.

@zkjays @iAnonymous3000 @brave Use @TransferChain_

@iAnonymous3000 @brave already use it since 3 years mate

the best way to support privacy talking about what you use everyday privacy becomes culture when it’s practiced daily one choice at a time for me: – i use proton mail + vpn – i hold and use zcash & mina – i talk about privacy without preaching and you, what’s one thing you already do for privacy?

Legacy security doesn’t cut it anymore. When your security breaks because of a browser extension, the architecture is already wrong. We don’t need more patches, we need a protocol-level reset. That’s exactly why we built @TransferChain_ Pass on a client-side & e2e, data fragmentation, and distributed storage. No trust in browsers. No trust in extensions. Security enforced by the protocol itself. If security lives on the surface, it will break. If it lives in the protocol, it won’t.

.@1Password browser extension is injecting Prism.js *globally* on every page, which then applies its syntax highlighting logic on all blocks matching [lang=*] regardless of whether it’s meant to be compatible, thus breaking original highlighting. Terrible negligence and even more so that this made to prod while already flagged during beta. Been a user for a long time but this will def push me to an alternative if not fixed soon.