

OffTheLists🔻🇵🇸
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@offthelists00
You probably found me defending Islam somewhere | Internet Money ₿ | Full Stack Developer





















No. The Kingdom of God in Daniel 2 is the stone “cut out without hands” set up by the God of heaven. It crushes the statue of human empires and becomes an eternal kingdom that fills the earth (Daniel 2:44-45). It is divine, not led by the Antichrist. Daniel 2 never mentions the Antichrist. That figure appears in Daniel 7 and later texts as an end-times opposer of God, often linked to a final phase of the fourth empire before God’s kingdom triumphs. Interpretations of timing and exact fulfillment vary among Christians (spiritual growth of the Church, Christ’s first or second coming). Claims tying it directly to Islamic conquests are one perspective but not the standard reading of the text.















This is THE LAST reply I send to you, you are not responding to anything you are welcome to join my panel. Mr. “Physical separability is a biological defense to a metaphysical problem, and this isn’t AI but rather my sophisticated rhetoric”, has (kinda?) responded. First off, I DO NOT HOLD to God being a 3D object, however, I do believe that it’s metaphysically coherent to commit to that yet simultaneously attribute it with aseity. Your argument in (1) hasn’t provided a defeater, why? Because as you said here; “This already is a problem because a 3D deity is arbitrarily limited in having 3 dimensions as to any other number. Therefore, your deity is modally contingent in His dimensionality. Furthermore, there must be an external cause or specifier that makes your deity 3 dimension as opposed to another number.”, you made two assumptions, and for the third time, PLEASE justify them! Why is it metaphysically incoherent for that “arbitrary limit” to be brute? How does that entail being “modally contingent”? It’s metaphysically coherent to assume that there exists x such that x is 3D, exists without a cause, and it’s a brute necessity, that “why” it’s the case is therefore brute. What’s the METAPHYSICAL problem here? Those aren’t even related. Also, another point, why “must there be an external specifier”? Why? What motivates that? Why can’t I say that for every object x, if x is simple, x needs an external simplifier? Are you arguing for epistemic inconsistency or metaphysical incoherency? Do you even know the difference, or did “biological defense” reading not suffice? If it’s epistemic inconsistency, then ontological dependency nor modal contingency are logically entailed. Do better. What’s funnier is that in (2), you basically make the same argument in a different way; “it is logically possible for that number to be different - thereby making His extent and boundaries an arbitrarily limit and rendering your God modally contingent. Again, there must be an external specifier for your God's finite spatial extent on the up-down axis.” First, logical possibility doesn’t entail metaphysical possibility. This is basic stuff dude. It’s demonstrably formally consistent that your “exists and not exists” outdated conception of God to not exist. Is that a serious defeater? No. Metaphysical possibility is motivated by commitments far beyond just mere formal consistency. Also again, “external specifier” and “arbitrary limits” are non-sequiturs as you haven’t demonstrated that they logically entail that, when I told you that such “issues” can be resolved by simply saying that such object is a brute necessity, and brute necessity isn’t ad-hoc because that’s what aseity is. Read up man. Third, speaking of aseity, you don’t even know what it means, it’s actually you who’s as clueless as a social Trinitarian. Aseity means there is x such that x obtains in all metaphysically possible worlds AND x lacks any external metaphysical explanation. In your ancient wizard of oz theology terms, aseity means something exists without a cause and always exists. That’s the mainstream definition within contemporary philosophy of religion. I told you, on the issue of composition, you low-tier, within my last tweet, which I told to not run away from and you did exactly that, to do three things, in order for the argument to follow; 1. Flesh out what ontic-priority is, 2. demonstrate why we ought to commit to that hermeneutic, and 3. prove how an object bearing properties necessarily entails ontological priority relations. Don’t run again and again from this. How is causal dependency even entailed? Is God under your view thereby causally dependent because of necessitarianism, really? Do you see how pathetic and self-defeating your argument is? I will reply to (4) of your tweet later under this post.





