Europe Defender 🇪🇺🇺🇦
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Europe Defender 🇪🇺🇺🇦
@oroborous
https://t.co/WMhhPUHrs0


From our point of view, a collective middle powers strategy is based on a faulty understanding of international relations. We are flexible realists. So, we view the international scene through the prism of interest, geography, economics, military power, etc. “Middle powers” don’t have a coherent basis for alignment. 2/



There is a great deal of hubbub about a collective “middle powers”strategy these days. At DoW, we are not concerned that this is a serious possibility. Rather, we are more concerned that a few allies and partners will *think it is* and waste valuable time, money, and political capital on a distraction. 1/


Good post. People often overlook the insane debt China has been racking up to fuel its (impressive) economic growth, both in the public and private sectors. Last year alone, Chinese publicly held debt rose by 9 (!) percentage points from 90.4% debt-to-GDP ratio to 99.2% - despite seeing strong economic growth of 5% (show in image 1). Debt-to-GDP for the total economy now exceeds 300% and continues to rise rapidly (image 2), the true pace of which seems even more staggering when looking at it in absolute terms (image 3). Debt can be a useful tool to supercharge ones development, but there is only so much headroom until a ceiling is reached, at which point something will have to give. Nobody knows where exactly that point is, but China is approaching it rapidly. Just One more of its mounting economic problems.


There is a great deal of hubbub about a collective “middle powers”strategy these days. At DoW, we are not concerned that this is a serious possibility. Rather, we are more concerned that a few allies and partners will *think it is* and waste valuable time, money, and political capital on a distraction. 1/

There is a great deal of hubbub about a collective “middle powers”strategy these days. At DoW, we are not concerned that this is a serious possibility. Rather, we are more concerned that a few allies and partners will *think it is* and waste valuable time, money, and political capital on a distraction. 1/


There is a great deal of hubbub about a collective “middle powers”strategy these days. At DoW, we are not concerned that this is a serious possibility. Rather, we are more concerned that a few allies and partners will *think it is* and waste valuable time, money, and political capital on a distraction. 1/









Very good piece by Joshua Busby on China's EV production. I only have one quibble. Busby says: "Xiaomi’s attempt to take on Apple and Tesla seems like one of those only-in-China stories. China’s scale of manufacturing — and the vast supplier ecosystems this sustains — make China arguably the only country where a mobile phone maker can try to become an EV maker as well." I would argue that the real reason a mobile phone maker in China can quickly pivot to becoming a major EV maker is because of near-unlimited financing at very accommodative terms. Anyone in China interested in expanding production capabilities in sectors deemed strategic by the government can raise enormous amounts of financing very easily, with little concern about eventually hitting hard budget constraints. But China's ability to do this wasn't an only-in-China story. It was also the story of Japan in the 1970s and 1980s. Every time Tokyo deemed a manufacturing sector to be of strategic importance, Japanese manufacturers quickly dominated that sector globally. For a while Japanese manufacturers in one sector after another seemed unassailable, but ultimately a country's debt capacity is always the constraint. No country can maintain global competitiveness forever if this competitiveness requires permanent increases in debt to fund the sources of its competitiveness (i.e., direct and indirect subsidies). The cost to Japan was a surge in overall debt that ultimate caused the whole strategy to reverse after 1990-91 in the form of an extremely difficult adjustment. China already has one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios in the world (second only to Japan's), and it is rising at perhaps the fastest rate in history. Like Japan's, in other words, China's manufacturing success depends ultimately on an unsustainable increase in the country's debt burden. But while this cannot go on forever, Busby is right to say that EV producers in the US (and Europe) should nonetheless be very concerned. As the history of the US chemical industries demonstrates, a county's productive capacity in a particular sector can be undermined in a very short period, but it is extremely difficult to rebuild. thewirechina.com/2026/07/12/ame…





There is a great deal of hubbub about a collective “middle powers”strategy these days. At DoW, we are not concerned that this is a serious possibility. Rather, we are more concerned that a few allies and partners will *think it is* and waste valuable time, money, and political capital on a distraction. 1/










