Patrick Wintour

Good to see Iran's foreign ministry spokesman take more than a hour of pertinent questions from media on camera, including many women diplomatic correspondents. He does this each week, unlike, of course, some parallel organisations in the UK....

Disbelief

Former Prosecutor of ICC asking for its staff to be protected properly by an EU statute blocking US sanctions- statements of concern ring hollow when staff in reality have lives ruined. US aim is to bully and isolate, she claims. theguardian.com/law/2026/may/2…

One cannot underestimate the significance of these visuals: Turkish police are raiding the headquarters of Turkey’s founding—and arguably largest—political party. Decades from now, this will be written into history, whether as a moment of change or further state consolidation.

Israeli official: Trump “clarified that he will stand firm in the negotiations on his longstanding demand for the dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program and the removal of all enriched uranium from Iranian territory, and that he will not sign a final agreement without these conditions being met". This is a promise by Trump that cannot be checked out until late July. Trump went to war to achieve these objectives, and did not do so. He has now reverted to diplomacy.

U.S. President Donald Trump told an ABC reporter that he 'cannot talk about the deal' with Iran, but added: 'It's entirely up to me, and if there's news, it will only be good news. I don't make bad deals.'

Pleased to announce that following the Azerbaijani railway, the Turkish railway via Georgia, is now open for Armenian export & import. This is a major develop for our country’s econ life. Express appreciation to our partners in Türkiye & Georgia for their constructive coop.

Best account of deal so far from Amwaj including implications for Lebanon. In essence sanctions relief for a regime that is more hard line than at war’s start. In return for reopening a previously open waterway. Brill. Not quite yet nailed down. 1 Precise amount of assets to be unfrozen and conditionality. 2 Iran’s plan for tolls & Persian Gulf Strait Authority - to be negotiated with Oman - appears now relegated to a back burner. 3 Trump can claim he has an Iranian commitment over 60 days to negotiate on nuclear stockpile but he had that in Geneva in February. Overall a true American Debacle. One can only hope lessons are learned and the war mongers banished. Those that lost their lives in this unnecessary battle of wills including innocent school children deserve that crumb of solace. amwaj.media/en/article/ins… via @amwajmedia

It’s hard to overstate how deeply Netanyahu views this moment as a possible personal and political defeat. A U.S.–Iran agreement under Trump would be a major blow to him mainly diplomatically, but above all politically. For years, Netanyahu built his political identity around being “Mr. Iran,” the leader who insisted that only pressure, deterrence, and force could stop the Iranian regime. And now, after multiple rounds of operational successes but one resounding strategic failure, and after finally succeeding in drawing the United States into direct confrontation with Iran, he may be forced to accept an agreement that not only legitimizes the very regime he sought to weaken, but also exposes the collapse of his long-standing Iran doctrine. His approach was based on the belief that more pressure, more military power, and tighter coordination between Israel and the United States would eventually either force Iran into submission or destabilize the regime itself. Instead, the result has been a more radicalized, more resilient, and more dangerous Iran, one that even Washington now hesitates to confront militarily again. If this confrontation ends with an agreement, an even bigger strategic question emerges: what future American president would be willing to commit U.S. forces to another major Middle Eastern conflict after seeing the political and military costs of this one? Netanyahu had what may have been his greatest opportunity to prove his central strategic theory: that a close Israeli-American military partnership could fundamentally reshape Iran and perhaps even threaten the regime’s survival. By every indication, that assumption failed. Against this backdrop, reports of a tense conversation between Trump and Netanyahu become much easier to understand. They also help explain the extraordinary level of pressure now coming from Jerusalem, and the extent to which Netanyahu is trying to persuade, or pressure, the administration not to move toward a deal with Tehran. The bottom line is that a U.S.–Iran agreement would not only signal the failure of the military confrontation Netanyahu pushed for, but also the collapse of the broader strategic doctrine he has championed since entering Israeli politics, all on the eve of what could be the most critical election of his career. In that sense, the next Israel’s leadership need to learn the fundamental lessons of this war. More than ever, this conflict demonstrates the urgent need for Israel to develop a different long-term strategy for dealing with Iran and especially to understand the following: Israel’s confrontation with Iran will not bring normalization with the Arab world, nor will it resolve Israel’s most fundamental security challenges, first and foremost, the Palestinian issue. The belief that regime change in Iran would transform Israel’s position in the Middle East was always detached from reality. In fact, the consistent opposition of Gulf leaders and major Arab states to further escalation against Iran has demonstrated this repeatedly throughout the conflict. Israel will not be able to use the “Iran card” as a substitute for addressing the core political issues shaping the region. Anyone arguing that military confrontation with Iran alone can unlock normalization is mistaken and, more importantly, misleading others about the strategic reality of the Middle East. Because despite the undeniable tactical and operational achievements of the campaign, this failure may ultimately leave Israel facing a more dangerous strategic reality, one that has not fundamentally improved its position in the Middle East. #IranWar‌

When this war ends with enormous and lasting costs and little to show for it, we should do something we haven’t done in a quarter century: collectively hold accountable those who pushed it in the first place. From Washington’s prolific Iran war lobby to my former colleagues who sane-washed it, their voices should no longer be allowed to dominate the conversation as they have for two decades. Their discrediting may be virtually all we have to show for this disastrous decision.

Let me be even less diplomatic than @AlanEyre1 (but more than I'd like): this entire debacle stems from a dishonest, bad faith approach taken by some people toward the JPOA/JCPOA/other diplomatic efforts & Iran policy more generally. 1/2

Iran foreign ministry spokesman: Solution possible in 3 to 4 days. We are in the finalisation process of the memorandum of understanding . The topics being discussed mainly at this stage are mainly focussed on ending the war.  Other issues are ending naval blockade and issues related to the release of Iran’ assets. Our goal was to formulate a memorandum of understanding and a framework understanding consisting of 14 clauses, including the most important issues that are necessary to end the imposed war and matters that are of fundamental importance to us, and to discuss them within a period of 30 and 60 days; We are now in the finalization stage of this memorandum of understanding." He explained “The Strait of Hormuz is not related to the United States. The Strait of Hormuz is between us and Oman as coastal countries, and a mechanism needs to be established regarding it. Of course, we are also in contact with international environmental organizations. We have had multiple meetings with the Omani side and we are certainly negotiating with other countries. This is because we are aware of the importance of this waterway for the entire international community. The international community has come to the conclusion that the imposed insecurity on this waterway is due to the provocative actions of the United States and the Zionist regime, and they understand that the responsible actions of Iran and Oman to establish mechanisms for ensuring safe passage of ships through this waterway are in the interest of the international community. “  “The issue of the Strait of Hormuz is one of the important topics that will be discussed in this memorandum, but more importantly, it involves addressing maritime piracy and American acts of piracy against international shipping. This issue is important for all sailors because it has led to increased insecurity at the international level, with shipping being targeted in international waters. It is also significant for us as a party targeted by America's aggressive actions against our commercial shipping”.

Oman to Iran “Emphasis was also placed on the importance of resuming maritime navigation freely and safely.” That does not read like Oman wanting to join the Iranian plan to impose tolls on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz

"من شريك ترامب في الحرب على إيران إلى مجرد راكب: نتنياهو خارج مقصورة القيادة" عنوان لتقرير نشرته صحيفة نيويورك تايمز اليوم. التقرير لا يتحدث فقط عن تهميش نتنياهو داخل المفاوضات الأمريكية-الإيرانية، بل يكشف تحولاً أعمق في طبيعة الحرب نفسها وفي طريقة نظر واشنطن إلى إسرائيل ودورها الإقليمي بعد الحرب. التقرير يكشف دلالات مهمة: 🔹الحرب تحولت من مشروع "تغيير نظام" إلى مشروع "إدارة احتواء". ففي بداية الحرب، بدا أن إسرائيل وبعض دوائر إدارة ترامب تعتقد أن الضربات العسكرية، مع الاغتيالات وصدمة البداية، قد تؤدي إلى انهيار النظام الإيراني. لكن مع صمود إيران، وعدم حدوث انهيار داخلي، انتقلت واشنطن تدريجياً من هدف الحسم إلى هدف منع الانفجار الإقليمي. وهنا ظهر العامل الحاسم؛ إغلاق أو تهديد مضيق هرمز وارتفاع أسعار الطاقة. هذه النقطة غيرت الحسابات الأمريكية بالكامل، لأن كلفة استمرار الحرب أصبحت عالمية وليست فقط عسكرية. أي أن إيران ربما لم تنتصر عسكرياً، لكنها نجحت في رفع كلفة الحرب إلى مستوى أجبر واشنطن على إعادة تعريف أهدافها. 🔹واشنطن بدأت ترى نتنياهو كعامل تصعيد لا كشريك استراتيجي كامل. التقرير يكشف بوضوح أن ترامب بدأ يتعامل مع نتنياهو باعتباره قائداً يجب ضبطه وليس فقط دعمه. وهذا تحول مهم جداً. ففي المراحل الأولى، كان هناك اندماج شبه كامل بين المؤسستين العسكريتين الأمريكية والإسرائيلية. لكن لاحقاً، عندما بدأت الضربات الإسرائيلية تمس منشآت الطاقة الإيرانية وتفتح احتمالات ردود أوسع ضد دول الخليج وأسواق النفط، بدأت واشنطن تنظر إلى إسرائيل كطرف قد يجر الولايات المتحدة إلى حرب مفتوحة لا تريدها. فالمشكلة لم تعد هل إسرائيل حليف؟ ولكن هل أهداف إسرائيل في الحرب تتطابق فعلاً مع المصالح الأمريكية الكبرى؟ وهنا بدأت الفجوة. 🔹إيران نجحت في تحويل البقاء إلى صورة نصر سياسي. التقرير يلمّح إلى نقطة شديدة الأهمية؛ في الحروب غير الحاسمة، مجرد بقاء النظام قد يتحول إلى رواية انتصار. إسرائيل دخلت الحرب بسقف مرتفع جداً؛ إسقاط النظام، إنهاء النووي، إنهاء الصواريخ. لكن عندما انتهت الحرب دون تحقيق هذه الأهداف، أصبح مجرد استمرار النظام الإيراني بحد ذاته دليلاً على فشل مشروع الحرب القصوى. وهذا يفسر لماذا بدأت طهران تتصرف بثقة أكبر في ملف هرمز والمفاوضات، ولماذا تتحدث بعض الدوائر الإيرانية اليوم وكأنها تفاوض من موقع الطرف الذي صمد وليس الطرف المهزوم. 🔹الحرب أعادت إنتاج معضلة 2015 بشكل أكثر تعقيداً. المفارقة التي يبرزها التقرير أن الحرب التي شُنت لمنع اتفاق ضعيف مع إيران قد تنتهي باتفاق يشبه اتفاق 2015 وربما أقل تشدداً. وهذه نقطة استراتيجية شديدة الحساسية لنتنياهو تحديداً، لأنه بنى جزءاً كبيراً من شرعيته السياسية على رفض اتفاق أوباما النووي. فإذا انتهت الحرب باتفاق لا يُسقط النظام، ولا ينهي البرنامج الصاروخي، ويؤجل فقط الملف النووي، فإن إسرائيل ستكون قد دفعت كلفة حرب كبرى لتعود تقريباً إلى نقطة تفاوضية مشابهة لما كان قائماً سابقاً. 🔹المقال يعكس بداية مرحلة "الأمركة الكاملة" لإدارة الأمن الإسرائيلي. فمن أخطر ما في التقرير أنه يُظهر إسرائيل وكأنها فقدت جزءاً من استقلالية قرارها العسكري والسياسي. والجملة الأكثر دلالة ربما كانت: "نحن فقط ننتظر الضوء الأخضر من الولايات المتحدة". هذه العبارة تكشف أن إسرائيل، رغم قوتها العسكرية، لم تعد قادرة على إدارة حرب إقليمية كبرى منفردة، خصوصاً عندما تتداخل مع أمن الطاقة العالمي، الخليج، الملاحة الدولية، وأسعار النفط. وهذا يعني أن سقف الحركة الإسرائيلية أصبح مرتبطاً أكثر من أي وقت مضى بالحسابات الأمريكية الكبرى، لا فقط بالأهداف الإسرائيلية المباشرة. الخلاصة التحليلية الأهم في التقرير؛ الحرب لم تُنهِ إيران، بل ربما أعادت تعريف توازن القوة في المنطقة بطريقة جعلت واشنطن أكثر ميلاً لإدارة التوازن مع طهران، وأكثر حذراً من الاندفاع الإسرائيلي نحو التصعيد المفتوح.

Powerful speech by Fatou Bensouda former ICC Prosecutor on the need for parties to the Rome Statute to do more to protect ICC staff from US sanctions. So far they have voiced concern. "To deploy such instruments against prosecutors, judges or court officials who are engaged in in judicial functions in the pursuit of accountability for the most egregious crimes represents a profound conceptual distortion. It is thuggish and inappropriate, and it should be called out for what it is. It transforms disagreement with legal process into crippling economic coercion to meet political ends. It is bullying, coercion and power politics through other means. It sends a chilling message not only to the ICC, but to any international judicial institution whose work may become politically inconvenient”. “If states normalise retaliation against judicial actors through inaction, appeasement or collusion, then the principle of impartial accountability becomes a hollow slogan and contingent on selective political acceptability. This is not the rule of law. This is not justice. That is conditional legality.” "The response to sanctions against the ICC will reveal much about the durability of the international legal order. The proper response to coercion against judicial independence is not hesitation. It is collective resolve. Not rhetorical solidarity, but operational solidarity, not temporal outrage, but durable institutional protection."

An independent female group showcased music from Southern Iran at the Tehran Museum for Contemporary Art, today May 21 2026

Iran's ambassador to France says Iran is in discussion with Oman about jointly implementing a toll system along the Strait of Hormuz. Oman not commenting in public very wary of this proposal. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…

One of those wicked problems. No justification for status quo, and certainly no justification for two of the five veto wielding powers being European. France can claim to be EU rep, something, until Wes Streeting takes over, the UK cannot. SC expansion + fewer vetoes may be more realistic option.

Why should the world’s fifth largest economic power’s position on the UN Security Council be a roadblock to reform? If Britain should leave, shouldn’t Russia and France? They have significantly smaller economies than the UK...

آمریکایی‌ها پس از دریافت نظراتِ ایران، پیشنهاد کرده‌اند که «پایانِ جنگ در تمامیِ جبهه‌ها»، «رفع محاصره تنگه هرمز توسط آمریکا»، «بازشدن تنگه هرمز توسط ایران با تعرفه و مسیر دریایی مدنظر ایران»، «آزادسازی ۲۵٪ از اموال بلوکه شده ایران _حدود ۲۵ میلیارد دلار»، «معافیتِ فروشِ نفت ایران به مدت ۳۰روز» و فازِ اصلیِ مذاکره یعنی «خروجِ ۴۰۰ کیلو اورانیوم از ایران _در بهترین حالت ارسال به کشور ثالث_» و «قبولِ حقِ غنی‌سازی ۳.۶۷ ٪ برای ایران (بعید است در فاز نهایی آمریکا آن را بپذیرد)» و «تعطیلی مراکز هسته‌ای _منهای راکتورِ تهران صرفا با کاربرد پزشکی) به طور یکجا توسط ایران امضا شود! ایران می‌گوید تمام فازهای پیشنهادی آمریکا برای راستی‌آزمایی به مدت ۳۰ روز انجام شود تا هم ایران نفت خود را بفروشد و هم‌مُجاب شود در بحث هسته‌ای مذاکره را انجام دهد! پی‌نوشت: ۱. اختلاف جدی بَر سَرِ مباحث هسته‌ای است؛ «۴۰۰ کیلو اورانیوم» خط قرمزِ دیکته‌ای اسرائیل برای آمریکاست! ایران ۴۰۰کیلو اورانیوم را نمی‌دهد، غنی‌سازی را هم حتما می‌خواهد و ۲۰ سال آن را تعلیق نمی‌کند. ایران با ارسال ۴۰۰ کیلو اورانیوم به کشور ثالث _چین و روسیه_ موافقت نکرده، آمریکا هم همینطور و خودش آن را می‌خواهد. نقطه‌ی جدی شکستِ توافق اینجاست. ایران مذاکره بر سر «پرونده‌ی هسته‌ای» را جُدای از «پرونده بازگشایی تنگه هرمز» و «اتمامِ جنگ» می‌داند! ۲. ایران و آمریکا سر فاز بندی توافق اختلاف دارند؛ ایران یکجا توافق نمی‌کند و آمریکا دنبالِ توافق یکجاست! ۳. آمریکا متعهد به متون و محورهای ارسالی نیست؛ محورهای ذکر شده با اینکه فاصله جدی با شروط ایران دارد ولی همین‌ها هم توسط آمریکا به مرحله اجرا در نمی‌آید! ۴. آمریکا تحریمی را لغو نمی‌کند؛ شاید تعلیقِ مدت‌دار در بهترین حالت، قسمتِ ایران در توافق شود. ۵. بر فرض توافق با آمریکا، هیچ تضمینی برای جلوگیری از ترور سطح بالا توسط اسرائیل نیست!

@JohnHol32019188 pathetic, I know, but my favourite comedy

Profound think tank exchanges International Energy Authority chief on the Strait of Hormuz crisis warns "we are entering the red zone". Chatham House director "What do you mean by the red zone?" IEA: "A zone that is red".