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Reflexer

@reflexerfinance

We built RAI, the first non-pegged, stable asset which is only backed by ETH 🗿 App: https://t.co/raiGXYGokV Discord: https://t.co/8Zi3EaJpVX

Katılım Eylül 2020
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Reflexer
Reflexer@reflexerfinance·
1/ “until this shit is in textbooks as a historical turning point for theory of central banking we are still early” RIP @delete_shitcoin To understand why we stand at the precipice of a central banking revolution, let us tell you story...
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vitalik.eth
vitalik.eth@VitalikButerin·
One thing that it is worth re-thinking is our perspective on when, and how, it makes sense to build "democratic things". This includes: * DAOs and voting mechanisms in DAOs * Quadratic and other funding gadgets * ZKpassport voting use cases, incl freedomtool type stuff, incl attempts to deploy it for local governance, etc * Voting systems inside social media * Attempts at "let's build and push for a brighter and freer political system for my country" Lately I am getting the feeling that there is less enthusiasm about these things than before. The "authoritarian wave" (a phenomenon that is often viewed as being about nation-state politics, but actually it stretches far beyond that, eg. see the phenomenon of companies lately becoming less "multi-stakeholder" and more founder-centric, and recent disillusionment with social media) is not just a matter of some malevolent strongmen smelling an opportunity to exert their will unopposed and seizing it. It's also a matter of genuine disillusionment with democratic things (of various types, not just nation-state, also corporate, nonprofit, social media). Defense of democratic things lately has the vibe of actually being conservatism: it's about fighting to preserve an existing order, and ward off hostile attempts to push the order toward a different order (or chaos) that favors a few people's interests at the expense of others, and not about appreciating positive benefits of the existing order. But conservatism is progressivism driving at the speed limit, and so if that's all that there is, it will inevitably lose, it will just take longer. There is an unfortunate irony to this, because it comes at the same time as we have much more powerful tools to build more effective democratic things: ZK, AI, much stronger cybersecurity, decades of research and experience. But to do so effectively we need to diagnose the present situation. I will break this down into a few parts. ## Stable era and chaotic era In the 00s and 10s, it was common to dream about things like: creating a global UBI, moving a country wholesale to a better political system like ranked-choice voting or quadratic voting, building a large-scale DAO that could eventually provide billions of dollars to global public goods that current systems miss (eg. open source software). Today, all of these dreams seem more unrealistic than ever. I see the main difference why as being that the 00s and 10s were a stable era, and the 20s are a chaotic era. In a stable era, more coordination is possible and imaginable, and so people naturally ask questions like "what would be a more perfect order?", and work towards it. In a chaotic era, the average intervention into the order is not a principled act of mechanism design, it's raw selfish power-grabbing, and so there is much less room to think about such questions. It's difficult to imagine eg. moving the United States to quadratic voting or ranked choice voting, when the country cannot even successfully ban gerrymandering. What do chaotic era democratic things look like? At a large scale, they do not look like hard binding mechanisms for making decisions. Rather, they look like tools for consensus-finding. They look like tools for identifying possible shifts to the order that would satisfy large cross-cutting groups of people, and presenting those possible shifts to change-making actors (yes, including centralized actors, even selfish actors), to make it clear to them that those particular shifts would be easier for them to accomplish, because they would have a lot of support and legitimacy. Pol.is style ideas are good here, anonymous voting is good, also perhaps assurance contract-style ideas: votes or statements that are anonymous at first, but that flip into being public (and hence publicly commit everyone at the same time) once they reach a certain threshold of support. This does not create a perfect order, but it gives highly distributed groups *a voice*. It gives actors with hard power something to listen to, and a credible claim that if they adjust their plans based on it, those plans are more likely to get widespread support and succeed. The Iran war is a good example here. My biggest fear in the ongoing situation has been that while the IRGC is unambiguously awful and murderous, there is an obvious divergence between US/Israel interests, and interests of Iranian common people: while both would be satisfied by a beautiful peaceful democratic Iran, the former would also be satisfied by the perhaps easier target of Iran becoming a low-threat low-capability wasteland, whereas for the latter that would be ruinous. How can Iranian people have a collective voice that carries hard power - not just in some future order that they create, but now, literally this week, while the situation is chaos? Some "sanctuary technology" is sanctuary money. Other times, it's sanctuary communication. But we need sanctuary tools for collective voice too.
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Reflexer
Reflexer@reflexerfinance·
Interesting 🗿
vitalik.eth@VitalikButerin

Now, account abstraction. We have been talking about account abstraction ever since early 2016, see the original EIP-86: github.com/ethereum/EIPs/… Now, we finally have EIP-8141 ( eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-8141 ), an omnibus that wraps up and solves every remaining problem that AA was intended to address (plus more). Let's talk again about what it does. The concept, "Frame Transactions", is about as simple as you can get while still being highly general purpose. A transaction is N calls, which can read each other's calldata, and which have the ability to authorize a sender and authorize a gas payer. At the protocol layer, *that's it*. Now, let's see how to use it. First, a "normal transaction from a normal account" (eg. a multisig, or an account with changeable keys, or with a quantum-resistant signature scheme). This would have two frames: * Validation (check the signature, and return using the ACCEPT opcode with flags set to signal approval of sender and of gas payment) * Execution You could have multiple execution frames, atomic operations (eg. approve then spend) become trivial now. If the account does not exist yet, then you prepend another frame, "Deployment", which calls a proxy to create the contract (EIP-7997 ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-7997-det… is good for this, as it would also let the contract address reliably be consistent across chains). Now, suppose you want to pay gas in RAI. You use a paymaster contract, which is a special-purpose onchain DEX that provides the ETH in real time. The tx frames are: * Deployment [if needed] * Validation (ACCEPT approves sender only, not gas payment) * Paymaster validation (paymaster checks that the immediate next op sends enough RAI to the paymaster and that the final op exists) * Send RAI to the paymaster * Execution [can be multiple] * Paymaster refunds unused RAI, and converts to ETH Basically the same thing that is done in existing sponsored transactions mechanisms, but with no intermediaries required (!!!!). Intermediary minimization is a core principle of non-ugly cypherpunk ethereum: maximize what you can do even if all the world's infrastructure except the ethereum chain itself goes down. Now, privacy protocols. Two strategies here. First, we can have a paymaster contract, which checks for a valid ZK-SNARK and pays for gas if it sees one. Second, we could add 2D nonces (see docs.erc4337.io/core-standards… ), which allow an individual account to function as a privacy protocol, and receive txs in parallel from many users. Basically, the mechanism is extremely flexible, and solves for all the use cases. But is it safe? At the onchain level, yes, obviously so: a tx is only valid to include if it contains a validation frame that returns ACCEPT with the flag to pay gas. The more challenging question is at the mempool level. If a tx contains a first frame which calls into 10000 accounts and rejects if any of them have different values, this cannot be broadcasted safely. But all of the examples above can. There is a similar notion here to "standard transactions" in bitcoin, where the chain itself only enforces a very limited set of rules, but there are more rules at the mempool layer. There are specific rulesets (eg. "validation frame must come before execution frames, and cannot call out to outside contracts") that are known to be safe, but are limited. For paymasters, there has been deep thought about a staking mechanism to limit DoS attacks in a very general-purpose way. Realistically, when 8141 is rolled out, the mempool rules will be very conservative, and there will be a second optional more aggressive mempool. The former will expand over time. For privacy protocol users, this means that we can completely remove "public broadcasters" that are the source of massive UX pain in railgun/PP/TC, and replace them with a general-purpose public mempool. For quantum-resistant signatures, we also have to solve one more problem: efficiency. Here's are posts about the ideas we have for that: firefly.social/post/lens/1gfe… firefly.social/post/x/2027405… AA is also highly complementary with FOCIL: FOCIL ensures rapid inclusion guarantees for transactions, and AA ensures that all of the more complex operations people want to make actually can be made directly as first-class transactions. Another interesting topic is EOA compatibility in 8141. This is being discussed, in principle it is possible, so all accounts incl existing ones can be put into the same framework and gain the ability to do batch operations, transaction sponsorship, etc, all as first-class transactions that fully benefit from FOCIL. Finally, after over a decade of research and refinement of these techniques, this all looks possible to make happen within a year (Hegota fork). firefly.social/post/bsky/qmaj…

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namic
namic@daonamic·
Real-time simulation as a living control layer One useful way to understand agents inside Money League is to view them as continuous, real-time simulation engines operating in the open. Instead of running models once before launch and freezing controller parameters forever, agents are constantly ingesting live system data, modeling possible future states, and expressing those expectations through prediction markets. Liquidity shifts, volatility spikes, collateral stress, user flows, and peg dynamics are all being simulated in parallel, all the time, by competing intelligence with capital at risk. Prediction markets aggregate the results of these ongoing simulations into clear, economically weighted forecasts. Controllers then read those forecasts and update their operating modes within safe, bounded limits. The loop becomes: Agents simulate the future -> markets price the most likely outcomes -> controllers adapt before instability arrives. This creates a proactive, highly adaptive stability system, fundamentally different from prior designs where simulations happened only during research and audits, followed by static parameter deployment. That shift from pre-launch simulation to perpetual onchain simulation is what allows stability itself to evolve.
namic@daonamic

x.com/i/article/2023…

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namic
namic@daonamic·
This is exactly the gap @0xMoneyLeague is trying to close. It makes ETH-backed and overcollateralized controlled-peg stables cheap to launch, iterate on, and run in parallel, with real redemption paths and bounded governance. Instead of one design trying to be everything, you get many systems with different assumptions, all forced to earn trust in the market. That’s how DeFi moves past “USDC yield” without repeating death spirals. And how Ethereum moves towards a standardized non-fiat UoA.
vitalik.eth@VitalikButerin

> inb4 "muh USDC yield", that's not DeFi Would algorithmic stablecoins fall under this? IMO no (ie. algorithmic stablecoins are genuine defi) Easy mode answer: if we had a good ETH-backed algorithmic stablecoin, then *even if* 99% of the liquidity is backed by CDP holders who hold negative algo-dollars and separately positive dollars elsewhere, the fact that you have the ability to punt the counterparty risk on the dollars to a market maker is still a big feature. Hard mode answer: even if an algorithmic stablecoin is backed by RWAs, if it is overcollateralized and diversified to the extent that it would still be collateralized if any single RWA failed (ie. max share of any individual backing asset <= overcollateralization ratio), then that's also still a meaningful improvement to the risk properties experienced by a holder. I feel like that sort of thing (ideally the former, failing that the latter) is what we should be aiming more towards. And then from there, move away from the dollar as the UoA, and toward some kind of more generalized diverse index. Though of course, current "put USDC into Aave" gadgets do not qualify under either of my categories.

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HAI 🌥️
HAI 🌥️@letsgethai·
Time to fly HAI ✈️ Introducing haiAERO, HAI’s debut on @base and the @AerodromeFi ecosystem. veAERO yield 🤝 decentralized stablecoin 🤝 seamless crosschain UX Let us take you HAI'er 🧵👇
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