

Reflexer
1.9K posts

@reflexerfinance
We built RAI, the first non-pegged, stable asset which is only backed by ETH 🗿 App: https://t.co/raiGXYGokV Discord: https://t.co/8Zi3EaJpVX



🎤 This Thursday on DeFi Roots Hosted by @RachelOnchain from @Onchainmedia, joined by Azos founders @0xJoshua and @c0mput3rxz featuring @rezajafery and @daonamic from @letsgethai and @0xMoneyLeague! Builders sharing perspectives, ideas, and what they're seeing across the ecosystem. Set your reminders 👇x.com/i/spaces/1qGvv…


Now, account abstraction. We have been talking about account abstraction ever since early 2016, see the original EIP-86: github.com/ethereum/EIPs/… Now, we finally have EIP-8141 ( eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-8141 ), an omnibus that wraps up and solves every remaining problem that AA was intended to address (plus more). Let's talk again about what it does. The concept, "Frame Transactions", is about as simple as you can get while still being highly general purpose. A transaction is N calls, which can read each other's calldata, and which have the ability to authorize a sender and authorize a gas payer. At the protocol layer, *that's it*. Now, let's see how to use it. First, a "normal transaction from a normal account" (eg. a multisig, or an account with changeable keys, or with a quantum-resistant signature scheme). This would have two frames: * Validation (check the signature, and return using the ACCEPT opcode with flags set to signal approval of sender and of gas payment) * Execution You could have multiple execution frames, atomic operations (eg. approve then spend) become trivial now. If the account does not exist yet, then you prepend another frame, "Deployment", which calls a proxy to create the contract (EIP-7997 ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-7997-det… is good for this, as it would also let the contract address reliably be consistent across chains). Now, suppose you want to pay gas in RAI. You use a paymaster contract, which is a special-purpose onchain DEX that provides the ETH in real time. The tx frames are: * Deployment [if needed] * Validation (ACCEPT approves sender only, not gas payment) * Paymaster validation (paymaster checks that the immediate next op sends enough RAI to the paymaster and that the final op exists) * Send RAI to the paymaster * Execution [can be multiple] * Paymaster refunds unused RAI, and converts to ETH Basically the same thing that is done in existing sponsored transactions mechanisms, but with no intermediaries required (!!!!). Intermediary minimization is a core principle of non-ugly cypherpunk ethereum: maximize what you can do even if all the world's infrastructure except the ethereum chain itself goes down. Now, privacy protocols. Two strategies here. First, we can have a paymaster contract, which checks for a valid ZK-SNARK and pays for gas if it sees one. Second, we could add 2D nonces (see docs.erc4337.io/core-standards… ), which allow an individual account to function as a privacy protocol, and receive txs in parallel from many users. Basically, the mechanism is extremely flexible, and solves for all the use cases. But is it safe? At the onchain level, yes, obviously so: a tx is only valid to include if it contains a validation frame that returns ACCEPT with the flag to pay gas. The more challenging question is at the mempool level. If a tx contains a first frame which calls into 10000 accounts and rejects if any of them have different values, this cannot be broadcasted safely. But all of the examples above can. There is a similar notion here to "standard transactions" in bitcoin, where the chain itself only enforces a very limited set of rules, but there are more rules at the mempool layer. There are specific rulesets (eg. "validation frame must come before execution frames, and cannot call out to outside contracts") that are known to be safe, but are limited. For paymasters, there has been deep thought about a staking mechanism to limit DoS attacks in a very general-purpose way. Realistically, when 8141 is rolled out, the mempool rules will be very conservative, and there will be a second optional more aggressive mempool. The former will expand over time. For privacy protocol users, this means that we can completely remove "public broadcasters" that are the source of massive UX pain in railgun/PP/TC, and replace them with a general-purpose public mempool. For quantum-resistant signatures, we also have to solve one more problem: efficiency. Here's are posts about the ideas we have for that: firefly.social/post/lens/1gfe… firefly.social/post/x/2027405… AA is also highly complementary with FOCIL: FOCIL ensures rapid inclusion guarantees for transactions, and AA ensures that all of the more complex operations people want to make actually can be made directly as first-class transactions. Another interesting topic is EOA compatibility in 8141. This is being discussed, in principle it is possible, so all accounts incl existing ones can be put into the same framework and gain the ability to do batch operations, transaction sponsorship, etc, all as first-class transactions that fully benefit from FOCIL. Finally, after over a decade of research and refinement of these techniques, this all looks possible to make happen within a year (Hegota fork). firefly.social/post/bsky/qmaj…



Who's ready for DeFi United? A space to connect with the people building what’s next in DeFi with a heavy emphasis on decentralized stables Hosted by @0xMoneyLeague, @Letsgethai @DefiMaseer, @thetreegens, and @Onchainmedia luma.com/1x6tllqh?tk=Dt…



RAI was as far from corposlop as possible. I still think we need to find a maximally good way of solving the problem of such ETH-backed algo stables competing with ETH staking demand, and also improve robustness on the oracle side. As for issuer-backed ones, I remember seeing some of them do some pretty clever legal engineering to make sure freezing anyone's funds requires multiple parties to agree. So you can definitely do better than status quo.

🌎 DeFi United is almost here! A space to connect with the people building what’s next in DeFi. Hosted by @AzosFinance, @DefiMaseer, @reflexerfinance, @thetreegens, and @Onchainmedia. If you’re at @EthereumDenver, check it out, spots are limited! 👇 luma.com/1x6tllqh?tk=Dt…


> inb4 "muh USDC yield", that's not DeFi Would algorithmic stablecoins fall under this? IMO no (ie. algorithmic stablecoins are genuine defi) Easy mode answer: if we had a good ETH-backed algorithmic stablecoin, then *even if* 99% of the liquidity is backed by CDP holders who hold negative algo-dollars and separately positive dollars elsewhere, the fact that you have the ability to punt the counterparty risk on the dollars to a market maker is still a big feature. Hard mode answer: even if an algorithmic stablecoin is backed by RWAs, if it is overcollateralized and diversified to the extent that it would still be collateralized if any single RWA failed (ie. max share of any individual backing asset <= overcollateralization ratio), then that's also still a meaningful improvement to the risk properties experienced by a holder. I feel like that sort of thing (ideally the former, failing that the latter) is what we should be aiming more towards. And then from there, move away from the dollar as the UoA, and toward some kind of more generalized diverse index. Though of course, current "put USDC into Aave" gadgets do not qualify under either of my categories.




One of the biggest reasons why it's hard to experiment in crypto is security audits and their costs. I've spoken to more than 10 teams in the last month who are all currently ready to launch on mainnet, but are held back by audits and their insane cost. A basic audit can cost up to 50k for a small codebase, which makes it hard for bootstrapped projects to launch and explore if they should even be spending their time on this. The industry did a terrible job of overpricing security audits and it has strongly held the space back.

> inb4 "muh USDC yield", that's not DeFi Would algorithmic stablecoins fall under this? IMO no (ie. algorithmic stablecoins are genuine defi) Easy mode answer: if we had a good ETH-backed algorithmic stablecoin, then *even if* 99% of the liquidity is backed by CDP holders who hold negative algo-dollars and separately positive dollars elsewhere, the fact that you have the ability to punt the counterparty risk on the dollars to a market maker is still a big feature. Hard mode answer: even if an algorithmic stablecoin is backed by RWAs, if it is overcollateralized and diversified to the extent that it would still be collateralized if any single RWA failed (ie. max share of any individual backing asset <= overcollateralization ratio), then that's also still a meaningful improvement to the risk properties experienced by a holder. I feel like that sort of thing (ideally the former, failing that the latter) is what we should be aiming more towards. And then from there, move away from the dollar as the UoA, and toward some kind of more generalized diverse index. Though of course, current "put USDC into Aave" gadgets do not qualify under either of my categories.
