Rida Lyammouri

#Sahel: In this paper I raised with @NiccolaMilnes concerns about new security challenge: #JNIM use of modified drones. This is a serious threat to #Mali, #Niger, #BurkinaFaso, #Benin, #Togo. Also a threat to #Nigeria, & #Cameroon as #ISWAP looking to adopt same tactic.

SO GLAD YOU DID DECLINE. Alhamdoulillah 🤲🏼

@Cn_Bone Double Check the coordinates for Tabankort and Tera.

West Africa's high-intensity summer: what actually happened in July -AITD~ Since April, security conditions across the Sahel-to-Gulf-of-Guinea corridor haven't really let up, and July continued that pattern rather than breaking it. Three fronts moved in parallel this month: Mali's north, Nigeria's northeast and northwest, and western Niger. None of these are new stories exactly, but each hit a notable inflection point in July. MALI: THE ANÉFIS SIEGE On July 4, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and JNIM launched a coordinated, multi-front offensive: Gao, Aguelhok and Anéfis in the north, several towns in central Mali, and a prison near Bamako, all struck the same day. The Malian army and its Russian Africa Corps partners say they held Gao and Aguelhok. Anéfis was the heaviest fight — insurgents brought at least one BTR-80 armored vehicle, artillery and drones, and took outlying positions around the town. What followed was a six-day siege. On July 5, a relief convoy heading north from Gao came under attack, and a Mi-24 helicopter went down near Tabrichat, southwest of Anéfis. The army claims 54 airstrikes over July 6-8 killed more than 300 fighters, a figure that comes only from the military itself and hasn't been corroborated independently. Russian-aligned outlets put the insurgent force at 5,000 fighters and over a thousand vehicles — numbers that look inflated and shouldn't be repeated as fact. On July 10, the army announced it had retaken Anéfis. Two days later, army chief of staff General Jean Elysée Dao gave the actual cost of that operation on state television: roughly 30 soldiers killed, 60 wounded. That's a different number from the "300 killed" claim above — one is a body count the army says it inflicted on the enemy, the other is the army admitting its own losses in retaking the town. Analysts, including ACLED's Héni Nsaibia, called it one of the longest sustained conventional engagements in Mali since the 2012 rebellion, and read it as a test of whether the JNIM-FLA alliance can follow up on capturing Kidal back in April. It wasn't over there. On July 18-19, a convoy withdrawing from Anéfis toward Gao was ambushed near Tabankort. Local officials described casualties as widespread; FLA released footage claiming to show dozens of captured Malian soldiers. So the actual sequence is siege, recapture, and then a second mauling on the way out — not the clean resolution the July 10 announcement implied. NIGERIA: THREE DIFFERENT FIGHTS UNDER ONE FLAG In the northeast, ISWAP has been probing harder since the bulk of US forces left Nigeria on July 3. On July 1 it hit a humanitarian convoy with a remote-detonated IED and separately raided a community in Biu. On July 10, fighters tried to push into the edges of Maiduguri itself, through Muna Garage, Shuwari and Ajilari Cross, before being repelled in the early hours. A similar push into Kukawa on July 11 ended with the army claiming a major kill count and, notably, alleging "external involvement" — a claim that's entirely the military's own and unverified. Mid-month, an ISWAP raid on a forward base at Logomani killed one soldier and burned a police post, a health center and two classrooms. On July 23 the military struck back, hitting a suspected ISWAP hideout near Lake Chad after intelligence reported around fifty motorcycles massing there. On July 31, a mass-kidnapping attempt on the Buratai-Kamuya road was foiled after CCTV picked up suspicious movement in time. The northwest is a messier problem: banditry that's increasingly hard to separate from jihadist networks. Sokoto state has just had its worst year of violence on record, with the forests along the Sokoto-Zamfara corridor functioning as a highway for fighters and stolen livestock alike. "Lakurawa" is really a catch-all label for Sahel-linked groups operating there, and the line between bandit and ideologue keeps blurring. There are reports JNIM lent roughly a hundred fighters to Lakurawa-aligned groups pushing toward Kwara state earlier this year. That Kwara spillover is worth watching on its own. On July 30, security forces freed nine kidnap victims and killed three gunmen in Kwara's Ekiti local government area — victims who had been taken from the Eju community and were being moved north toward Niger state when the convoy was intercepted. It's a small incident, but it traces a corridor that didn't used to carry this kind of traffic. NIGER: A CONTEST AND A COALITION Western Niger remains the most contested ground in the region. On July 17, a Nigerien army unit was ambushed near Doungourou village, on the Bankilaré-Téra axis. The defense ministry's own count, released two days later, was 16 soldiers killed and 23 wounded; independent reporting suggests the real toll was higher, though no verified figure exists. Regional counterterrorism data shows attacks and casualties in Niger have roughly tripled year over year, with ISSP and ISGS the most active groups and Tillabéri, Tahoua and Dosso bearing the brunt. JNIM and ISSP are effectively competing for the same ground here. Less covered, and arguably more interesting, is what's happening on the other side of the country. A cluster of politico-military movements opposed to the 2023 coup — the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL), the Patriotic Justice Front (FPJ) and the Patriotic Movement for Liberty and Justice (MPLJ) — have been consolidating. On June 28, the latter two signed a coalition agreement at Djado. On July 25, just ahead of the third anniversary of the coup, FPL fighters gathered roughly a hundred strong with eighteen pickup trucks at Ahahi, near the Libya-Chad-Niger tripoint, and its leader, recently released after being held by forces loyal to Haftar in Libya, publicly vowed to continue the fight. These groups aren't jihadists. They want Mohamed Bazoum reinstated and the junta gone. But MPLJ in particular has settled on a specific tactic: repeatedly striking the oil pipeline running from the Agadem fields to Benin, the junta's main source of hard currency, with attacks recorded in December and February. It's a genuinely different kind of threat from the jihadist violence elsewhere in the region — targeted and political, aimed at the government's finances rather than at territory or civilians. Put together, July didn't produce a single new crisis so much as confirm that three separate conflicts are all running hot at once: a conventional-style war in northern Mali, a hybrid jihadist-criminal complex spanning northern Nigeria, and a two-front struggle in Niger between jihadists and coup opponents. And there's growing evidence that violence in one corridor is starting to bleed into the next.

😂 says a migrant herself 🤦🏻‍♂️🤦🏻‍♂️🤦🏻‍♂️🤦🏻‍♂️

الرئيس دونالد ترامب: الولايات المتحدة كانت واضحة في موقفها: نحن نعترف بالسيادة المغربية على الصحراء الغربية، وندعم مقترح الحكم الذاتي المغربي الجاد وذي المصداقية والواقعي باعتباره الأساس الوحيد للتوصل إلى حل عادل ودائم. وأي مسار آخر لن يؤدي إلا إلى إطالة أمد الوضع القائم، وهو أمر غير مقبول. إن هذا الحل الذي تشتد الحاجة إليه لن يجلب السلام إلى المنطقة فحسب، بل سيفتح أيضًا آفاقًا أوسع للازدهار والتكامل في جميع أنحاء القارة الإفريقية. ويجب أن ينتهي هذا النزاع الآن، وستواصل الولايات المتحدة دفع الجهود الرامية إلى تحقيق هذا الهدف. رسالة الرئيس ترامب لجلالة الملك محمد السادس بمناسبة عيد العرش: ma.usembassy.gov/message-from-p…

✨ Today, we were pleased to welcome a senior British defence and diplomatic delegation, led by Vice Admiral Edward Ahlgren, the United Kingdom’s Defence Senior Adviser for the Middle East and North Africa (DSAME), for a strategic discussion at the Policy Center for the New South. 🗣️ Under the theme “Morocco and the Evolving Geography of Regional Security,” the exchange explored how shifting geopolitical and security dynamics are reshaping Morocco’s regional environment, from the Atlantic and the Sahel to North Africa and the wider Middle East, as well as the implications for regional cooperation, stability, and resilience. 🤝 We thank all participants for their valuable contributions. @UKinMorocco

@icembrero Who are you again?

Donald Trump anunció el domingo a bombo y platillo que la carretera de 1.055 kilómetros de Tiznit a Dajla (Sáhara Occidental) había sido bautizada con su nombre por el rey Mohamed VI de #Marruecos. Este lunes la Casa Real marroquí ni el Ministerio de Infraestructuras han confirmado ese anuncio. ¿Significa que Trump fue de farol? No. Significa que Marruecos es un país opaco cuyas autoridades no informan a su pueblo de muchas de sus decisiones. @realDonaldTrump/posts/116986582428363613" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTru…

When naming a highway bothers someone, it says a lot about the one bothered 😆, not the other way around!

RT @PolicyCenterNS: "Cet article évalue la pertinence du paradigme de la réconciliation pour analyser la rivalité maroco-algérienne. À par…

@TalebSahara What’s your point?

Me llega este vídeo de esta misma tarde desde la entrada norte de la ciudad saharaui ocupada El Aaiún. Marruecos moviliza decenas de vehículos y material militar al Sáhara ocupado.

#Morocco continues to take actions rather than just doing the talking. Others still dreaming of something called “trans-Saharan” highway!!!

The President Donald J. Trump Highway stands as a powerful monument to the visionary leadership of His Majesty King Mohammed VI - a true partner for peace. The United States, under President Donald J. Trump, maintains an enduring resolve to stand with Morocco for a Moroccan Sahara defined by peace, regional stability, and prosperity for generations to come. @realDonaldTrump/posts/116986582428363613" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTru…

#Mali: #Morocco continues to be probably the only country offering Mali practical solutions other than security. The rest keeps being fascinated by #JNIM #FLA & wondering if Bamako would fall! #Sahel lematin.ma/activites-roya…

Très Hautes Instructions de S.M. le Roi pour la remise aux autorités maliennes du Complexe Mohammed VI de Formation Professionnelle lematin.ma/article/42033

🤦🏻‍♂️🤦🏻‍♂️🤦🏻‍♂️🤦🏻‍♂️🤦🏻‍♂️ suddenly we care about our tax money, just because it’s #Morocco 😆

#Morocco: Amazes me how someone so-called #Algeria expert (white American, not even Algerian) only shitposts about Morocco 😂

How is the rapid evolution of armed-group #drone capabilities challenging existing security and counter-drone measures in the #Sahel and Lake Chad Basin? @rmaghrebi @NiccolaMilnes policycenter.ma/publications/a…

Morocco🇲🇦 is attracting global investment through its expanding automotive, aerospace, renewable energy, and manufacturing sectors. The European Parliament approved Croatia's🇭🇷 inclusion in the EU🇪🇺–Morocco🇲🇦 Open Skies Agreement, offering Moroccan and European airlines non-discriminatory access to routes. The protocol enhances Morocco's🇲🇦 aviation connectivity and simplifies regulatory frameworks, potentially boosting new routes but not mandating them. The move aligns with Morocco's🇲🇦 increased transport and tourism investments ahead of co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup with Spain🇪🇸 and Portugal🇵🇹.

Portugal and Morocco will ask the European Commission to consider a long-mooted power interconnector between the two countries as a candidate for EU funding, they said on Monday, while also exploring private-sector investment. reuters.com/business/energ…

Context 😂

#Morocco #Nigeria #ECOWAS