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15.4K posts

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@ryanberckmans
Ethereum community member and ETH investor






what bothers me about Arbitrum funds confiscation is not that it was done (it had to be done under the circumstances), but that the circumstances enabling it--9 people controlling all money on a blockhain--are terrible and unsustainable, as well as being fundamentally uninteresting & not-useful from a financial systems and social evolution point of view the defenses I've heard as to why this is suddenly entirely compatible with and still counts "DeFi" and "decentralized" and "autonomous" and "a DAO" (and thus maybe even should be a permanent feature or at least not one we're in a hurry to sunset) are: (1) the DAO voted for these people & could remove them, and thus whatever they do counts as "decentralized" (2) the fact that these people have control of all money on Arbitrum by being able to do an upgrade at any time is permitted by the code, thus anything they do with that power is "code is law" there are a bunch of reasons why these arguments are dubious (for example, if the Security Council can simply remove all onchain powers of the DAO via an upgrade, thus the DAO is actually accountable to the Security Council rather than the other way around), but I thought a more principled reasoning would be good rather than taking potshots, so I revised the article to explain why, despite superficial appearances to the contrary, this confiscation action violates the three laws of DAObotics explained by Stan Larimer in the first article on DAOs (initially called DACs by him until Vitalik broadened the concept) I would love to see crypto people going back to building systems that are orders of magnitude better than (or at least different from) existing financial services, which means we trust code, algorithms and systems, and embed them with strong *intrinsic* due process protections, rather than deferring to small groups of elitist humans who think they are the best arbiters of justice and morality, as is done in tradfi (but worse, as at least there are some rules and accountability for these people in tradfi--in crypto there are nearly none) x.com/lex_node/statu…




imo L2 Aave ETH lenders taking a concentrated loss would be among the ugliest, nastiest outcomes in our history. you're talking about kneecapping the life savings of our brothers in eth whose only crime was not being rich enough to use L1 Aave






The Arbitrum Security Council has taken emergency action to freeze the 30,766 ETH being held in the address on Arbitrum One that is connected to the KelpDAO exploit. The Security Council acted with input from law enforcement as to the exploiter’s identity, and, at all times, weighed its commitment to the security and integrity of the Arbitrum community without impacting any Arbitrum users or applications. After significant technical diligence and deliberation, the Security Council identified and executed a technical approach to move funds to safety without affecting any other chain state or Arbitrum users. As of April 20 11:26pm ET the funds have been successfully transferred to an intermediary frozen wallet. They are no longer accessible to the address that originally held the funds, and can only be moved by further action by Arbitrum governance, which will be coordinated with relevant parties.

Thanks for your responses! I'm generally in favor of an issuance change that satisfies all of these criteria, and I think others would be, too: - We are extremely certain it will be the last issuance change ever needed. A permanent solution. - We've successfully built broad social consensus around the change, it's not controversial, except perhaps with groups like Lido where they directly lose money from the change. - We moved at an appropriately glacial pace to have many independent researchers analyze the solution and drive confidence it will be a healthy permanent solution, and give lots of time for the community to socialize and prepare for the issuance change. I see 1559 as a success story here where the spec was nailed down year(s) (??) before mainnet activation and that gave a lot of time for healthy discourse and formation of common knowledge. The Roughgarden paper was particularly excellent as a coordination point. - Obviously, the issuance change must be expected to meaningfully reduce issuance. Given these criteria, I strongly agree that doing the change sooner than later is much better for the long-term political and institutional stability of ethereum. So I see the tension between doing this as soon as possible vs. the criterion to move at a glacial pace. Perhaps a useful rule of thumb here may be that the spec for the issuance change can be nailed down at least one hard fork before it ends up being deployed. Personally, I think Pectra will launch in perhaps Q2/3 2025. Maybe we could finalize the spec for an issuance change by Q2 2025, and then seek to include it in the next hard fork after Pectra or even the one after that.








