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@ryanberckmans

Ethereum community member and ETH investor

Ethereum Katılım Nisan 2012
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@ryanberckmans·
For any person in the world, the goods & services accessible by them are determined by the extent of their trade network. A larger trade network increases capacity for specialization, resulting in new goods & services and making existing goods & services better and cheaper. The size of a person's trade network depends on the total friction of their individual circumstances. Economists refer to this friction as "aggregate transaction costs". They use a much wider definition of "transaction cost" than, for example, a gas fee. Any kind of added friction cost whatsoever reduces the size of a person's trade network, and that reduces the quality, affordability, and variety of their available goods & services. Costs of all kinds play a role in determining the extent of a person's trade network: Does the person live in a city or on a farm? Is their city separated from neighboring cities by a mountain range or a flat highway? What regulations or taxes exist to restrict or enable commerce? Are there any wars, famine, natural disasters, or other circumstances? Does their country have good physical infrastructure? All types of costs and friction play a role. How does a person's trade network move information? Do they rely on wagon loads of clay tablets hauled by oxen to move information, as was done in some ancient civilizations? Do they use morse code telegraph lines? Or, do they have digital information transfer, ie. the internet? Is the same information transfer technology available everywhere in their trade network? How does their trade network move goods? Do they haul wagons of wheat on dirt-packed roads? Or, do they have a modern network of vehicles and highways, of ships and shipping lanes? What loss of goods occurs during transit? To disasters? To theft? Perishable? What technologies and systems work to prevent these losses? Political systems? Security cameras and national ID databases? Is the level of risk similar throughout the trade network, or are some parts safer than others? How does a person's trade network move money? Do they pass around IOUs by messengers on horseback? Do they pass around digital IOUs in a rigid banking federation based on privilege and relationships (web2 finance)? Or, do they have a global internet financial system that's an open access level playing field and lets you "hand cash" to anyone in the world (web3)? Jason asks, "How does web3 improve economic output?" The answer is that economic output depends on the quality, affordability, and variety of goods & services available to each person, and this depends on that person's unique vantage point into the global trade network, and that depends on each person's trade network's aggregate transaction costs, and these transactions costs are greatly reduced by web3. Web3 - reduces information transfer transaction costs (secure open data for prices, markets, etc) - reduces money transfer transaction costs (bearer ownership, instant settlement, etc) - decentralization reduces risk which further reduces transaction costs. Example: erc20 transfer on BSC vs Eth L1, both are the same token transfer, but the one on Eth has much lower risk because BSC is centralized. That lower risk is a type of transaction cost reduction. - public chains are global and open-access, so these beneficial reductions in transaction costs can apply to everyone in the world's unique vantage point into the global trade network. Web3 helps everyone, not just people in wealthy countries. Every major benefit of web3 tends to reduce transaction costs: ERC standards, public composability, trustless bridging among L2s, censorship resistance, strong property rights, open innovation, etc. In short, web3 increases economic output by reducing friction costs that limit the extent of the global trade network and therefore growing the quality, affordability, and variety of goods & services available to everyone in the world.
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L2BEAT 💗
L2BEAT 💗@l2beat·
We are excited to announce that @solana is now live on the L2BEAT Interoperability Dashboard. Volume, token diversity, and protocol breakdown are now available for the ecosystem.
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@ryanberckmans·
Interop market share of eth L2 rollups that buy blobs: 46.1% 🤯 Suspect this has been rising over time. Will be great to watch as L2 hypergrowth continues. l2beat.com/interop/summary
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@ryanberckmans·
Ethereum interop dominance: 85% 🔥🚀 Yesterday, 85% of bridge volume tracked on L2Beat used eth L1 as the transfer source or destination. LFG
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@ryanberckmans·
@lex_node Base at stage 2 while Arb embraces 7-day withdrawals and security councils that can reverse hacks during those windows... was not on my bingo card. There's legit value in a 7-day hack prevention window, it's a valid virtuous strategy. Love both teams and their commitment to eth
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_gabrielShapir0
_gabrielShapir0@lex_node·
@ryanberckmans I would be shocked if they go to stage 2. watch my debate with griff. he seems in no hurry and believes ARB will pump now that they have shown centralized hack protection
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@ryanberckmans·
In a way, it was brave of the Arb security council to seize the stolen funds despite knowing it would weigh heavily on both the public perception and true reality of Arb's competitive position as "the most decentralized L2". Saying this as a huge fan of Arb. Arb may be stage 1 and pass the walkaway test, but once "you" use such a power to seize funds, it opens the barn doors on "control as liability" (as Vitalik once put it). Folks will endlessly pressure "Arb" to use the power of seizure again. I put "you" and "Arb" in quotes because it's difficult for the public, users, and other stakeholders to digest the credibly realized separation of authority between Arb DAO, Offchain Labs, and the security council. It's a multifaceted problem with at least political, gov, legal, and marketing implications. It wouldn't surprise me if having a security council with the power for seizures and arbitrary state transitions ends up being a temporary and dying practice in industry. The schelling models are probably either stage 2, or giving the operators a multisig and letting them handle it privately. In for a penny, in for a pound. Nobody asks Circle or Tether for their "security council information". Nothing wrong with this at all. Centralized models of all varieties have plenty of opportunities and play an important role in growing Ethereum. Investing in upgrading security council optics/gov is probably not the long term way forward for Arb. Clearly Arb has no inherent interest in being a "happily centralized L2". Likely the only way out of this tricky situation is to go forwards to Stage 2 and relinquishing the power to seize. Especially now that Base has announced plans to go stage 2 via multiproofs.
_gabrielShapir0@lex_node

what bothers me about Arbitrum funds confiscation is not that it was done (it had to be done under the circumstances), but that the circumstances enabling it--9 people controlling all money on a blockhain--are terrible and unsustainable, as well as being fundamentally uninteresting & not-useful from a financial systems and social evolution point of view the defenses I've heard as to why this is suddenly entirely compatible with and still counts "DeFi" and "decentralized" and "autonomous" and "a DAO" (and thus maybe even should be a permanent feature or at least not one we're in a hurry to sunset) are: (1) the DAO voted for these people & could remove them, and thus whatever they do counts as "decentralized" (2) the fact that these people have control of all money on Arbitrum by being able to do an upgrade at any time is permitted by the code, thus anything they do with that power is "code is law" there are a bunch of reasons why these arguments are dubious (for example, if the Security Council can simply remove all onchain powers of the DAO via an upgrade, thus the DAO is actually accountable to the Security Council rather than the other way around), but I thought a more principled reasoning would be good rather than taking potshots, so I revised the article to explain why, despite superficial appearances to the contrary, this confiscation action violates the three laws of DAObotics explained by Stan Larimer in the first article on DAOs (initially called DACs by him until Vitalik broadened the concept) I would love to see crypto people going back to building systems that are orders of magnitude better than (or at least different from) existing financial services, which means we trust code, algorithms and systems, and embed them with strong *intrinsic* due process protections, rather than deferring to small groups of elitist humans who think they are the best arbiters of justice and morality, as is done in tradfi (but worse, as at least there are some rules and accountability for these people in tradfi--in crypto there are nearly none) x.com/lex_node/statu…

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Pedro Gomes
Pedro Gomes@pedrouid·
EIP-8141 is really powerful as is but we still need more eyes to get it over the finish line Learn more about it eip8141.io and share it around! Its a fundamental change for a better Ethereum 💎
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@ryanberckmans·
> This isn't about whether Kelp socializes or not. @ryanberckmans was engaging with the idea that, were there to be a bad debt scenario, AAVE ought to socialize its own bad debt between its L2 and L1 depositors Correct. I'm with you that L2 is riskier and L2 users must shoulder that risk and its potential consequences. However, for L2 Aave ETH lenders, this had almost nothing to do with "L2 risk" and everything to do with Aave's negligent onboarding of rsETH collateral on both L1 and L2, with negligently high LTVs and low max borrow rates. I'm not making an "L2 argument". I'm making an Aave argument. I would feel the same if the Aave instances with greatest potential bad debt were on alt L1s.
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tim-clancy.eth
tim-clancy.eth@_Enoch·
This isn't about whether Kelp socializes or not. @ryanberckmans was engaging with the idea that, were there to be a bad debt scenario, AAVE ought to socialize its own bad debt between its L2 and L1 depositors. I don't even know if this is possible or not; I don't use AAVE. I'm just rejecting that idea on principle.
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tim-clancy.eth
tim-clancy.eth@_Enoch·
Absolutely not. To sustained disappointment, not a single major Ethereum L2s is properly trustless. It has always been, and continues to be, a risk to use these trustful L2s. There are many users who stay exclusively on L1 because of exactly this risk. Were AAVE to socialize L2 losses to L1 users, it opens a much larger can of worms where any trust-conscious L1 user needs to reject DeFi which is otherwise trustless from an L1 perspective.
@ryanberckmans

imo L2 Aave ETH lenders taking a concentrated loss would be among the ugliest, nastiest outcomes in our history. you're talking about kneecapping the life savings of our brothers in eth whose only crime was not being rich enough to use L1 Aave

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@ryanberckmans·
Transparent opt-in centralization for L2s/rollups/apps/tokens is virtuous and extremely bullish for ETH. Eth will be 1000x larger specifically because users are free to choose, and because our L2 and tokenization ERCs/SDKs are great for institutions to meet their needs and prefs
@ryanberckmans

Transparent opt-in centralization on eth is virtuous and extremely bullish for ETH The rage that this previous sentence evokes in some of our friends, and gleeful smirks in many of our opponents, shows how early we are to widespread understanding of the inevitable realities of onchain and eth growing to global ubiquity. Some rollups with security councils only have them because the tech is immature. Yet, many other rollups have security councils because they *want* security councils. The full implications of this are slept on by both "L2s are multisigs" people and decentralization maxis. There will be countless different kinds of L2s/rollups... as well as many different "kinds of kinds" aka dimensions of differentiation. Looking at things from a tech point of view has clearly been the key driver in ethereum throughout our history. Yet, as we are now actively growing to global ubiquity and colliding with the real world, tech is no longer the primary determinant in which L2s/rollups/apps/tokens will emerge, succeed, and fail. In the real world, political, economic, and business model lenses are dominant. Look at security councils. Notice the potential diversity in reasons for their adoption: Some rollups see their own security council as training wheels until the tech is ready. Some rollups believe that a reduction user freedom is justified by the increase in operational safety provided by a security council, and always will be, regardless of tech improvements. Security councils and many flavors of centralization will forever remain a huge feature for many rollups, apps, protocols, and tokens. Understanding why this is the case, and why it's *fantastic*, *virtuous*, and *inevitable*, is key to understanding why Ethereum is going to get so huge and why ETH is going to get so valuable. Centralization is often a valuable feature, whether it's a security council, enshrined stablecoin, or reversible transaction zone with withdrawal delays. Centralization is autocracy. Autocracy in all its shades is a big part of life. Is ethereum here to "solve autocracy"? Some think so. But in many cases, being subject to some kind of autocracy is a voluntary choice made by users. Corporations are autocracies, are they all evil? When we use commercial air travel, we all agree to reductions in freedom. Does that make flying evil or "training wheels"? Many user segments *want* autocratic controls. Are they all wrong? Lots of OG whales leave most of their net worths in CEX or ETFs just because they want custodians to decide if a withdrawal is an attack or not. The future of much of custody is to do exactly the same thing but onchain, via L2s/app zones/assets with tight controls. Today's defi mullet systems are an early form of this. Don't like it? Great, don't use it. Projecting your views of what constitutes valid centralization is ironically a rather distasteful form of centralization: you are trying to decide how everyone else should use Ethereum. Ethereum is for everybody, including the billions of people and millions of entities that want forms of centralization and controls. When you buy ETH with the full understanding of the deep value of centralization on Ethereum, you're not just on the other side of the trade from the "L2s are just multisigs" people or "how does ETH accrue value" people. You're also on the other side of the trade with decentralization maxis, who often believe that any form of centralization is, to paraphrase, a cancer to be eradicated, and rationalize the widespread voluntary existence of centralization by saying it must or should all be tech-driven training wheels (couldn't be further from the truth). The real world is incomprehensibly large and complicated. Politics and markets have created our modern way of life by growing a fabulously intricate and differentiated global trade network, based on fundamental principles of tolerance and mutually beneficial exchange. You don't have to *like* a centralized app/L2/token. Or like *why* it's centralized. Or like *how* it's centralized. But maybe you still can like that they export a cool yield source to L1 and other L2s, or hold/use ETH, or pay L1 gas fees, buy blobs, stimulate EVM research/investment, onboard millions of people to eth, help normalize eth for net new institutional entrants, create net new demand for L1 assets and protocols, etc. Centralizooors, in all their flavors, are our trading partners. Our fellow citizens in the digital nation of nations that is Ethereum. Respect them. Understand them. And for goodness sake, appreciate their role in growing ethereum to global ubiquity and ETH to multi trillion. Crucially, centralization must never extend to the L1 itself. Apps can't be more decentralized than their underlying L1. An L1 disaster can cause a total collapse of its onchain economy. The value of an onchain economy grows superlinearly in its elements (ie. greater than the sum of its parts, metcalf's law of network value). That's why we need a rock solid decentralized credibly neutral L1 (Ethereum) upon which the world's onchain economy will flourish and become worth hundreds of trillions in app capital and economic activity. In sum, Ethereum is for users, and for mutually beneficial exchange. Users naturally want many different things for countless different reasons. This includes a wide variety of centralization. Transparent opt-in centralization for L2s/rollups/apps/tokens is virtuous and extremely bullish for ETH. Ethereum will be 1000x larger specifically because users are free to choose, and because our L2 and tokenization ERCs/SDKs are so flexible and convenient for real world institutions to meet their needs and preferences. Ethereum is thriving like never before. The defi crisis this week and its root causes and ongoing mitigations are direct evidence of us thriving and maturing, even if many don't appreciate that yet. The future is extremely bright.

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@ryanberckmans·
Centralizooors, in all their flavors, are our trading partners. Our fellow citizens in the digital nation of nations that is Ethereum. Respect them. Understand them. And for goodness sake, appreciate their role in growing ethereum to global ubiquity and ETH to multi trillion
@ryanberckmans

Transparent opt-in centralization on eth is virtuous and extremely bullish for ETH The rage that this previous sentence evokes in some of our friends, and gleeful smirks in many of our opponents, shows how early we are to widespread understanding of the inevitable realities of onchain and eth growing to global ubiquity. Some rollups with security councils only have them because the tech is immature. Yet, many other rollups have security councils because they *want* security councils. The full implications of this are slept on by both "L2s are multisigs" people and decentralization maxis. There will be countless different kinds of L2s/rollups... as well as many different "kinds of kinds" aka dimensions of differentiation. Looking at things from a tech point of view has clearly been the key driver in ethereum throughout our history. Yet, as we are now actively growing to global ubiquity and colliding with the real world, tech is no longer the primary determinant in which L2s/rollups/apps/tokens will emerge, succeed, and fail. In the real world, political, economic, and business model lenses are dominant. Look at security councils. Notice the potential diversity in reasons for their adoption: Some rollups see their own security council as training wheels until the tech is ready. Some rollups believe that a reduction user freedom is justified by the increase in operational safety provided by a security council, and always will be, regardless of tech improvements. Security councils and many flavors of centralization will forever remain a huge feature for many rollups, apps, protocols, and tokens. Understanding why this is the case, and why it's *fantastic*, *virtuous*, and *inevitable*, is key to understanding why Ethereum is going to get so huge and why ETH is going to get so valuable. Centralization is often a valuable feature, whether it's a security council, enshrined stablecoin, or reversible transaction zone with withdrawal delays. Centralization is autocracy. Autocracy in all its shades is a big part of life. Is ethereum here to "solve autocracy"? Some think so. But in many cases, being subject to some kind of autocracy is a voluntary choice made by users. Corporations are autocracies, are they all evil? When we use commercial air travel, we all agree to reductions in freedom. Does that make flying evil or "training wheels"? Many user segments *want* autocratic controls. Are they all wrong? Lots of OG whales leave most of their net worths in CEX or ETFs just because they want custodians to decide if a withdrawal is an attack or not. The future of much of custody is to do exactly the same thing but onchain, via L2s/app zones/assets with tight controls. Today's defi mullet systems are an early form of this. Don't like it? Great, don't use it. Projecting your views of what constitutes valid centralization is ironically a rather distasteful form of centralization: you are trying to decide how everyone else should use Ethereum. Ethereum is for everybody, including the billions of people and millions of entities that want forms of centralization and controls. When you buy ETH with the full understanding of the deep value of centralization on Ethereum, you're not just on the other side of the trade from the "L2s are just multisigs" people or "how does ETH accrue value" people. You're also on the other side of the trade with decentralization maxis, who often believe that any form of centralization is, to paraphrase, a cancer to be eradicated, and rationalize the widespread voluntary existence of centralization by saying it must or should all be tech-driven training wheels (couldn't be further from the truth). The real world is incomprehensibly large and complicated. Politics and markets have created our modern way of life by growing a fabulously intricate and differentiated global trade network, based on fundamental principles of tolerance and mutually beneficial exchange. You don't have to *like* a centralized app/L2/token. Or like *why* it's centralized. Or like *how* it's centralized. But maybe you still can like that they export a cool yield source to L1 and other L2s, or hold/use ETH, or pay L1 gas fees, buy blobs, stimulate EVM research/investment, onboard millions of people to eth, help normalize eth for net new institutional entrants, create net new demand for L1 assets and protocols, etc. Centralizooors, in all their flavors, are our trading partners. Our fellow citizens in the digital nation of nations that is Ethereum. Respect them. Understand them. And for goodness sake, appreciate their role in growing ethereum to global ubiquity and ETH to multi trillion. Crucially, centralization must never extend to the L1 itself. Apps can't be more decentralized than their underlying L1. An L1 disaster can cause a total collapse of its onchain economy. The value of an onchain economy grows superlinearly in its elements (ie. greater than the sum of its parts, metcalf's law of network value). That's why we need a rock solid decentralized credibly neutral L1 (Ethereum) upon which the world's onchain economy will flourish and become worth hundreds of trillions in app capital and economic activity. In sum, Ethereum is for users, and for mutually beneficial exchange. Users naturally want many different things for countless different reasons. This includes a wide variety of centralization. Transparent opt-in centralization for L2s/rollups/apps/tokens is virtuous and extremely bullish for ETH. Ethereum will be 1000x larger specifically because users are free to choose, and because our L2 and tokenization ERCs/SDKs are so flexible and convenient for real world institutions to meet their needs and preferences. Ethereum is thriving like never before. The defi crisis this week and its root causes and ongoing mitigations are direct evidence of us thriving and maturing, even if many don't appreciate that yet. The future is extremely bright.

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@ryanberckmans·
Transparent opt-in centralization on eth is virtuous and extremely bullish for ETH The rage that this previous sentence evokes in some of our friends, and gleeful smirks in many of our opponents, shows how early we are to widespread understanding of the inevitable realities of onchain and eth growing to global ubiquity. Some rollups with security councils only have them because the tech is immature. Yet, many other rollups have security councils because they *want* security councils. The full implications of this are slept on by both "L2s are multisigs" people and decentralization maxis. There will be countless different kinds of L2s/rollups... as well as many different "kinds of kinds" aka dimensions of differentiation. Looking at things from a tech point of view has clearly been the key driver in ethereum throughout our history. Yet, as we are now actively growing to global ubiquity and colliding with the real world, tech is no longer the primary determinant in which L2s/rollups/apps/tokens will emerge, succeed, and fail. In the real world, political, economic, and business model lenses are dominant. Look at security councils. Notice the potential diversity in reasons for their adoption: Some rollups see their own security council as training wheels until the tech is ready. Some rollups believe that a reduction user freedom is justified by the increase in operational safety provided by a security council, and always will be, regardless of tech improvements. Security councils and many flavors of centralization will forever remain a huge feature for many rollups, apps, protocols, and tokens. Understanding why this is the case, and why it's *fantastic*, *virtuous*, and *inevitable*, is key to understanding why Ethereum is going to get so huge and why ETH is going to get so valuable. Centralization is often a valuable feature, whether it's a security council, enshrined stablecoin, or reversible transaction zone with withdrawal delays. Centralization is autocracy. Autocracy in all its shades is a big part of life. Is ethereum here to "solve autocracy"? Some think so. But in many cases, being subject to some kind of autocracy is a voluntary choice made by users. Corporations are autocracies, are they all evil? When we use commercial air travel, we all agree to reductions in freedom. Does that make flying evil or "training wheels"? Many user segments *want* autocratic controls. Are they all wrong? Lots of OG whales leave most of their net worths in CEX or ETFs just because they want custodians to decide if a withdrawal is an attack or not. The future of much of custody is to do exactly the same thing but onchain, via L2s/app zones/assets with tight controls. Today's defi mullet systems are an early form of this. Don't like it? Great, don't use it. Projecting your views of what constitutes valid centralization is ironically a rather distasteful form of centralization: you are trying to decide how everyone else should use Ethereum. Ethereum is for everybody, including the billions of people and millions of entities that want forms of centralization and controls. When you buy ETH with the full understanding of the deep value of centralization on Ethereum, you're not just on the other side of the trade from the "L2s are just multisigs" people or "how does ETH accrue value" people. You're also on the other side of the trade with decentralization maxis, who often believe that any form of centralization is, to paraphrase, a cancer to be eradicated, and rationalize the widespread voluntary existence of centralization by saying it must or should all be tech-driven training wheels (couldn't be further from the truth). The real world is incomprehensibly large and complicated. Politics and markets have created our modern way of life by growing a fabulously intricate and differentiated global trade network, based on fundamental principles of tolerance and mutually beneficial exchange. You don't have to *like* a centralized app/L2/token. Or like *why* it's centralized. Or like *how* it's centralized. But maybe you still can like that they export a cool yield source to L1 and other L2s, or hold/use ETH, or pay L1 gas fees, buy blobs, stimulate EVM research/investment, onboard millions of people to eth, help normalize eth for net new institutional entrants, create net new demand for L1 assets and protocols, etc. Centralizooors, in all their flavors, are our trading partners. Our fellow citizens in the digital nation of nations that is Ethereum. Respect them. Understand them. And for goodness sake, appreciate their role in growing ethereum to global ubiquity and ETH to multi trillion. Crucially, centralization must never extend to the L1 itself. Apps can't be more decentralized than their underlying L1. An L1 disaster can cause a total collapse of its onchain economy. The value of an onchain economy grows superlinearly in its elements (ie. greater than the sum of its parts, metcalf's law of network value). That's why we need a rock solid decentralized credibly neutral L1 (Ethereum) upon which the world's onchain economy will flourish and become worth hundreds of trillions in app capital and economic activity. In sum, Ethereum is for users, and for mutually beneficial exchange. Users naturally want many different things for countless different reasons. This includes a wide variety of centralization. Transparent opt-in centralization for L2s/rollups/apps/tokens is virtuous and extremely bullish for ETH. Ethereum will be 1000x larger specifically because users are free to choose, and because our L2 and tokenization ERCs/SDKs are so flexible and convenient for real world institutions to meet their needs and preferences. Ethereum is thriving like never before. The defi crisis this week and its root causes and ongoing mitigations are direct evidence of us thriving and maturing, even if many don't appreciate that yet. The future is extremely bright.
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@ryanberckmans·
The multisigfi people are deeply incorrect because what they don't realize is that the continuum from a "1 of 1 on joe's android phone" to a "9 of 12 with great gov on a stage 1.5 rollup" is the gulf on which tens of trillions in economic activity will be grown. On Ethereum.
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@ryanberckmans·
@sgoldfed blaming the rollup centric roadmap is also silly because going *harder* on it would have helped fix these attacks, as we'd have built better ERCs/codebases for interop/3rd party bridges years sooner, preventing layerzero from existing in the first place
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Steven Goldfeder
Steven Goldfeder@sgoldfed·
Blaming bridge hacks on the rollup centric roadmap is ironic and naive at best. Here’s a fact. There is and will continue to be demand for many chains. The rollup centric roadmap didn’t create that demand, as evidenced by the constant flow of new L1s (Tempo, Arc, Zero etc.). And any time there are multiple chains, users will need to bridge. What the rollup centric roadmap actually gave you is a better way to secure the chain and a better way to bridge — by using the native bridge which is secured by the chain. Of course users for a variety of reasons may elect to use other bridging solutions which rely on other security assumptions, but then you’re in the same place as you’d be if you’re bridging between two L1s. The rollup centric roadmap didn’t create the demand for many chains, and even in a world of just L1s, bridge security would still be critical.
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@ryanberckmans·
Wonderful action. Thank you to Arb! > As I’ve said many times, the best path that I see to getting rid of security councils is for the L1 itself to take on this burden for its most important L2s (as defined by objective criteria). In that case, in the case of a vulnerability or an exploit the conversation for L1 and L2 will be identical — does this warrant an L1 hard fork. I’m hopeful that we can reopen this conversation in the coming weeks. This will never, ever happen on L1, by design. This highlights yet another reason why why L2 differentiation is important. Some day, the net safest place for funds in defi may be on L2s with tight controls, where that safety also a form of risk that doesn't exist on L1. Great action taken today!
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Steven Goldfeder
Steven Goldfeder@sgoldfed·
Surely one of the most complex decisions ever made in Arbitrum governance history but a few things worth noting: 1. To all those screaming for the past few days “Arbitrum has a centralized sequencer so they can move funds”, take a few minutes to learn how Arbitrum works. The sequencer has absolutely no power to move funds and was not the one who acted here. 2. The decision to act was made entirely by the Arbitrum Security Council, a group of 12 individuals elected by the Arbitrum DAO (the annual election is currently underway — vote now!), which required 9/12 of them to agree. The council is independent from the Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs (1/12 of the elected members is an OCL engineer), and came to this decision by themselves after much deliberation. You may not like the existence of security councils and you can form your own opinion on whether you agree with their actions, but this process was extremely distributed and coordinated by independent actors, and ina world where security councils exist, Arbitrum’s is a masterclass on how a truly independent security council should operate. 3. For many, the ultimate goal is to get rid of the security council entirely, but this is complicated. Technically it’s easy — the security council is elected by the DAO and operates at its pleasure, and the DAO can turn it off at any time. But the harder question is _should_ the DAO do that? L1s have the ability to hard fork. Security councils control the analogous power for the L2. If you get rid of it, you lose the ability to hard fork. You can still update the chain via DAO vote but that’s a slow process and you can no longer do fast emergency actions (which includes both actions like the security council took today as well as the ability to quickly upgrade the code in case an exploitable vulnerability in the software stack is discovered). As I’ve said many times, the best path that I see to getting rid of security councils is for the L1 itself to take on this burden for its most important L2s (as defined by objective criteria). In that case, in the case of a vulnerability or an exploit the conversation for L1 and L2 will be identical — does this warrant an L1 hard fork. I’m hopeful that we can reopen this conversation in the coming weeks.
Arbitrum@arbitrum

The Arbitrum Security Council has taken emergency action to freeze the 30,766 ETH being held in the address on Arbitrum One that is connected to the KelpDAO exploit. The Security Council acted with input from law enforcement as to the exploiter’s identity, and, at all times, weighed its commitment to the security and integrity of the Arbitrum community without impacting any Arbitrum users or applications. After significant technical diligence and deliberation, the Security Council identified and executed a technical approach to move funds to safety without affecting any other chain state or Arbitrum users. As of April 20 11:26pm ET the funds have been successfully transferred to an intermediary frozen wallet. They are no longer accessible to the address that originally held the funds, and can only be moved by further action by Arbitrum governance, which will be coordinated with relevant parties.

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@ryanberckmans·
@pintail_xyz great article. we need a fully specified proposal that can bake in public sentiment for as long as possible while mustering support x.com/ryanberckmans/…
@ryanberckmans

Thanks for your responses! I'm generally in favor of an issuance change that satisfies all of these criteria, and I think others would be, too: - We are extremely certain it will be the last issuance change ever needed. A permanent solution. - We've successfully built broad social consensus around the change, it's not controversial, except perhaps with groups like Lido where they directly lose money from the change. - We moved at an appropriately glacial pace to have many independent researchers analyze the solution and drive confidence it will be a healthy permanent solution, and give lots of time for the community to socialize and prepare for the issuance change. I see 1559 as a success story here where the spec was nailed down year(s) (??) before mainnet activation and that gave a lot of time for healthy discourse and formation of common knowledge. The Roughgarden paper was particularly excellent as a coordination point. - Obviously, the issuance change must be expected to meaningfully reduce issuance. Given these criteria, I strongly agree that doing the change sooner than later is much better for the long-term political and institutional stability of ethereum. So I see the tension between doing this as soon as possible vs. the criterion to move at a glacial pace. Perhaps a useful rule of thumb here may be that the spec for the issuance change can be nailed down at least one hard fork before it ends up being deployed. Personally, I think Pectra will launch in perhaps Q2/3 2025. Maybe we could finalize the spec for an issuance change by Q2 2025, and then seek to include it in the next hard fork after Pectra or even the one after that.

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pintail
pintail@pintail_xyz·
Ethereum's staking ratio just passed 1/3 for the first time. Under the current issuance curve, it won't stop until nearly all ETH is staked and solo stakers are forced out. The window to fix this is closing - article "Ethereum’s Staking Ratio: The Tipping Point" linked below.
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