
China tried to protect a billion consumers by turning every shopper into an enforcement agent. It worked perfectly, and that was the problem.
In 1995, China had hundreds of millions of daily transactions and no way to put an inspector in every shop. So the law did something radical: it attached a fat, predictable payout to any documented violation.
Article 148 of the Food Safety Law: ten times the purchase price for food that fails safety standards, floor of one thousand yuan. The Consumer Protection Law: treble damages for fraud, floor of five hundred. Every shopper became a potential enforcement agent working on commission, paid not by the state but by the offender. The bounty was the budget.
But when you price a violation at a fixed number, you've told the market exactly which violations are worth hunting. And it's never the dangerous ones. Tainted formula that poisons a child is rare, hard to source on purpose, and dangerous to handle. A mislabeled additive level is everywhere, costs three yuan to acquire, and pays the same thousand-yuan floor.
So the hunters went where the math went. They chased the cheapest provable defect, which is paperwork, and largely ignored the actual safety failures that hurt people. The label was supposed to be a proxy for safety. The bounty made the label the prize.
And once a proxy becomes the prize, people stop caring what it was a proxy for. China got an army that polices fonts and footnotes while the real dangers sit outside the bounty's line of sight.
The number you reward is the only thing the system will ever optimize. That's true for bounties, for sales quotas, for test scores. China just built the purest version anyone has run at national scale.
English





