Sabitlenmiş Tweet
“What fools we are to live in a generation for which war is a computer game”
Richard Leonard@LabourRichard
Tony Benn, 10 years gone. What we would give to have him back.
English
tfrab
21.7K posts
tfrab retweetledi
@ASefardito da braccetto nel 3-5-2 può far valere l'esperienza e il senso della posizione. non meno di 15 milioni
Italiano
Quanto può valere una nonna sul mercato?
matteo@forsematteo
Oggi liberato casa di nonna prima di venderla definitivamente e trovato questa. Vamos
Italiano
Stimare l'età delle persone in base alla loro prima tragedia calcistica
Italiano
oramai sente le vocine
@INArteCarloDoss @emomarzi
Eric Daugherty@EricLDaugh
🚨 BREAKING: President Trump just confirmed Iran is on its KNEES, crying for a deal, but they can't say anything PUBLICLY out of fear they'll be killed "We'd like to make you the next Supreme Leader! NO THANK YOU, I don't want it!" 😭 "They are negotiating, by the way, and they want to make a deal so BADLY, but they're afraid to say it because they figure they'll be killed by their own people. They're also afraid they'll be killed by us!" "There's never been a head of a country that wanted that job less than being the head of Iran."
Italiano
Le guerre sono scoppiate da quando Angelino Alfano ha lasciato la politica.
Inutile che facciate tanto gli indifferenti.
Alfy torna!
Italiano
𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝘽𝙧𝙖𝙘𝙠𝙚𝙩 𝙤𝙛 𝘿𝙎 🔎
Il sondaggio del male lo vince Moggi, addio Monchi. Sorpresa Lucchesi. Avanzano i big.
Vota, scegli, discuti. Ogni turno conta. Ogni scelta pesa. A tra poco con i prossimi turni.
Italiano
tfrab retweetledi
“With the monstrous weapons man already has, humanity is in danger of being trapped in this world by its moral adolescents. Our knowledge of science has clearly outstripped our capacity to control it. We have many men of science; too few men of God. We have grasped the mystery of the atom and rejected the Sermon on the Mount. Man is stumbling blindly through a spiritual darkness while toying with the precarious secrets of life and death. The world has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know about living."
-General Omar N. Bradley, 10 November, 1948
English
Dopo Lookman e Svilar prendono anche Koné, stanno costruendo una squadra da Champions 👀
Guido Olivares🇮🇹@Guidolino8
Gazzetta: “L’#Inter vuole Manu Konè della #Roma. Per il francese i nerazzurri potrebbero sfondare quota 40 milioni e tendere verso i 50 per completare l’operazione che la scorsa estate è stata sfiorata. L’Inter vuole puntare anche sulle necessità della squadra di Gasperini, costretta a far cassa entro il 30 giugno, indipendentemente dalla qualificazione Champions. Non è detto che il piano d’assalto interista vada in porto, anche perché sono troppe le variabili in campo: la possibilità che i giallorossi continuino a fare muro o facciano una salvifica plusvalenza con altri giocatori, eventuali offerte superiori (attenzione al Psg), senza sottovalutare l’effetto Mondiale che, già all’inizio, potrebbe far schizzare il prezzo oltre il consentito. Almeno in teoria e almeno adesso, però, i nerazzurri vogliono finalmente mettere un carico, il più pesante possibile”.
Italiano
Assolutamente mica c’ha più di 10 anni di Champions League. Io vorrei davvero capire perché dovete scrivere porcherie se conoscete 3 calciatori in croce.
Poi vabbè, non penso proprio venga a Roma a bivaccare un calciatore del genere.
🦁@psbrdx
Piuttosto rinnovo El Shaarawy e Pellegrini per 3 anni
Italiano
"testa di calciatori buona solo per portare cappello", evidentemente non per accorgersi che gli stanno facendo la risonanza al ginocchio sano 😄
The Athletic | Football@TheAthleticFC
Kylian Mbappe’s knee injury was misdiagnosed after Real Madrid medical staff performed an MRI scan on the wrong leg back in December. When no problem was found after a scan of his uninjured right knee, the 27-year-old featured in three games for Madrid before the mistake was realised and rectified. Full story from @GuillermoRai_ and @MarioCortegana Free to read here ⬇️ 🔗 nyti.ms/4bM95qf
Italiano
Santanché più ostinata di George Costanza 😄
GIF
Camilla Conti@petunianelsole
Dal retroscena di Minzolini sul Giornale👇
Italiano
tfrab retweetledi
Seconded for the most part. Let me add a few notes.
— There are three theories of air power. We know Douhetist terror bombing has never destroyed the will of the enemy to fight. Decapitation has now failed. As long as the US remains ‘up in the air’ there is only one path to avoiding strategic defeat: winning the interdiction war to disarm Iran.
— The interdiction theory of victory is ‘analytically attractive’ because it empirically testable in real time. If Iranian strike tempo is dwindling to zero, the US is winning; otherwise it is losing outright.
— The all-important interdiction war is going very poorly. I look at the attached map every day from ACLED, the gold standard of conflict data (acleddata.com/iran-crisis-li…). Iranian strike tempo shows no sign of dwindling.
To the contrary, depletion of interceptor inventories and the use of heavier missiles has dramatically increased the effectiveness of Iranian missile strikes, as we are seeing in the strikes on Israel.
— The Iranians’ interdiction/counterforce campaign has been surprisingly successful. At least 10 radars have been destroyed, partially blinding US forces and interceptor systems. US bases in the region have been largely evacuated, forcing the US to use European bases.
— There have been some big kills. Two dozen heavy drones and a half a dozen manned aircraft have been lost to Iranian fire/accidents, not clear which, including an F-35. A mighty carrier group has been put out of business.
— Iran enjoys escalation dominance. This was confirmed when Trump had to walk back his ultimatum. Iran has a very powerful threat at the top of the escalation ladder: the O&G infrastructure and water desalinization systems in the gulf are both under Iranian fire control.
— Iran holds horizontal escalation options in reserve. The Houthis have their ‘fingers on the trigger.’ That is a deterrent to keep the Saudis out of the war, and may be used at any time to expand the war and impose greater costs on the West.
— Iran retains a firm grip on the Hormuz weapon. No serious military option to retake Hormuz exists as long as the interdiction war is not won. No matter where you land the marines, they will be fully exposed to Iranian fire, including artillery fire. US force protection requirements, ultimately a function of casualty intolerance, mean that the Kharg idea etc are just not going to fly.
— The United States is at a crossroads. Either it swallows this military humiliation and accepts a ceasefire largely on Iranian terms, or it must send in ground forces to in a bid to retake Hormuz and restore US military prestige.
— If the US chooses a negotiated ceasefire, Iran will emerge as a regional hegemon with the Hormuz weapon firmly in its hands; and, having defeated the US in a high-intensity conventional war, as a great power in the international system.
— If the US chooses to escalate to a ground war, the war will last for years. This is because both force protection and the overriding objective of fire suppression will drive ever greater commitment of ground forces.
But the US cannot win the ground war under any circumstances because the division math (x.com/policytensor/s…) is even more forbidding than the drone math (x.com/policytensor/s…).
This means that the choice facing the aggressor is between accepting strategic defeat now at limited costs, or later at far, far higher costs.
— So the United States has already suffered a catastrophic military defeat. The multipolar world was a hypothesis until last month. Now it is a demonstrated military fact. It has obtained due to the diffusion of military technology (x.com/policytensor/s…). The US monopoly in precision-strike is now gone. Deterrence in Asia is now dead. This cannot but fail to have far-reaching geopolitical consequences, which I will lay out in detail in a forthcoming interview on @MultipolarPod with @admcollingwood later today.
Rosemary Kelanic@RKelanic
Wars reveal information about countries' relative military capabilities and interests. That's one of the most important insights from the bargaining model of war. Iran believed before the war that fighting the U.S. would strengthen its bargaining position -- and Iran was correct. This war has revealed that Iran wouldn't topple after Khamenei's death, that Iran is highly resolved, and it can inflict damage across the Gulf at low cost, indefinitely. It revealed that Iran can gain massive leverage -- and perhaps even collect "tolls" -- from controlling shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. By contrast, the war has *hurt* U.S. & Israeli bargaining power compared to where it was before the Geneva talks in February. That means we'll get worse terms now than if we'd accepted Iran's proposal then. Why is the U.S./Israel position worse? Decapitation strikes failed to induce Iran to surrender (always an unlikely prospect), nullifying the U.S./Israeli theory of victory by day 3. No new plausible theory of victory has emerged, and it's doubtful one will. That hurts the U.S. position. Trump has proven highly sensitive to oil market swings, and even *removed sanctions* on Iranian oil. As @edwardfishman noted, Iran gained more sanctions relief from closing Hormuz than through any diplomatic means, including the JCPOA. The disruption to oil markets, and Trump's concern about them, also hurts the U.S. position. Now that the war has bogged down into an attrition battle, where Iran can impose costs with cheap means like drones and missiles and Israeli interceptors seem to be running low, the U.S. and Israel are on the losing end of the damage and casualties curve. Costs and casualties will get worse, not better, over time, and that further hurts U.S./Israeli bargaining leverage. Trump is now considering, frankly, foolhardy military gambits, potentially to seize Kharg, islands in Hormuz, or perhaps the highly enriched uranium trapped somewhere under rubble in Iran. These would be significant escalations putting U.S. troops on the ground. None are likely to end the war, and all would likely cause U.S. casualties. In the business lingo, Trump's BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) is way worse -- not least because of the shadow of Afghanistan. The U.S. forces being surged to the Middle East (2 MEUs plus some airborne units) are comparable to what George W. Bush used to invade Afghanistan in the autumn 2001. What started out as a limited mission to topple the Taliban and capture Osama bin Laden, who instead escaped through the Tora Bora mountains, evolved into a ground campaign that eventually ballooned to over 100k U.S. troops in 2011. The clear imperative here is for Trump to deescalate, credibility costs be damned. This war is existential for Iran but not for the United States, Iran will keep fighting with cheap means like drones, and it will eventually outlast the U.S. just like the Taliban did in Afghanistan. That, or Iran could fracture into chaos, creating refugee flows and breeding terrorism for decades to come. (Terrorism isn't an existential threat to the U.S., but we shouldn't be creating the conditions for it.) Trump doesn't like backing down, but that is what needs to happen here, and stat, before ill-fated escalation leads to more needless deaths. @defpriorities
English
tfrab retweetledi
A truck carrying antiprotons will drive across Europe. A team at CERN just transported antimatter across the laboratory's campus in a truck. Literally. 92 antiprotons packed into a portable trap weighing one tonne. As everyone knows, antimatter annihilates on contact with ordinary matter - which is basically everything. The final destination is Germany: Heinrich Heine University in Düsseldorf. An extraordinary delivery in the history of road transport. home.cern/news/press-rel…
English
il regolamento della Champions League dell'umiltà solo grazie a @vox2box
vox2box@vox2box
la coppa dalle orecchie normali spreaker.com/episode/episod…
Italiano
Gelli non aveva previsto che i suoi collaboratori sarebbero passati da Federico Umberto D'amato a Delmastro e Bartolozzi.
Italiano
dialog boxes from Windows 3.1 are my favourites, every time I see one I feel much younger 😛
Windows Latest@WindowsLatest
In fact, you can find legacy features, including dialog boxes from Windows 3.1, in Windows 11 😁
English