Zz wu
271 posts
@lwj51036d 这两个是日语网络/同人圈的隐语
ワタア (wataa) —— 来自「綿子(わたこ)」的变体,是日语成人语境里指女性自慰/手淫的隐语,大致对应中文圈说的”自慰”。
ちゅんだい (chundai) —— 这是「ちんぽ(ちんちん)」+「だい(でかい)」之类组合演化出来的隐语,男性器官相关、特别是”大尺寸”
日本語
看大物是也的一个感受是，北大医学院的八年临床直博学生、三甲医院里的国内头部顶级医院副主任们，也非常想要一个litterman master cardiology 2，一两千一副，都要工作很多年才能买一副，小心翼翼带着自己用，别人摔坏了都要赔。
我以为这个东西很贵，结果一看amazon，200刀，约等于吃两顿海底捞。
其实这东西国产化没有任何难度，难度远远低于一个高速ADC，为什么这么多器械厂商还不做这种高端听诊器呢？
中文
看了一下澜起的Q1 财报，我对澜起的判断是：没有水分，趋势驱动的真增长。
目前中国上市公司里最好的存储公司，MRCD/MDB、PCIe Retimer、CKD、CXL MXC 四类新产品合计收入 2.69 亿元，同比 +93.8%，占互连类芯片收入提升到 19.0%。这说明公司不是只靠 DDR5 RCD 单品，而是在向“内存互连 + PCIe/CXL 高速互连”扩展，今天大涨，也应该是偷跑业绩了。
全球层面，TrendForce 也指出 AI 服务器需求带动 CSP 扩大 DDR5 服务器库存和 2026-2027 采购策略，DDR5/服务器内存供需偏紧，这个外部产业趋势能解释澜起的基本面弹性。
中文
Jukan (@jukan05) wrote a sharp memo on how the US let China's display industry grow unchecked while drawing the line at semiconductors. The strategic analysis is right. But there's a second layer he didn't touch, and it matters more if you actually invest in this space. China's display industry won. Its shareholders lost. And the same pattern is about to replay in memory.
BOE controls 25% of the global display panel market. Revenue approaching $29 billion. Net margin: 2.7%. ROE: 3.1%. The stock has gone nowhere for years.
Jukan's point is that the US made a mistake by not sanctioning China's display equipment imports the way it sanctioned semiconductor equipment. He's correct. BOE bought the same tools from Applied Materials that Samsung used. No CFIUS review, no Entity List, no restrictions. The result is exactly what he describes. China now holds 70% of global LCD production and just crossed 50% of OLED shipments. Korea is hanging by a thread.
But here's what the geopolitical framing misses. Even inside China, the winners of this industrial war weren't the display companies themselves. The value destruction mechanism has four moving parts.
First, the capex treadmill. A single Gen 8.6 OLED line costs $4-9 billion. BOE's latest Chengdu fab alone is $8.7 billion. The moment one investment cycle finishes, the next generation demands even more. Profits never accumulate. They get recycled into the next fab before shareholders see a cent.
Second, perpetual dilution. Every fab requires massive equity raises, JV structures with state-owned partners, and government co-investment. BOE's share count has expanded enormously over two decades while earnings-per-share growth has been negligible. The pie grows, but each slice keeps getting thinner.
Third, the principal-agent problem. BOE's six largest shareholders are SOEs from Beijing, Chongqing, and Hefei. Their KPI is employment, industrial upgrading, and supply chain control. Return on equity was never the objective. When the people running the company don't care about stock returns, the stock doesn't return.
Fourth, self-inflicted overcapacity. Four Chinese firms are building Gen 8.6 OLED lines simultaneously. They compete on price against each other, not just against Samsung. Panel prices recover, producers ramp utilization, prices crash again. BOE's gross margin sits at 14%. Even at the top of the cycle, current prices barely keep panel makers above break-even.
Market dominance and shareholder value destruction, simultaneously. The industry won. The stocks lost.
Now watch CXMT and YMTC.
CXMT is pursuing a STAR Market IPO at roughly $42 billion valuation, raising $4.2 billion. YMTC plans to list in H2 2026. CXMT posted cumulative losses exceeding 30 billion yuan across 2022-2024, then reported its first profitable year in 2025, timed perfectly for the IPO window, during the hottest memory supercycle in years.
Check the four forces against them.
Capex treadmill? CXMT plans to expand from 200,000 to 300,000 wafers per month this year, then to 400,000. The IPO proceeds of $4.2 billion are earmarked almost entirely for fab expansion and R&D. Not a dollar returns to shareholders. YMTC is breaking ground on its third Wuhan fab, targeting production in 2027.
Perpetual dilution? CXMT's IPO alone issues 10.62 billion new shares. This is round one. Scaling to 400,000 wafers requires tens of billions more in capital that doesn't exist yet. More raises will follow.
Principal-agent misalignment? CXMT was founded by the Hefei government. YMTC is a creation of Tsinghua Unigroup and the National IC Fund. The controlling interest is the state. The mission is memory self-sufficiency, not EPS.
Self-inflicted overcapacity? Both are scaling aggressively at the same time. UBS estimates Chinese memory capacity expansion could reach 120,000-140,000 additional wafers per month in 2026, with further increases in 2027. When this capacity hits the market, commodity DRAM and NAND pricing will compress. Samsung and SK Hynix will respond with price cuts in segments where their fabs are fully depreciated. CXMT and YMTC, running brand-new fabs with heavy depreciation, get squeezed hardest.
Jukan asks whether the West's semiconductor hegemony will last. That's the right question at the geopolitical level. At the investment level, the question is different. Even if CXMT and YMTC succeed in displacing Samsung and Micron from commodity memory segments, their shareholders will likely suffer the same fate as BOE's. The pattern is structural, not accidental. When the state's objective is industrial displacement and the industry requires perpetual multi-billion-dollar reinvestment, market dominance and shareholder value destruction travel together.
So how do you actually profit from this?
You don't buy the miners. You sell them pickaxes.
Every dollar CXMT raises in its IPO, every dollar of government subsidy flowing to YMTC, a significant portion ends up as revenue for semiconductor equipment suppliers. These companies capture the capex regardless of whether the end customer ever earns a return on its fabs.
Three names sit at the center of this flow.
Naura Technology is China's largest equipment maker, now ranked sixth globally. Revenue growing 30%+ annually, net margins around 17%, ROE of 17%. That margin profile is six times BOE's. The product portfolio spans etch, PVD, CVD, ALD, furnaces, and cleaning.
AMEC is China's etch specialist, founded by a former Applied Materials executive. Revenue expected around 12.4 billion yuan in 2025, up 37%. Etching tools deployed across more than 100 production lines. R&D intensity runs at 30% of revenue, aggressively expanding from etch into thin-film deposition.
ACM Research focuses on cleaning and electroplating. Smaller and more specialized, but cleaning is one of the most repeated process steps in memory manufacturing. Dual-listed on STAR Market and Nasdaq.
The asymmetry is clean. CXMT and YMTC will spend tens of billions building fabs. Their shareholders will be diluted, margins will compress, and the cycle will punish them. The equipment suppliers earn 17% margins selling the tools that build those fabs, cycle after cycle.
One risk. Naura was added to the US Entity List in December 2024. If Washington extends restrictions to Chinese equipment makers more broadly, the thesis gets complicated. And none of these trade cheaply. Naura sits at 52x earnings.
But the structural logic holds. In the display industry, the correct trade was never BOE. It was the companies selling BOE the tools to build its fabs. The same logic applies to memory today. Jukan is right that China's display dominance is a cautionary tale for the West. For investors, the cautionary tale is different. The industry succeeds. The value just accrues somewhere else in the chain.
English
China’s coercive actions undermine the status quo, once again exposing the risks authoritarian regimes pose to the international order. Ahead of my visit to Eswatini, several countries along our flight route abruptly revoked overflight clearance under pressure from China. 1/2
English
一些需要知道的:
· 必须人到澳门才能开,大陆开会失败
· 要带身份证+港澳通行证
· 邀请码要在开户前绑定,不然领不到新户奖励
适合普通投资者做一点境外资产配置,不是高频交易。
邀请码: 拎2股阿里港股+半年佣金優惠，最高再得新款手機m.antbank.mo/s/SZMpnb
邀请码也是介绍
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