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Putin will make a state visit to India on December 4-5, 2025, to take part in the 23rd annual India-Russia summit. His delegation includes the heads of Sberbank, Rosoboronexport, as well as the leadership of Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (banking, weapons, oil companies). For Putin, it is an important visit for several reasons. ‼️ What Putin aims to negotiate in India: ▪️ Energy: oil, coal, fertilizers Putin is traveling to India to shore up the energy base of his war effort. Over the last financial year, bilateral trade between Russia and India reached about $68-69 billion, and the lion’s share of it is Russian commodities - above all, oil. At peak months in 2025, India was buying up to 1.6-1.8 million barrels of Russian oil per day - roughly 30-40% of Russia's total imports. Under the pressure of sanctions, these volumes are gradually declining, but the Kremlin is trying to hold on to the Indian market by offering ever-deeper discounts: the Urals discount is widening again. In the fertilizer sector, the dependence is even tighter: for several categories, 80-90% of India’s imports come from Russia, directly affecting food security and prices for Indian farmers. Russia's interest is obvious: to cement India as its second-largest market after China - for oil, coal, fertilizers, and partly gas. This will offset the loss of the EU and secure a stable cash flow for the Russian war economy. New Delhi, for its part, is pragmatically exploiting the Kremlin’s weakened negotiating position. India is trying to lock in the best possible prices, longer-term contracts, and flexible delivery terms - essentially turning Russia’s crisis into its own energy and agricultural advantage. ▪️ Defense: from the S-400 to the AK-203 The second major aspect of the visit is defense cooperation. India has been one of the largest buyers of Russian weapons for decades, but this model is shifting rapidly under sanctions pressure, Western competition, and India’s own rearmament programs. Putin is coming to New Delhi with a clear goal: to prevent this market niche from being fully taken over by the US, France, and domestic Indian manufacturers. Talks will focus on completing the delivery of the five S-400 divisions, possible future air defense cooperation and servicing terms, as well as scaling up joint production of AK-203 rifles: by 2030, the Amethi plant is expected to produce over 600,000 units with maximum localization. In parallel, Moscow is trying to promote new platforms - from combat aviation to electronic warfare systems - framed not just as finished products but under the banner of "technology transfer" and joint assembly. India’s interests are equally pragmatic. New Delhi wants to transform the old import-heavy model into one where manufacturing and key components are controlled on Indian soil, and where Russian contracts become only one part of a broader, diversified portfolio. For India, this is one more tool in balancing relations with Washington, Moscow, Paris, and Beijing. For the Kremlin, it is a struggle to preserve the image of an important (though no longer indispensable) defense partner. Notably, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia’s share in India’s arms imports has been steadily declining: from 72% in 2010-2014 to 36% in 2020-2024. India is pursuing diversification and developing its own defense industry. ▪️ Financial architecture, BRICS, and the new global order Behind the ceremonial language of a "special strategic partnership" lies a much more practical goal: to rebuild financial architecture for a long war and long-term life under sanctions. Moscow and New Delhi are gradually pushing their bilateral trade out from under the dollar and euro: expanding settlements in rubles and rupees, discussing the linkage of the Mir and RuPay payment systems, and integrating Russia’s SPFS with India’s UPI (local payment systems). For the Kremlin, this is a way to reduce the risk of transaction blocks through Western banks and make energy and defense deals more sanctions-proof. For India, it is a chance to buy cheap Russian resources with fewer political and financial risks, while strengthening its own currency and payments autonomy. These bilateral mechanisms fit into the broader BRICS narrative as an alternative international order - with the New Development Bank, talk of national-currency settlements, and potential joint instruments. For Russia, BRICS is primarily a political showcase of "non-isolation": signaling that it still has a club and a financial ecosystem of its own. For India, the value lies in having a platform where it can cooperate with both Russia and China while maintaining distance and avoiding becoming part of a formal anti-Western bloc. ‼️ A comparison with China is revealing In its relations with Beijing, Russia has already fallen into a deep asymmetric dependence: the yuan, Chinese technologies, and major infrastructure projects give China far greater leverage. With India, the situation is different: it is a large but not monopolistic market, and New Delhi is simultaneously deepening ties with the US, the EU, and Japan. That is why the Kremlin is so eager to present the India visit as a "second pillar" balancing its over-reliance on China. ‼️ For the EU and the US, this situation is a test of the real effectiveness of sanctions and containment policy. For Europe, it is a reminder that even without access to the EU market, Russia can find new outlets for its energy and arms in the Global South. For Washington, it underscores that India is not a "junior partner" but an autonomous power center: it cooperates with the US on Indo-Pacific security while continuing to buy cheap Russian oil and weapons. The uncomfortable question for Western capitals is this: Are they prepared to meaningfully limit Russia’s maneuvering space in the Global South if that requires confronting the interests of key partners - above all, India? And what position will India take? This is no longer merely about trade deals or economic interests. What is being shaped now is the future architecture of global order and global security. What are India’s true interests? India is China’s main regional rival. New Delhi sees Russia’s growing dependence on Beijing - and this is a restraining factor for India. Unlike Russia, the United States can offer India not just oil but advanced technologies, weapons, and investment capital. India already receives everything it really needs from Russia - oil paid in rupees and at an ever-deeper discount. Russia opposes the West; India seeks cooperation with the West. Will India strengthen its ties with Russia at the expense of its relations with the United States? Until now, Russia has been a regular commercial partner for India - not a strategic one. Will that status change? Especially considering the fact that Russia is gradually ceasing to be a "geopolitical pole" and is turning into a satellite - even a vassal - of China. Russia and Putin embody an imperial, colonial mindset that is fundamentally alien to India. And today, Putin is waging a brutal, unjust, unprovoked war against our independent state - Ukraine. The world will descend into complete chaos if territorial issues begin to be resolved through military force. And if Ukraine loses, that chaos will inevitably follow. That is why countries that seek to restore the global security system and avoid a descent into multiple armed conflicts have a clear interest in a just peace for Ukraine. I have already said that, in my view, it is India - not Russia or China - that could lead the states of the Global South and demonstrate leadership in establishing peace in Ukraine and the region. Such leadership would be a fundamental contribution to the Ukrainian people and to global peace.