Rakendragis
3.2K posts
@MyLittlePyro0
Docteur en trucs qui brûlent - 🎆 PhD - J'aime aussi les épées ⚔ Sinon je suis gentil en vrai 🇨🇵🇨🇭🏳️🌈
« Qu'ils crèvent. Israël fait le travail de l'humanité ici. Qu'ils crèvent tous ces palestiniens. » Louis Sarkozy n'a jamais été convoqué par la police pour apologie d'un crime contre l'humanité. [Via @JRenardiere]
Quand l’extrême droite prend le pouvoir, elle restreint immédiatement les libertés publiques. Ici ce maire RN a infiltré un groupe Instagram de lycéens pour les menacer en cas de manifestation. Manifester est un droit, interdire et menacer c’est du fascisme. Inquiétant.
Super Mario Galaxy Movie | Reviews 7.5 - Seattle Times 7 - Collider 7 - Looper 6 - IGN 6 - Time Out 6 - Total Film 5 - Playlist 5 - Screen Rant 5 - Boston Globe 4 - Independent 3 - NYT 3 - Screen Daily 2.5 - TheWrap 2 - Variety 2 - Guardian 0 - The Times MC: 35 RT: 45% Rotten
🔴 Municipales à Paris 🗣️ Rachida Dati donne des précisions sur ses affaires judiciaires : "Je trouve que cela ne concerne pas la vie publique. Je suis très sereine. Ce qui est énervant, c’est la société du soupçon." #GGRMC
BREAKING: France is running out of the missiles it uses to shoot down Iranian drones. Macron’s response is not to ask America for more. It is to build a European nuclear arsenal that does not need America at all. La Tribune reported on 16 March that the French Air Force faces rapid depletion of Mica and Meteor air-to-air missile stockpiles for its Dassault Rafale fighters after intensive Shahed drone interceptions during Red Sea and Gulf patrol missions supporting EU Aspides and Hormuz escort operations. The Charles de Gaulle carrier group and land-based Rafale squadrons have been intercepting Iranian drones at a tempo that was never anticipated in peacetime procurement cycles. Each Meteor costs approximately €2 million. Each Shahed costs $20,000 to $35,000. France is spending sixty times more per interception than Iran spends per drone. The arithmetic is unsustainable. This is the same cost asymmetry that defines the entire war, applied to a NATO ally that did not start it. On 2 March, standing at the Île-Longue submarine base, Macron delivered the most significant shift in French nuclear doctrine since 1992. The speech announced three changes. First: France increases nuclear warheads for the first time in three decades. The previous count was approximately 290; the new total is classified under a new opacity policy. Second: a strategic hypersonic missile programme launches in 2026, with the M51.3 submarine-launched missile already operational and a next-generation SSBN ordered for 2036. Third: “forward deterrence,” dissuasion avancée, progressive European nuclear cooperation without sharing command or the decision to launch. Eight countries were named as initial partners: the UK, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark. Joint steering groups and nuclear exercises begin immediately. Rafale nuclear-capable aircraft can be temporarily forward-deployed to partner nations. But the red button stays in Paris. The decision stays with one person. The sovereignty stays French. The connection between the Rafale depletion and the nuclear pivot is the thesis nobody else is drawing. France’s conventional munitions are being consumed by a $20,000 drone from a country France is not at war with, in a conflict France did not authorise, supporting an operation France’s president publicly criticised as “outside international law.” The conventional stockpile that protects France’s European interests is being drained by an American war in the Gulf. Macron’s response is not to replenish from American stocks. It is to accelerate the one capability that no drone can exhaust and no ally can withdraw: nuclear deterrence under exclusively French command. The defence budget tells the story. France accelerated its target to €64 billion by 2027 with an additional €36 billion injection by 2030. The rearmament is not reactive. It is structural. Macron is using the Iran war, which is depleting French conventional capacity in real time, as the political accelerant for a European defence architecture that reduces dependence on the alliance whose war is causing the depletion. Trump views Macron as a frustrating independent operator. Macron criticised US strikes. France declined the Hormuz warship call. Yet France continues intercepting Shaheds with the very missiles it is running out of. The relationship is Gaullist strategic autonomy at full voltage: contribute enough to remain relevant, refuse enough to remain sovereign, and use the crisis to build the capability that makes the next refusal permanent. France is not leaving NATO. It is building the pillar inside NATO that functions when NATO’s leader is distracted by a war in the Gulf, a fuel tank fire in Dubai, and 26 Chinese aircraft over Taiwan. open.substack.com/pub/shanakaans…
