
Player For Love 🇰🇷🇫🇷🇪🇺
6.7K posts

Player For Love 🇰🇷🇫🇷🇪🇺
@PlayerForLove1
🍄I love ❤️ #Nintendo 🍄 #Xbox 🙅♂️ #PlayStation 🎮 (Maxime Semet)















🇺🇸🇮🇷🇸🇦 Les frappes iraniennes ont également endommagé un avion avion de détection et de commandement américain E-3 Sentry AWACS.





Kataib Hezbollah just released footage of an FPV kamikaze drone flying inside the perimeter of the US Victory Base Complex near Baghdad International Airport. The drone flew undetected past the air defence umbrella, surveyed the base from inside, struck an AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel radar system, then a second drone hit a parked UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter. Direct impacts. On camera. The AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel is the radar that is supposed to detect the drone. The drone destroyed the system designed to see it coming. The Black Hawk costs $21 million. The FPV drone costs less than a thousand dollars. The footage shows both strikes from the drone’s own camera, first-person view, the pilot watching through goggles from a safe position in Iraqi territory as the drone navigates inside an American military installation and selects its targets. This is not a Shahed. This is not a cruise missile. This is not a ballistic trajectory that air defences are designed to intercept. This is a small, fast, manoeuvrable quadcopter guided by fiber-optic cable that makes it immune to electronic jamming, flying at treetop height through gaps in radar coverage that were designed for larger, slower, higher-altitude threats. The defensive architecture of Camp Victory was built for a different kind of weapon. The weapon has evolved. The architecture has not. The technology was born in Ukraine. FPV racing drones, originally designed for hobbyists, were adapted in mid-2022 into kamikaze weapons: strap explosives to a racing drone, fly it at a tank through first-person goggles. Hit rates exceeded 80 percent by 2023. By 2024, fiber-optic guidance replaced radio, making drones immune to jamming. By 2025, AI “last-mile” autonomy allowed operators to lock a target and let the drone finish independently. By March 2026, dual fiber-radio control was being tested in Ukraine, and the same technology had crossed to Iraqi militias inside an American base near Baghdad. The transfer chain is visible. Russia receives Shahed drones from Iran under the January 2025 strategic partnership. Russia provides Iran with satellite imagery, communication upgrades, navigation components, and Ukraine-tested tactics in return. China supplies BeiDou satellite navigation, kamikaze drone designs, rocket fuel chemicals, and dual-use components. The IRGC distributes the technology to proxies: Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq. Each proxy adapts the technology to its local theatre. The FPV that hit Camp Victory was assembled in Iraq using components that trace through at least three countries and two active wars. Two hours before the Camp Victory footage recirculated on March 25, an Iranian drone hit a fuel storage tank at Kuwait International Airport for the second time this month. Different weapon, same doctrine. The Shahed that hit Kuwait flies 185 kilometres per hour for 2,500 kilometres. The FPV that hit Camp Victory flies 400 kilometres per hour for 20 kilometres. One is a strategic saturation weapon designed to overwhelm air defences through volume. The other is a tactical precision weapon designed to fly under air defences through agility. Both arrived. Both hit their targets. Both were manufactured for a fraction of the cost of the systems designed to stop them. The $3 million Patriot interceptor versus the $20,000 Shahed. The $21 million Black Hawk versus the $800 FPV. The arithmetic does not require a defence analyst to understand. It requires a calculator. The drone war is no longer about whether the weapons arrive. It is about whether any air defence architecture designed before 2022 can stop what was designed after 2022. The footage from Camp Victory suggests the answer. open.substack.com/pub/shanakaans…























